Did USAF Decide to Save Money But Sacrifice Aircrews? Seems like it!

When C-23K Tail #362 ("Patches") was decontaminated at the USAF Museum, the cost for the commercial HAZMAT contractor was $60,000. A substantial sum!

Air Force paid that $60,000 because of everyone's overwhelming desire to keep the historical Patches in the Museum. The Air Force did not decontaminate any other C-123s. Faced with a potential $3.4 billion EPA illegal HAZMAT storage fine, in 2009 the Air Force opted to decontaminate by shredding and smelting all remaining aircraft at Davis-Monthan's Boneyard, turning them into aluminum blocks for the auto industry.

• Question: 
Since the Air Force knew the Agent Orange spray history of the ten or twelve former UC-123K spray birds as well as the results of the Conway report in 1979 (same year the Air Force Health Study began on Operation Ranch Hand veterans) why weren't all the airplanes properly decontaminated to protect aircrews and maintainers?

• Answers: 
1. Innocence and ignorance: In the '70s, there was growing concern about Agent Orange but little solid knowledge available to decision makers. Tests for deadly TCDD weren't even available in 1979 for the Conway report. Net result of the '79 test: (1) aircrew safety was assured (wrongly) and (2) aircrews were actually told the Air Force Material Command to continue scraping residue from nooks and crannies in the airplane, and to use air freshener to mask the nauseating stench, and scrub the C-123s with Dawn detergent. These steps all proved completely useless, as proven by the 1994 toxicological inspection of Patches that found it still "heavily contaminated with dioxin on all test surfaces" and "a danger to public health."
2. The end-of-life for the C-123 fleet was fast coming, and the Air Force was extremely hesitant to invest $60,000 for the couple years of remaining use of the transports.
3. Records vaguely suggest 24 UC-123K former Agent Orange spray birds were still in use by three squadrons. At $60,000 each, decontamination would cost the Air Force $1,400,000, plus it would take the airplanes out of service for an uncertain time.
4. The Big Reason*: if the Air Force moved to decontaminate the C-123s, it would be an announcement to the aircrews and maintainers that they'd already been exposed to deadly dioxin for several years. The illnesses and deaths of veterans between 1972 and whatever date a decontamination might occur would instantly have an association with Agent Orange exposure and veterans would apply to VA for disability benefits.

• Pound Wise-Penny Foolish!

Initially, the Air Force "saved" $1,400,000 by skipping the necessary decontamination of its C-123s. However, the June 2015 Interim Final Rule for C-123 veterans is estimated by the White House Office of Manpower and Budget to cost over $47,000,000 plus medical care. So the decision was a big money loser.

Worse, many of the two thousand men and women who volunteered to fly these aircraft now suffer the illnesses associated with long-term Agent Orange exposure. Although VA now might provide medical care and compensation, that is not worth cancers, heart disease, ALS, diabetes, soft tissue sarcoma and the other recognized Agent Orange illnesses.

* The Big Reason: a little background to prove the point:

In 2009 the Air Force was in turmoil about what to do with the toxic C-123s, known throughout the service as "the Agent Orange airplanes." The DOD consultant emphasized the potential for exposed veterans learning about their exposures and turning to the VA for earned benefits. Apparently this was something the Air Force felt best avoided, principally by destroying the surplus C-123s with as little visibility as possible.

Seeking Air Staff approval for the destruction, Air Force officials repeated the consultant's cautions, and as a result veterans did not learn for several years about the exposures they experienced in the 1972-1986 timeframe:

(from 505ACSS Position Paper, Mr. Buddy Boor, 5 Aug 2009)

The consultant is the same person named by Newsday (May 1 1985) who recommended all further testing on Agent Orange be discontinued:

 "White House scientist Alvin L. Young, a toxicologist, recommends that no further research on dioxin should be funded, "because research has failed to show it causes cancer or birth defects in humans."

Thankfully, his attempt to stop research on Agent Orange and its toxic component dioxin was not accepted, and over time a much fuller appreciation of the harm caused by Agent Orange developed.

C-123 Veterans Presentation to Institute of Medicine 16 January 2013

Fellow C-123 Veterans:

Opportunity: Friday I was informed by the Institute of Medicine, Agent Orange Committee (part of the National Academy of Sciences) that C-123 veterans have been scheduled for a brief afternoon presentation to the Committee to discuss C-123 Agent Orange contamination.

Background: Congress set up a process in which the VA must consider findings of the Institute of Medicine regarding Agent Orange issues. While their meeting on 16 January does not directly deal with our airplanes, it is our chance to bring the lingering contamination and the VA's stonewalling of our claims to their very public forum.

