C-123 Exposure Claims - The Effort Makes No Sense Any Longer

One thousand three hundred days.

That's the VA's wait between their blanket policy-driven illegal and automatic denial of every C-123 Agent Orange exposure claim and the hoped-for resolution finally offered by the Board of Veterans Appeals.

That means we're looking at over two years (720 days) for our claims' automatic denial, just for the privilege of then waiting nearly three years for a BVA to set things right at last...over five years wasted (2,080 days, or more.) After seven or so years there'll be a catch-up check, but that doesn't make up for seven years of denied VA medical care, no pharmacy, no rehab, no prosthetics, no dental or eye, nothing. Nothing. A catch-up check won't make up for seven years of denied life-saving medical care for a veteran, or for the financial ruin brought on a family waiting so long. So terribly long.

I don't know about the rest of you but this is crushing...so profoundly depressing I would need to look for the right, dark, hopeless words but they don't exist anyway.

We're in our mid-to-late '60s, so submitting an Agent Orange exposure claim now means in five to six years, thus we're past the average man's life expectancy, and perhaps eventually there may be a big brown envelope announcing a VA disability decision for the widow to open.

Six years is an impossibly long time for a sick vet to wait to get in front of a VA doctor. Thats a long time to wait for help with prescription expenses. That's terribly long time to suffer the financial impact of severe illness, denied all state and federal benefits due disabled veterans. Frankly, those years are years better spent focused on health and family issues. It is a very long time, and that's a skillfully managed part of the VA claims process. The Vietnam War vets call it "waiting for an army to die." Good point. Right on.

Should we give it up? I wish I had, two years ago. I had other stuff to do with my family.

Let's face it. The USAFSAM and HQ/AFMC people at Wright-Pat knew what they were doing in restricting all C-123K herbicide contamination information in their "official use only"(per the USAF Office of Environmental Law) secret file cabinet back in 1996. We never knew what we'd gone through flying the C-123Ks for a decade.

Then, in 2011, the VA beat us to the punch with their staff in VBA and VHA sneaking in that Society of Toxicology poster on "exposure," showing them ready to redefine law, medicine, science and ethics in their determination, ready to get rid of us.

As VBA Compensation and Pension Service told us, "Go somewhere else." As VHA (Dr Michael Peterson, Chief Consultant, Post-Deployment Health) told us, "We all die." VBA even ordered claims denied writing "TCDD has not been shown to cause harm." Amazing...Agent Orange is "harmless", so claims are denied. And besides, claims denied "because (non-existent) VA regulations do not permit" C-123 claims, so VA's Deputy Director Post Deployment Health orders C-123 vets barred even from Agent Orange Registry exams! (telecon w/Major W. Carter)

We innocently thought we'd show them truth in facts and figures, offer scientific and medical support from other federal agencies and our physicians, fill out their forms and sit back for good VA government staffers to do the right thing. Wrong.

We didn't understand the wall of prejudice we were to face...of VA executives willing to write deceptive answers to congressional leaders, of Air Force executives willing to deceive senators asking about aircraft contamination by answering that the aircraft were "safe in their present configuration," – which was smelted aluminum ingots, the fleet of C-123Ks having been destroyed as toxic waste two years earlier.

Little did we know the automatic reaction at 810 Vermont was not only "NO" but "HELL NO. No Way. Never. Not on my watch! Go elsewhere. Cannot permit!" Whatever their motivation is with denying Freedom of Information of requests and otherwise  obstructing our rights under the law isn't an issue.

The issue is that their instructions to the regional offices to deny all claims dooms us just as completely as if we'd never applied in the first place. Believe me, they wish we'd gone away years ago - their C-123 "final solution." Through our United States Senators, Secretary Shinseki promises us careful, individual evaluations, but then VA provides their rating officials boilerplate language to deny each and every claim, stating "Regulations do not permit us to concede exposure." And there are no such regulations, of course...just words VA enjoys typing to deny claims.

Deny, deny until they die. And die we do. Paul, Bob, General Mike, Doc Warner, Gabby, Jim, Mayleen, Lou, and all the others.

A veteran couldn't meet a better nurse or doctor than at the VA medical center. Praise God for each and every one of them, and tell the President the nation should be proud of these dedicated health professionals.

The rest of the VA bunch, those whose job it is to prevent veterans' claims, are not worth writing about. The hell with it. Let's just drop the misery of it.

Preventing claims is VBA's profession, Job One! They do it so very, very expertly, for all but the claims forced on them by law. Any wiggle room, any judgement call, any interpretation required means a denied claim and another VA victory. If laws and Title 38 can be ignored to deny claims...victory. If requirements spelled out in the Federal Register can be ignored to deny claims...victory, sweet victory for VA. And even worse for veterans, VA will ignore their own staff physicians, even if internationally recognized as Agent Orange researchers and professors of medicine as well as VA senior staff.

