GAO Criticizes DOD's Agent Orange Site Report

The Government Accountability Office has released its critical report entitled AGENT ORANGE: Actions Needed to Improve Accuracy and Communication of Information on Testing and Storage Locations."

Key point: Both VA and DOD have for decades relied on a fatally-flawed list prepared for DOD by Dr. Al Young, AKA "Dr. Orange." VA has employed his reports principally to deny veterans claiming exposure to Agent Orange. That's right...our famed nemesis has once again been found inadequate in the work he's done, while making millions from VA and DOD writing about this stuff. For years, VA adjudicators, the Board of Veterans Appeals and the US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims have wrongly denied claims from veterans who claim exposure in locations or situations not listed in Young's report. C-123 vets were also denied for years, but won our presumptive exposure ruling in June 2015...despite Young's ceaseless efforts against us.

The GAO reported it plainly: VA seized on Young's incomplete report to refuse medical care and other benefits to veterans claiming Agent Orange cancers, ALS, diabetes, heart disease and other ailments. And Young's report, along with lots of other material gathered by VA, was fatally flawed.

At the Veterans Benefits Administration "Agent Orange Desk" run by Mr. James Sampsel, (who himself officially stated that veterans' Agent Orange disabilities is only "hype and hysteria.") VA had its boiler-plate denial ready to shoot down each and every claim of Agent Orange exposure outside Vietnam, It is important to grasp the great reliance placed by VA on Young's work, and the equal fact that Young has consistently argued against the various foundations for veterans' Agent Orange claims. His 2006 report on Agent Orange sites is but one example of VA's obstruction that led to the GAO report.

Even if discouraged vets opted to appeal Sampsel's use of the Young report to oppose claims, the Board of Appeals for Veterans Claims (BVA) also relied on Young to prevent exposure claims. For example, read this November 2014 BVA denial:

"In fact, Dr. Young's report, which provides the most complete data available on this subject, expressly found that there was there were no documents or records to validate the use of Agent Orange in Okinawa. In this case, the Board finds the exhaustive searches and related findings conducted by the various agencies/entities outlined above, to be far more probative than the Veteran's baseless assertions that he was exposed to Agent Orange/herbicides in Okinawa. Notably, the Veteran has not submitted any medical reports/literature or other evidence to support his claim of exposure, or that otherwise contradict the above findings."

And this:

"Upon review of the Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange, which is part of the National Agricultural Library, the Department of Agriculture was unable to find any reference to the military use of any herbicidal agents, including Agents Orange and Blue, at Fort Jackson during the moving party's period of service. The motion for reversal or revision of the May 3, 2011 Board decision finding that the moving party was not entitled to service connection for diabetes mellitus, type 2, claimed as due to exposure to herbicides, is denied." 

Young's "expertise" on the Agent Orange topic was frequently cited in BVA denials:

"The RO associated with the record a February 2014 report entitled "Investigation into the Environmental Fate of TCDD/Dioxin" that listed Dr. Alvin L. Young as the primary author (the "February 2014 Report"). According to the attached biography, Dr. Young completed his PhD in herbicide physiology and environmental toxicology in 1968, and since then, has amassed more than 300 publications in the scientific literature, including five books on issues related to Agent Orange and/or dioxin. "

But neither the regional office claims adjudicators, nor the BVA, or even the US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims bother to report the full story about Young, his 2006 report, or relationship to Sampsel. The Young-VA-Agent Orange story includes many revealing points:

1. Young's work supports VA positions disputing Agent Orange exposure and harmful effects
2. Young famously wrote that Agent-Orange-exposed vets were"trash-haulers, freeloaders looking for a tax-free dollar from a sympathetic congressman. I have no respect."
3. Even Young agrees his 2006 report was inadequate, however he didn't do this until he sought yet another VA contract to update it. In other words, his report was okay unless he could make more money
4. As for money, Young agreed he's made "millions" writing reports for the VA and DOD. He also got a $600,000 no-bid-sole source contract mostly directed against C-123 veterans' claims
5. Even while under VA contract at $26,000/month, Young wrongly insisted he wasn't representing VA when he appeared before the National Academy of Medicine to oppose C-123 claims while also failing to reveal his contract and close coordination with VA for input to the Academy. Fortunately, the Academy found that his work, and other from VA and DOD, has been found to be incomplete and also it wrongly minimized veterans' harmful AO exposure risks

My advice to every vet whose claim was denied citing Young's report: appeal based on the now-established fact that the 2006 Young report has been found flawed.

official photo from AFPMB newsletter

Back to the GAO report itself. One key finding was that DOD, sponsor of Young's 2006 report, agreed that the report was flawed but couldn't identify any process to improve it. I'm reminded of my frequent requests to both DOD and VA to help add C-123 spray aircraft to the list, but each agency refused. DOD said it was VA's duty, VA said they simply used what DOD provided and couldn't change anything. My letters to the Armed Forces Pest Management Board, where Young has lectured, were met with refusals to get involved. Interestingly, even though Young has (or had) contracts with the AFPMB as recently as 2017, nothing about him is found in AFPMB files. Guess they don't read their own official newsletter–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––>

My 2013 letters to LtGen Judith Fedder, DCS/Logistics, Installations & Mission Support, were similarly rebuffed. She answered,

Very disappointing. Especially so, reading in the November 2018 GAO report that DOD finally has agreed.

Below: The GAO report's six key conclusions:

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment assigns responsibility for 

ensuring that DOD’s list of locations where Agent Orange or its 

components were tested and stored is as complete and accurate as 

available records allow. (Recommendation 1) 

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of
 Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment develops a process for
updating the revised list as new information becomes available.
(Recommendation 2)  

The Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs, should develop clear and transparent criteria for what constitutes 

a location that should be included on the list of testing and storage 

locations. (Recommendation 3) 

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretary of 

Defense, should develop clear and transparent criteria for what 

constitutes a location that should be included on the list of testing and 

storage locations. (Recommendation 4)

The Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs, should develop a formal process for coordinating on how best to 

communicate information to veterans and the public regarding where 

Agent Orange was known to have been present outside of Vietnam. 

(Recommendation 5)

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretary of 

Defense, should develop a formal process for coordinating on how best to 

communicate information to veterans and the public regarding where 

Agent Orange was known to have been present outside of Vietnam. 

(Recommendation 6)