Under Secretary Allison Hickey

Many of the scientists who have weighed on to support us are well-known to the Committee. These scientists' letter of 29 November to the VA's Under Secretary for Benefits General Hickey firmly reenforced the basis for our VA claims, in particular the input from Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Professor Emerita at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health.

Dr. Stellman has been a firm supporter of C-123 veterans for this past year, ever since her first independent expert review of the many Air Force tests on Patches and other aircraft. Although the young scientists assigned by the VA to refuse our claims have tried to dismiss Dr. Stellman's findings, the Institute of Medicine knows her very, very well. Her work is cited throughout many of their reports, she has appeared as an exert witness many times, and has also been contracted to do many research projects on Agent Orange as used during the Vietnam War. Conclusion: she knows her stuff and blows away the VA's wonks...they just don't know it! Interesting that none of the VA scientists are cited in these reports. On the other hand, Dr. Stellman and the other experts (from other federal agencies as well as numerous universities) are perfectly objective as scientists and physicians, they have studied the C-123 exposure issue, formed their opinions, which are in favor of the veterans, and they defend that position (and us!) mightily. The only possible response from the VA is to ignore the letter, of course. No surprise. One gets the impression the VA respects only those experts employed by them, whose job it is to construct barriers to veterans' claims. 

Request: We need a volunteer speaker!

We continue to seek venues such as this with the IOM to set right our unfortunate situation - we've been exposed and nothing will change that, yet our duty remains getting our veterans essential care for the typical Agent Orange ailments confronting us. Our Association is looking for one of our vets in the Irvine area to represent us at the University of California meeting on January 16, 2013. If we don't find a "volunteer", I'll do it, flying there from Denver where we're vacationing with our kids. If one of you airline-types can still fit onto a jump seat, want to take this on and save me the airfare? I'll do an outline if you wish, and even text the entire presentation - the IOM has offered to print and distribute to the Committee for us, and place it into their conference records.

Let me know...I have to get my flight and hotel reservation if nobody signs up to volunteer.

Christmas suddenly and horribly changed for so many Connecticut families in Newtown. God bless and keep them all. 

Peace.

VA Releases Newest C-123 Exposure Denials

In their most recent Internet posting, the VA's Public Health Division incorporates the results of the Air Force C-123 Agent Orange Report. In it they construct a false argument that crews weren't exposed when in fact, all scientific opinion is that we were! Three AF conclusions are cited by VA in their post and both the VA and AF have twisted scientific FACTS 180 degrees to deny the truth - aircrews WERE indeed exposed! (see their points below):

1. There indeed wasn't enough information or data to conclude how much any individual was exposed, but that cannot truthfully be used to deny that any of us were actually exposed. The lack of abundant data cannot be used to disprove a hypothesis when there is ample data indicating the certainty of exposure
2. Exposure in these aircraft was certainly more intense during Vietnam, and Ranch Hand aircrews were more greatly exposed, but this point cannot be used to create the false impression that post-Vietnam aircrews weren't also exposed - according to experts and testing data over the years, crews were exposed at a level greatly exceeding exposure by ground forces during the war
3. All evidence points to the fact that aircrews and maintenance personnel were indeed exposed to Agent Orange (TCDD) at an unsafe level, according to the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

Conclusion: VA Public Health is dedicated to preventing C-123 veterans' Agent Orange exposure claims, and to preventing any vet's case-by-case evaluation which may introduce the truth!

Here is the VA Internet post of 20 June which incorporates mistakes from the AF Report:

Some Veterans who were crew members on C-123 Provider aircraft, formerly used to spray Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, have raised health concerns about exposure to residual amounts of herbicides on the plane surfaces.

VA’s Office of Public Health thoroughly reviewed all available scientific information regarding the exposure potential. We concluded that the potential of long-term health effects for the post-Vietnam crews that flew or maintained these planes was extremely low and therefore, the risk of long-term health effects is minimal.

Testing for Agent Orange residue on planes used in Vietnam

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) collected and analyzed numerous samples from C-123 aircraft to test for Agent Orange. USAF's recent risk assessment report (April 27, 2012) (2.3 MB, PDF) found that potential exposures to Agent Orange in C-123 planes used after the Vietnam War were unlikely to have put aircrew or passengers at risk for future health problems. The report’s three conclusions:

1. There was not enough information and data to conclude how much individual persons would have been exposed to Agent Orange.