"Mission accomplished" to VBA means claim denied or a vet passing on while waiting for word. We can't win...they'll just keep obstructing and delaying until the last of us is dead. This is why VA employees draw their paychecks, and how their accomplishments are measured for performance bonuses.

VBA knows the longer they keep us from medical care the faster our demise due to lack of medical care. From their perspective, the sooner the better.

To VBA, a live veteran is a waste of space.

I'll say it again. The 1991 Agent Orange Act and Title 38 spell out that military herbicide exposed veterans will be granted service connection for Agent Orange-presumptive illnesses. The Federal Register of 8 May 2001 page 23166 details it further...exposed veterans will be treated the same as Vietnam War veterans. Exposure to military herbicides...the only proof a veteran need provide besides his medical diagnosis.

That's why VA pretends there is no exposure, and in doing so defies official conclusions that C-123 veterans have indeed been exposed...proofs from the NIH, CDC, EPA, US Public Health Service, USAF and others. VA does this by their own, in-house redefinition of "exposure," a definition adding the word "bioavailability" and an act challenged by the National Institutes of Health/National Toxicology Program's Dr. Linda Birnbaum and also by the CDC/Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.

These proofs from other agencies will spell success for C-123 claims once at the Board of Veterans Appeals...for the veterans who survive their cancers and heart conditions those extra three to five years!

Petition to US Senate: VA Must Care for C-123 Veterans

Click to Sign C-123 Petition to Senate

Please CLICK TO READ OUR PETITION - Sign if you wish.

Taking advantage of wonderful social media such as Google's Blogger and YouTube has helped get our message out to over 80,000 visitors. Today we add another useful tool, the petition services of CHANGE.ORG. We created a brief petition to the Senate Veterans Affairs committee, asking that they direct VA to treat C-123 veterans in accordance with the benefits we have earned under the law.

Please consider signing it, and please consider forwarding it to others for their support as well.

USAF Cheats on FOIA Response - then USAF Demands Return of FOIA Response

What a comedy of errors! The C-123 Veterans Association submitted an FOIA in August 2012 for everything associated with the Air Force C-123 Consultative Letter. That letter was a messed-up analysis of the aircraft's contamination and twisted conclusion that veterans somehow were not exposed to Agent Orange.

The request was approved completely – documentation, correspondence, recordings, emails...everything was to be released within the required response time of 20 days. What we got, however, after waiting 347 days, was a CD loaded with a bunch of decades-old records and a single page related to the massive study - and not even a copy of that study! That's not good, because the Freedom of Information Act assures us that citizens have a right to this information, and the FOIA is an important cornerstone of American democracy, according to the Congress, the Supreme Court and the President. Hey, Air Force - its the law!

But apparently not an important enough law to the folks at Wright-Patterson AFB. They feel free to delay as they wish, and to withhold information as they wish, even about this 60-year-old warplane. Apparently, something in the issue embarrasses the Air Force in some way, or there is something which needs being covered up (from their perspective) and that (from their perspective) makes it perfectly okay to sneer at our rights.

But the joke - FOIA officials at Wright-Patterson AFB almost immediately demanded RETURN of their CD. Seems they inadvertently included a full page of civilian employees' Social Security numbers. The same error as I'd pointed out to them two years ago, but this time we'd posted the CD of information before we noticed their problem (and immediately informed the 88th FOIA officials, of course) so it was out for all the world to see, and now AF has to find those employees and do a big mea culpa.

USAF CHEATS on C-123 Freedom of Information Act Request

Today a CD with about 500 mg of test reports and other materials was received in response

to our 1 August 2012 FOIA submitted to the USAF Surgeon General and the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, part of the Air Force Material Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The basic subject was the 2012 USAF Consultatative Letter dealing with post-Vietnam C-123 contamination and veteran exposure.

Requested those ten and a half months ago were public documents, already gathered in one place as per the orders given the AFMC earlier, so finding everything shouldn't have proved difficult.

(Click for Video on this Subject) What does seem to be difficult was letting go of the information, despite the force of law in the FOIA. Over six weeks were required for the AFMC Judge Advocate General attorneys to select what few items they'd approve for release. A single sheet of paper was all that C-123 veterans were permitted to get, and that was simply a note from one office at Wright-Pat to a JAG at Davis-Monthan asking for some copies of old records.