2.   It is expected that exposure to Agent Orange in these aircraft after the Vietnam War was lower than exposure during the spraying missions in Vietnam.

3.  Potential Agent Orange exposures were unlikely to have exceeded standards set by regulators or to have put people at risk for future health problems.

How Veterans may have been exposed

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Air Force used C-123 aircraft to spray Agent Orange to clear jungles that provided enemy cover in Vietnam. At the end of the spraying campaign in 1971, the remaining C-123 planes were reassigned to reserve units in the U.S. for routine cargo and medical evacuation missions spanning the next 10 years.

Crew members aboard one of these post-Vietnam C-123 planes reported smelling strong odors, which raised concerns about Agent Orange exposure – but Agent Orange is odorless. These odors may have come from various chemicals associated with aircraft.

Health effects of Agent Orange residue

The health effects of exposure to Agent Orange residue on airplanes differ from direct contact with liquid Agent Orange. In liquid or spray form, Agent Orange can enter the body through inhalation or ingestion (such as hand-to-mouth contact or getting into food). But in the dry form – for example, adhered to a surface – Agent Orange residue cannot be inhaled or absorbed through the skin, and would be difficult to ingest.

The potential for health effects depends on the amount of Agent Orange present, as well as its ability to enter the body. After reviewing available scientific reports, VA has concluded that the exposure potential in these planes was extremely low and therefore, the risk of long-term health effects is minimal. Even if crew exposure did occur, it is unlikely that sufficient amounts of dried Agent Orange residue could have entered the body to have caused harm.

Research studies on Agent Orange

Research on the health effects of Agent Orange has been extensive and it continues. Diverse populations have been studied, including herbicide sprayers and manufacturers, other Vietnam-era Veterans, and those exposed during industrial accidents. This information helps us to determine what potential health effects may be related to different levels of exposure.

Find out more about research on health effects of Agent Orange.

VA benefits

If you have health concerns about Agent Orange, talk to your health care provider or local VA Environmental Health Coordinator.

Veterans not enrolled in the VA health care system, find out if you qualify for VA health care.

Although the risk of long-term health problems from exposure to Agent Orange residue on post-Vietnam C-123 airplanes is minimal, Veterans who believe they have exposure-related health problems may file a claim for disability compensation. These claims will be decided on a case-by-case basis.

USAF School of Aerospace Medicine Releases C-123 Agent Orange Letter

The Commander, USAF School of Aerospace Medicine has finally released the long-awaited examination of the C-123 Agent Orange contamination issue and it is totally lackluster! A buck-passer. Actually, a stab in the back of all C-123 veterans! (update: on 18 Jun 2015 VA agreed with the Institute of Medicine that this USAF report was scientifically and mathematically flawed)

The USAFSAM spent several months looking over earlier toxicologist's testing of the C-123 fleet, particularly Patches (Tail #362) which had the most documented contamination by dioxin left over from Operation Ranch Hand in Vietnam. Released by the unit's commander, a physician, no note is made of the individual researchers who worked on the study, unlike most other such reports. 
For our veterans, this is a tremendous disappointment. The errors abound and are certain to be brought up in other forums, particularly the Senate and the VA itself.
Here's our take on the report. First, it is not new science or research, but rather an examination of earlier tests and reports because all the subject aircraft have been destroyed - because they were toxic! The report is written by a physician, not a scientist. If there were professional toxicologists or other scientists, their names were left off the report. Our points are:

1. The report fails to state that the ten years exposure inside the aircraft for the crews would be more harmful than levels of TCDD as detected twelve and 27 years after the airplanes retired - one should assume, though here they did not, that contamination was more intense in the years before authoritative testing was done

2. The report does give some wiggle room, if they'd use it, for the VA and the IOM to provide benefit of the doubt for crews. In the Blue Water Navy situation the VA went with the IOM simply because of the IOM statement that sailor's exposure couldn't be ruled out - here, the contamination is confirmed but a misleading conclusion invented out of the true facts to offer a pretense that exposure, miraculously, wasn't likely to be damaging in the long-term. This will be interesting news to the world's toxicologists!