What did the AF keep from the public? They failed to release the following items listed in the FOIA, which itself was earlier approved without exception, other than for irrelevant personal information such as telephone numbers and names of junior personnel:

-marginal notations ==kept secret

-interim and final reports==kept secret

-emails===kept secret

-tapes or other recordings===kept secret

-correspondence==kept secret except for a single page letter===kept secret

-other official documents, many of which we first provided USAFSAM===kept secret

The FOIA response didn't even include the report itself, nor the instructions to the team, nor their work product...nothing at all. The materials were vital to help us challenge the various mistakes the AF made in concluding that our decade flying the toxic, Agent Orange-contaminated C-123 left us somehow unexposed. We veterans believe, especially considering the expert input we've received from other federal agencies confirming our dioxin exposure, that USAFSAM must have had command interference to reach any alternate position.The AF Consultative Letter is cited by the VA in their over-eager rejection of all C-123 veterans claims, and we needed this to better challenge the mistakes in it. But... KEPT SECRET for reasons that must be VERY important at WPAFB and the USAF Surgeon General!

This reeks! What in the heck is going on, with the VA responding in a similar manner stating that, although the VA had conducted a "thorough scientific review" no materials existed within VA regarding that thorough scientific review of the C-123 -- yet the VA has enough materials somewhere to permit them to deny veterans benefits! And now the AF doing much the same, releasing only older papers which generally address Agent Orange issues from the beginning of the Vietnam War until around the late 1990's. Absolutely nothing except a single page addressing the Consultative Letter and how it came to be so anti-veteran! 

Truly, this reeks! Something very unusual is going on to force otherwise responsible Air Force civilians and military personnel to disregard laws like the FOIA! 

HEY, VA and USAF: We veterans have a RIGHT, claimed here under the FOIA regardless of your preference to such hide such things (FOIA be damned, right?? Ain't no stinkin' law gonna bother you, right??) and thus to know the foundation of your schemes to turn us away from the doors of our VA hospitals as we seek Agent Orange medical care!

Anybody remember in some high school civics class long, long ago when we were fed the line about the people being sovereign, not the government? Anybody remember "support and defend the Constitution" in our oaths?

VA & Army Seek C-123 Source Documents

In his letter to The C-123 Veterans Association dated 4 December 2012, the Director of the Army's Joint Services Records Research Center defended his agency's responses to inquiries about C-123 issues from the Veterans Administration. [CLICK HERE for our response, mailed 31 Jan 2013]

Director Dominic Baldini explained that when JSRRC is asked to provide information about  veteran's service they consult unit histories to form their response. Baldini further explained "it is not the JSRRC's mission to conduct scientific studies or research of this nature or comprehensive scientific literature or documentation reviews." He does, however, promise "if during the course of unit records reviews in individual claims, the JSRRC finds information, however indicative, to any degree, of AO exposure to C-123 air crew members, we would immediately notify our VA contacts."

This is reassuring. What is not reassuring, however, is the fact that twice our Association has provided just those essential source documents to the JSRRC! Of course, because concerns about Agent Orange were not known in the 1972-1982 timeframe when unit histories would have made mention of the issue, we had to turn to other official documents. We provided flight orders showing tail numbers of aircraft, AFMC records from Davis-Monthan detailing which aircraft were known to be spray aircraft, reports from other federal agencies such as the CDC/ATSDR stating that C-123 aircrews were exposed! How much more could Mr. Bonomi demand?

Further, I am confused about how JSRRC could have ignored the initial, 1979 testing on Patches, so clearly documented at both AMC and USAFSAM. The additional testing at The Air Force Museum further substantiated the contamination, and that report was overlooked also. As was all the documentation from Hill AFB and Davis-Monthan.

Confusing.

Conclusion: Get them even more data. Get it from our members, from the 439th and other units which flew the post-Vietnam C-123 fleet, and get it from HQ AFRC. To do this well, I need EVERYONE's collection of official documents, such as flight orders, Form 5s and anything showing tail numbers and units to which the airplanes were assigned. Now, if you can...pretty please?

Otherwise, JSRRC will happily continue to screw every single C-123 claim we submit to the VA!

Veterans Last to know! Timeline of the C-123 Agent Orange Deception

History of the C-123 Agent Orange Contamination 

1972-1982...C-123 warplanes' continued service after Vietnam Agent Orange spray missions (1961-1971).

1978...First known C-123 veteran's Agent Orange illnesses surfaced (peripheral neuropathy) but not understood to be caused by Agent Orange at the time.

1979...Military herbicide residue was first confirmed to contaminate C-123 aircraft.

1983...First C-123 Agent Orange death (MSgt Robert Boyd, ischemic heart disease).

Smelting C-123 (USAF photo)

1994...Agent Orange contamination of C-123 warplanes became known to officials in the Air Force. Decision made not to inform exposed C-123 veterans.

1996...Air Force JAG directed all Agent Orange contamination in the C-123 be "kept in official channels only."

2010...All remaining C-123 warplanes destroyed as "toxic waste" with special measures to minimize publicity.

2011...Using Freedom of Information Act veterans uncover details confirming C-123 Agent Orange contamination.

2011...Office of Secretary of Defense privately slurs C-123 veterans as "trash haulers, freeloaders looking for a tax-free dollar from sympathetic congressmen."

2012...Veterans Administration official notifies C-123 veterans Agent Orange isn't actually harmful, so there was no exposure to any C-123 veteran, and VA will bar all C-123 veterans from all medical care for Agent Orange illnesses.

C-123 Veterans Respond to VA Undersecretary Allison Hickey

Voice of the 74th AES, 731st TAS & 901st OMS

Honorable Allison Hickey
Undersecretary for Benefits

The Undersecretary for Benefits Allison Hickey graciously wrote us about the VA's perspective on C-123 veteran exposure to dioxin. We disagree in many places with General Hickey's letter but much appreciate the attention she has given our situation. We ask for reconsideration in our response to her, posted below:

(continued to page 6...click to read further)

Ah, the smell! Malathion or Dioxin? Does it even matter?

One of the first lessons our C-123 veterans learned about Agent Orange contamination in the airplanes, especially in Patches, was that dioxin is odorless. What we were smelling wasn't dioxin but instead, malathion residue from Patches' insecticide spray missions over Vietnam.

Thus, many "experts" dismissed our dioxin exposure claims when we brought up the foul smell by pointing out this error. However...the smell indeed does indicate the persistence of the Agent Orange contamination.

Why, or how? We veterans don't dispute the lesson learned regarding where the terrible smells came from...it was very probably the malathion. We contend, however, that if the malathion persisted to the point of sickening the crew as it did so often, and if it forced us to fly with the heat off or even the cockpit windows open, or even avoid scheduling the aircraft altogether, that dioxin had to be present in significant quantities.

Our maintenance folks like Charlie Fusco remind us of countless efforts at cleaning Patches. Of scraping that black or dark brown "goop" with putty knives and screwdrivers to get rid of it. Of tech bulletins from Warner-Robins detailing cleaning instructions with specific detergents and even the recommendation in 1979 by Air Force toxicologists that it would probably be necessary to remove the wings and remove the cargo deck to get out enough of the "goop" to improve the situation.

We are also reminded that, in Vietnam, the malathion missions by Patches were after her years of spraying Agent Orange.

It is clear that Agent Orange "goop" got mixed in with malathion "goop". The Air Force tests on Patches in 1979 and 1994 confirmed, in the words of the toxicologists, that the airplane remained "heavily contaminated" with dioxin despite all efforts over the ten years we flew her, and despite all the efforts of the Ranch Hand crews to keep her clean, and despite at least one depot-level maintenance and cleaning cycle that we know of...there were perhaps more. It even took three decontamination efforts on Patches at Wright-Patterson before the airplane was reasonably safe to enter.

How can any VA administrator or physician fail to see we were exposed?

Eventually one of our veteran's claims will reach the Board of Veterans Appeals or the US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims! There, the justice of our exposure claim will be clear. The Air Force tests over several decades. The Air Force efforts by AFMC JAG to restrict the contamination information to "official channels only." The Air Force decision to quarantine the contaminated airplanes at the Davis-Monthan Bone Yard. The Air Force decision, approved by the Air Staff, to destroy the remaining airplanes because of the lingering contamination and the threat of an EPA $3.4 billion fine. The multitude of independent scientific opinions confirming our exposure. The finding by the CDC/ATSDR that aircrews were exposed to 200x the Army's TG312 cancer screening threshold. The finding by Dr. Jeanne Stellman that our aircrews were exposed to as much or more dioxin than ground troops during Vietnam. It will be clear that our aircrews have met the VA's "as likely to as not" exposure requirement with more evidence than any veterans population except the guys in Ranch Hand.

It will be quite revealing - and frightening - when one of our veteran's claims before the court is from a female crewmember. Remember that dioxin accumulates in body fat, and has a half-life of about seven to ten years. Remember, dear VA, that once a woman is exposed to dioxin as in our airplanes, the dioxin is concentrated and can be passed on via lactation after childbirth. Remember that numerous scientific studies establish the dermal route of dioxin exposure, despite the VA pretense of the human skin being a 'near-perfect barrier." Washington State University's recent study revealed:

Dioxin builds up in the body and has up to a decade-long half-life in humans, so scientists say a woman who becomes pregnant even 20 years after exposure is at risk of transmitting the consequences of her exposure to later generations.

So we must ask, "why can't the VA permit the individual veteran's claim to be accepted without challenge to the issue of exposure?"

New Agent Orange Exposure Studies Requested

In addition to the request filed with the US Army's Directorate for Risk Assessment , similar applications have been filed for investigations by the National Industrial Occupational Health Administration (part of the CDC) and an independent scientific agency, the Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment (TERA). TERA has been asked to evaluate the USAF report on C-123 contamination and its relevance to aircrew exposure to Agent Orange. Our veterans can only hope that TERA accepts this challenging responsibility!