3. Great weight is given the results of the 2009 tests conducted at Davis-Monthan, yet the author of that report told veterans that no conclusions should be drawn regarding dioxin exposure from his data. Further, even those tests confirm TCDD presence - 27 years after the aircraft were stored in the Arizona desert. Again, one reasonable conclusion would be that those 27 years in storage, preceded by ten years of our flying, allowed TCDD to degrade and allowed the TCDD to be released via wind and rain (which freely enters this old aircraft - famously, the crews wore raincoats flying it especially in the cargo area!) No report specifies the degree of contamination which existed in 1972 when stateside crews started flying these aircraft - no attempt was made to provide a retrospective analysis of the earlier levels of our exposure

4. The 1994 and 1996 Air Force tests, done by the military's own toxicologists, are mentioned but dismissed. Here, an excuse to discard these early results was the cautious statement by the researchers that further testing would be necessary to fully characterize the contamination - logical enough but not an excuse to dismiss the results! These original 1994 researchers did, very clearly, establish to their professional satisfaction the fact that the cabin and flight deck were "heavily contaminated" on 100% of their test surfaces, and this damning characterization was noted in today's release - then dismissed without justification

5. No mention is given of the testimony of Dr. Ron Porter, AF toxicologist from the AF Armstrong Labs who also co-authored the 1994 and 1996 tests, where he swore under oath the C-123 fleet was "a danger to public health" such that they couldn't be used or sold

6. No mention is made of the fact that Patches at the Air Force Museum took three separate decontamination procedures before it was reasonably safe to place inside the facility - but crews flew this specific aircraft for a decade, over twelve years before this testing - and others in the fleet were even more contaminated!

7. No weight is given to the fact that contamination of the C-123 would have to be more intense as post-Vietnam crews began flying them in 1972, and more intense before the veterans' own repeated efforts to decontaminate the airplane - many AF documents detail the early scrapping and washing of Patches and the other aircraft, removing gooey black substances, scrubbing with Dawn detergent as directed by AFMC Warner-Robbins - the airplanes would necessarily then have been more contaminated in 1972 before any testing which was first done in 1979 (and that was not a test for dioxin, only military herbicides which were confirmed to be present)

8. No mention is made of the ATSDR letter nor are the points of Dr. Sink's letter dealt with. He says the AF and VA have both contacted him and wishes the C-123 veterans "good luck", and stands behind his letter

9. And the big point: The report says not enough data could be located to draw a conclusion about aircrew exposure, but still it draws the conclusion that the aircrews were not exposed to enough for long-term health problems. This is a set of statements 180 degrees apart from one another
10. Various laws dealing with exposure to agents used in Vietnam generally group them as "military herbicides" - every single test done on these aged airplanes has confirmed the contamination of them by "military herbicides" - a fact not even touched upon in today's reports

C-123 veterans believe the AF is justifiably concerned about earlier sales of the C-123s to Disney Films and to South Korea and Thailand through the AF Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson. A bit embarrassing to tell another government we sold them dioxin-contaminated airplanes. This report has chewed over what old data could be uncovered, dismissed the military's own test conclusions, and constructed a denial of the aircraft even being contaminated!

Why didn't they simply say enough doubt exists to extend the benefit of the doubt, or clearly state there is a possibility, through remote to some degree, of aircrew exposure?

C-123 veterans agree with the report's conclusions that it would be virtually impossible for patients, paratroops, cargo attendants, and other passengers to have had any exposure. Veterans, however, feel strongly that the aircrews, maintainers and aerial port personnel absolutely were exposed.

Colonel Christian Benjamin, USAF MC CFS

Tell us, Colonel Benjamin. If these aircraft were being delivered to AFMC today, would you find them airworthy and safe for flight? Would any of these veterans' illnesses today been less likely to manifest themselves if they hadn't been exposed to such long-term duties aboard this "danger to public health?"

Frankly, this report smells of VA editing all over the place. Unwarranted assumptions are injected to construct an artifice that denies aircrew exposure, and obvious facts are ignored.  Maybe USAFSAM and AFMC leadership should have added their signatures to Colonel Benjamin's. Should USAFSAM welcome VA into to the Wright-Patterson blue-suit "Band of Brothers?"

AF Museum Confirms Patches Dioxin Decontamination (Tail 362)

In his response to our letter asking about Patches and the dioxin contamination discovered on it during the 1994 testing cycle, the Director of the National Museum of the Air Force, LtGen John Hudson responded:

"It is my understanding that long before my tenure as Director the aircraft ("Patches", C-123K Tail #362) was found to be contaminated with dioxin, was de-contaminated by a contractor, and determined to be clean and safe to human health".

Nothing dramatic here, as the airplane has been tested over the years by the Air Force and found to be "heavily contaminated" in 100% of the swipe samples, but we are grateful for General Hudson not taking the now-standard dodge of referring our veterans to the VA for the VA's automatic denials. 


Thanks, General. That's called leadership. Its what you rightfully demanded of us and what we rightfully expect of you and our other leaders.