The Army Directorate for Risk Assessment earlier published the famous TG312, the technical guide to assessment of worker contaminants exposure. TG312 has been cited by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in their letter confirming the likely exposure of aircrews and maintenance personnel assigned to the C-123 to dioxin remaining from the aircraft's Vietnam War missions. Further, TG312 was cited by each of the university-based experts who weighed in to support the veterans' claims of having been exposed to the deadly herbicide. Such experts have further claimed that C-123 aircrews (1970 to 1980) were even more severely exposed than nearly all Vietnam War veterans!

Davis-Monthan DAF Employees in Required C-123 HAZMAT Protection

The VA and USAF have disagreed. Faced with the alternative of admitting that they'd sold these dioxin-contaminated aircraft to Walt Disney for movies, and to Thailand and South Vietnam for their militaries, the USAF took a middle-of-the-road approach in their evaluation of the C-123 risks, opining that they could not confirm or deny exposure, but then somehow concluded that aircrew exposure was "unlikely." Of course, having destroyed all the contaminated aircraft in 2010, they've made their limpid position difficult to challenge. All the aircraft were very quietly destroyed on order of the Air Force Material Command and approved by the Air Staff...that is, all were destroyed except for the souvenirs kept by the inspectors themselves (who certified the complete destruction of the airplanes...so destruction complete except for their private, personal and improperly kept souvenirs?)

The VA, faced with the costs of providing medical care for the exposed veterans, quickly prepared their opinion denying veterans' exposure, and did so in the face of toxicology tests completed by the Air Force's Armstrong Labs in which the airplanes were tested as "heavily contaminated" and about which the USAF scientists testified were "a danger to public health." The VA even challenged the industry-standard method by which the Air Force tests were conducted, and concluded the aircraft were not contaminated "enough" to affect veterans' health. This position staggered professional toxicologists - was the VA suggesting a threshold of dioxin exposure, or describing a situation where workers could perform their duties in a dioxin-contaminated aircraft and somehow not be exposed?? Is VA unaware of decisions that NO LEVEL OF DIOXIN is considered "safe" - decisions reached by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) as well as the US Environmental Protection Agency?

Any such "ignorance" seems highly unlikely since these agencies' documents were cited by both the AF and the VA! Any attempt to now claim that the C-123 didn't have enough dioxin to potentially cause harm to aircrews is clearly an equivocation - an attempt to worm their way out of having to care for our veterans' Agent Orange-caused illnesses!

Why can't we get Senator Gillibrand to stand up for us as has Senator Burr?

AF Surgeon's Office Briefs Sen. Burr's Staff & C-123 Veterans

Yesterday, a very well prepared team from the AF Surgeon's Office briefed Senator Burr's staff  about their 27 April 2012 report dealing with C-123 aircrew dioxin exposure. A lot of effort went into their participation and the C-123 Veterans Association extends thanks to the Air Force Surgeon General as well as Senator Burr's staff.

Joining the teleconference were Dr. Richard Clapp (Professor Emeritus Boston University School of Public Health) and Dr. Jeanie Stellman (Professor Emerita Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health). These dedicated scientists, so familiar with Agent Orange issues, helped C-123 veterans better understand both the Air Force report and the earlier VA report.

During this meeting, the Air Force briefers explained:

• the report was prepared by "tens" of experts from various health professions assigned to the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Released over the signature of USAFSAM's commander, the report correctly reflects the professional opinion of each of the various experts who contributed to it. Drafts of earlier versions or of the final staff report submitted to USAFSAM/CC prior to the published version will not be made available
• USAFSAM undertook the project partly to gather all relevant information, provide an analysis, and make it all available to the public
• complete and thorough release of materials from all Air Force sources was provided; no documents were withheld from USAFSAM researchers by any source, including Davis-Monthan and Hill.
• USAFSAM was unable to determine any particular individual or group exposure, lacking an adequate population for an epidemiological study and having to rely on reports done over the decades since concerns first surfaced about C-123 Agent Orange contamination (the aircraft having been since destroyed)
• the briefers twice stressed their report was unable to make a finding about whether or not individual or occupational groups were exposed. Yet in very stark contrast to that claim of indecision or neutrality, the report reads "At this time, we conclude that the discernible information suggests the potential Agent Orange exposures...were unlikely to have exceeded acceptable regulatory standards or to have predisposed persons in either group to experience future adverse outcomes."
• the executive summary's finding of "unlikely" exposure contrasts with the report's conclusion in 4(d), "is is reasonable to conclude that it is not possible to derive quantitative estimates of any increased health risks for those individuals". If that is the case, why did the report earlier deny any likelihood of such exposure? Shouldn't any such indecision result in the benefit of the doubt given the veterans?
• the pivotal 1994 Weisman/Porter survey of Patches for the Air Force Museum concluded the aircraft was "heavily contaminated" but from the perspective of extensive restoration (grinding, ripping out insulation, fabric, etc.)
• the Air Force briefers suggest the report was not written for guidance of other agencies, such as the Veterans Administration, and that the VA would likely evaluate C-123 veterans' claims "on an individual basis." We explained that VA has already cited the AF report as decisive evidence against C-123 veterans' exposure to dioxin and as justification for denying service connection.

Dr. Clapp stressed that the VA and AF need to discuss the issue in a manner similar to the effort he assists at Camp Lejeune, and find an avenue for individual claims to be evaluated more effectively. Dr. Stellman stressed the importance of remembering the tests' confirmation of "military herbicides" and the need to treat C-123 veterans with the same logic, the same fairness, as the VA has treated Vietnam veterans.

Mr. Tucker of Senator Brook's staff stressed that federal agencies need to find a more compassionate approach to evaluation of individual C-123 veterans' dioxin exposure, and that a reasonable benefit of the doubt be applied to the situation.

For C-123 veterans, the day did not go well. Air Force briefers were enthusiastic in presentation of the report and defensive about its conclusions. Although the briefing began with a general statement that their report was unable to reach a conclusion regarding "occupational" exposure, no retreat was made from the actual wording of the report's Executive Summary which states exposure was "unlikely."

Air Force leadership should know that C-123 veterans are respectful of their authority, and we are absolutely dedicated to the Air Force mission and core values. Given our age, these values have been part of our lives longer than with those currently serving.

We differ in our opinions regarding aircrew dioxin exposure and trust that future peer-reviewed articles in professional journals will better articulate the basis for our actual and harmful exposure and qualification for VA service connection. We also hope for continued support from universities and federal agencies such as the ATSDR.

VA Reneges on Promised C-123 Agent Orange Study!

Once again breaking faith with veterans, the VA's Public Health organization caved to political pressure and brought dishonor to their organization by canceling arrangements for an Institute of Medicine study of C-123 TCDD contamination. Promised to leaders of the C-123 Veterans Organization at their April meeting hosted by Senator Burr's staff, the study was to assess the contamination of C-123 aircraft and the exposure by aircrew, maintenance and aerial port personnel.

But last week the VA's Senate Liaison Office (Mr. Carter Moore) informed senators that the study is canceled in view of the very mild conclusions reached by the recent USAF School of Aerospace Medicine study. That study claimed that, while many tests established C-123 contamination by Agent Orange, somehow veterans weren't exposed to "enough" TCDD to cause long-term health damage. This is despite tests establishing "heavily contaminated" aircraft which scientists testified were "a danger to public health."

Lucky veterans. Perhaps the VA suggests our famous Nomex green bag flight suit and BDUs, like Superman's costume, stop speeding bullets as well as dioxin contamination.

War Plans from this point:
1. FOIA the VA materials re: earlier meetings
2. FOIA the USAFSAM materials in depth to establish VA-directred false results
3. Peer review of USAFSAM report by outside experts
4. Continued individual submission of Agent Orange exposure claims by all C-123 veterans followed by BVA appeals of denied claims
5. Re-visit American Legion, Vietnam Veterans of America & Disabled American Veterans leaders
6. Editorial coverage (thanks, J. Harris, for MOAA article!)
7. Congressional pressure
8. Essay in Journal of the Society of Toxicology regarding VA's phony poster display in San Francisco, and twisting of the situation to prevent veterans' claims

USAF School of Aerospace Medicine Releases C-123 Agent Orange Letter

The Commander, USAF School of Aerospace Medicine has finally released the long-awaited examination of the C-123 Agent Orange contamination issue and it is totally lackluster! A buck-passer. Actually, a stab in the back of all C-123 veterans! (update: on 18 Jun 2015 VA agreed with the Institute of Medicine that this USAF report was scientifically and mathematically flawed)

The USAFSAM spent several months looking over earlier toxicologist's testing of the C-123 fleet, particularly Patches (Tail #362) which had the most documented contamination by dioxin left over from Operation Ranch Hand in Vietnam. Released by the unit's commander, a physician, no note is made of the individual researchers who worked on the study, unlike most other such reports. 
For our veterans, this is a tremendous disappointment. The errors abound and are certain to be brought up in other forums, particularly the Senate and the VA itself.
Here's our take on the report. First, it is not new science or research, but rather an examination of earlier tests and reports because all the subject aircraft have been destroyed - because they were toxic! The report is written by a physician, not a scientist. If there were professional toxicologists or other scientists, their names were left off the report. Our points are:

1. The report fails to state that the ten years exposure inside the aircraft for the crews would be more harmful than levels of TCDD as detected twelve and 27 years after the airplanes retired - one should assume, though here they did not, that contamination was more intense in the years before authoritative testing was done

2. The report does give some wiggle room, if they'd use it, for the VA and the IOM to provide benefit of the doubt for crews. In the Blue Water Navy situation the VA went with the IOM simply because of the IOM statement that sailor's exposure couldn't be ruled out - here, the contamination is confirmed but a misleading conclusion invented out of the true facts to offer a pretense that exposure, miraculously, wasn't likely to be damaging in the long-term. This will be interesting news to the world's toxicologists!

3. Great weight is given the results of the 2009 tests conducted at Davis-Monthan, yet the author of that report told veterans that no conclusions should be drawn regarding dioxin exposure from his data. Further, even those tests confirm TCDD presence - 27 years after the aircraft were stored in the Arizona desert. Again, one reasonable conclusion would be that those 27 years in storage, preceded by ten years of our flying, allowed TCDD to degrade and allowed the TCDD to be released via wind and rain (which freely enters this old aircraft - famously, the crews wore raincoats flying it especially in the cargo area!) No report specifies the degree of contamination which existed in 1972 when stateside crews started flying these aircraft - no attempt was made to provide a retrospective analysis of the earlier levels of our exposure

4. The 1994 and 1996 Air Force tests, done by the military's own toxicologists, are mentioned but dismissed. Here, an excuse to discard these early results was the cautious statement by the researchers that further testing would be necessary to fully characterize the contamination - logical enough but not an excuse to dismiss the results! These original 1994 researchers did, very clearly, establish to their professional satisfaction the fact that the cabin and flight deck were "heavily contaminated" on 100% of their test surfaces, and this damning characterization was noted in today's release - then dismissed without justification

5. No mention is given of the testimony of Dr. Ron Porter, AF toxicologist from the AF Armstrong Labs who also co-authored the 1994 and 1996 tests, where he swore under oath the C-123 fleet was "a danger to public health" such that they couldn't be used or sold

6. No mention is made of the fact that Patches at the Air Force Museum took three separate decontamination procedures before it was reasonably safe to place inside the facility - but crews flew this specific aircraft for a decade, over twelve years before this testing - and others in the fleet were even more contaminated!

7. No weight is given to the fact that contamination of the C-123 would have to be more intense as post-Vietnam crews began flying them in 1972, and more intense before the veterans' own repeated efforts to decontaminate the airplane - many AF documents detail the early scrapping and washing of Patches and the other aircraft, removing gooey black substances, scrubbing with Dawn detergent as directed by AFMC Warner-Robbins - the airplanes would necessarily then have been more contaminated in 1972 before any testing which was first done in 1979 (and that was not a test for dioxin, only military herbicides which were confirmed to be present)

8. No mention is made of the ATSDR letter nor are the points of Dr. Sink's letter dealt with. He says the AF and VA have both contacted him and wishes the C-123 veterans "good luck", and stands behind his letter

9. And the big point: The report says not enough data could be located to draw a conclusion about aircrew exposure, but still it draws the conclusion that the aircrews were not exposed to enough for long-term health problems. This is a set of statements 180 degrees apart from one another
10. Various laws dealing with exposure to agents used in Vietnam generally group them as "military herbicides" - every single test done on these aged airplanes has confirmed the contamination of them by "military herbicides" - a fact not even touched upon in today's reports

C-123 veterans believe the AF is justifiably concerned about earlier sales of the C-123s to Disney Films and to South Korea and Thailand through the AF Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson. A bit embarrassing to tell another government we sold them dioxin-contaminated airplanes. This report has chewed over what old data could be uncovered, dismissed the military's own test conclusions, and constructed a denial of the aircraft even being contaminated!

Why didn't they simply say enough doubt exists to extend the benefit of the doubt, or clearly state there is a possibility, through remote to some degree, of aircrew exposure?

C-123 veterans agree with the report's conclusions that it would be virtually impossible for patients, paratroops, cargo attendants, and other passengers to have had any exposure. Veterans, however, feel strongly that the aircrews, maintainers and aerial port personnel absolutely were exposed.

Colonel Christian Benjamin, USAF MC CFS

Tell us, Colonel Benjamin. If these aircraft were being delivered to AFMC today, would you find them airworthy and safe for flight? Would any of these veterans' illnesses today been less likely to manifest themselves if they hadn't been exposed to such long-term duties aboard this "danger to public health?"

Frankly, this report smells of VA editing all over the place. Unwarranted assumptions are injected to construct an artifice that denies aircrew exposure, and obvious facts are ignored.  Maybe USAFSAM and AFMC leadership should have added their signatures to Colonel Benjamin's. Should USAFSAM welcome VA into to the Wright-Patterson blue-suit "Band of Brothers?"

Blue Water Navy & C-123 Veterans - what are the differences?

I have been asked to explain, as best I can, some differences between our effort to have the VA recognize Agent Orange exposure by C-123 veterans, and similar claims by veterans who served aboard ships during the Vietnam War - well-known as the "Blue Water Navy". Another group are the children of Vietnam veterans with birth defects, and I do not know how to address their claims - my heart is torn apart when considering their suffering. Men like Ben Quick are the best voice for justice for these folks.

First, in no way do I argue with or disparage claims made by Blue Water Veterans, nor seek to make our claim more or less legitimate than theirs. We should all expect that justice and science treat both groups equally.

The fundamental differences in our situations are:
1. The Blue Water Navy group is huge...over 200,000 veterans, compared to C-123 post-Vietnam flyers, AME and maintenance folks totaling only about 1,500; Blue Water Navy has tremendous political support, membership support, and media visibility. Large size means huge financial impact on the VA if benefits are approved. C-123 veterans have had their requests to Congress and the Senate answered by exactly one staffer...Mr. Brooks Tucker of Senator Burr's staff, who has carried the burden for us in Washington for nearly a year now! Other politicians have simply ignored us
2. The C-123 has detailed, scientific USAF testing establishing the contamination by TCDD (dioxin) on many aircraft, with exact tail numbers identified in many instances. There are also AF tests done before and after decontamination of Tail #362. There have been no similar scientific tests on Blue Water Navy vessels although a convincing report was just released about decontamination of carriers!
3. There is a huge paper trail of official documents within Air Force Material Command and the Air Staff concerning the "Agent Orange" airplanes, from 1994 through final destruction of the remaining aircraft in 2010. AF Office of Environmental Science recommended test information "be kept in official channels only," prompting questions about a possible cover-up
4. The recent Institute of Medicine report about Blue Water Navy concerns said the possibility of dioxin contamination via desalination procedures out at sea "could not be disproved." This gives some low degree of probability to the argument, rather than the VA's requisite "as likely to as not" level of proof. In the case of C-123s, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (part of the CDC with responsibility for this issue) has determined C-123 aircrews likely were exposed and stated our exposure was at a high level of cancer threat. This language is far above the VA's threshold requiring the benefit of the doubt resting in favor of a veteran's claim for disability
5. TCDD contamination of the C-123 was established by AF testing, and the testing procedures and results challenged by the VA in November 2011. However, the AF testing was specifically cited as proper procedure with valid results by the ATSDR, as well as by the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health in their Independent Scientific Opinion. Columbia labeled the VA review of C-123 Agent Orange issues as "unscientific"
6. Columbia further classified C-123 veterans' exposure as on a par with or greater than ground personnel serving in-country during the Vietnam War
7. C-123 veterans, in some cases, served a full decade aboard the contaminated aircraft. Service was in direct contact with contaminated surfaces, providing inhalation, ingestion and dermal contact routes of contamination
8. Blue Water Navy has successfully had many ships identified by hull number for presumptive connection for veterans who served aboard. No C-123 veteran (other than those who previously served in Vietnam during the war) has had a claim approved by the VA or by the BVA upon appeal

I feel that both groups have valid claims deserving of scientific and legislative evaluation and, if well-founded, recognition by the Department of Veterans Affairs for treatment of our veterans' Agent Orange-presumptive illnesses. That's all we ask...if TCDD contamination and exposure can be established and a veteran suffers from an AO-related disease, the veteran should be given treatment for that disease. 

Our claim  - "Boots on the Airplane" = Recognition for Agent Orange Illnesses

VA Retroactive AO Rules (per Nehmer decision)

VA Publishes Agent Orange Retroactivity Rules (Nehmer Decision) (this is of greater interest to our Vietnam veterans) Since 1991, the VA has been required to follow special retroactive benefit  rules whenever it grants a disability compensation claim or a claim for death  benefits under the VA’s Agent Orange rules. These rules are very favorable to  Vietnam veterans and survivors of Vietnam veterans and they are contained  in an Order issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California  in the Nehmer class action brought by lawyers from the National Veterans Legal  Services Program.                   The VA finally recognized that the retroactive benefit rules are complex and that  VA regional offices and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals need more guidance  on how to apply the rules. As a result, on August 25, 2003, the VA published  detailed regulations that VA regional offices and the BVA must follow in deciding  the effective date of benefits awarded under the VA’s Agent Orange rules. (The  effective date of an award controls the amount of retroactive benefits to which a  Vietnam veteran or a survivor of a Vietnam veteran is entitled when the VA grants  an Agent Orange claim).                                    The new regulations also explain that if the person to whom the retroactive  benefits is owed (that is, the Vietnam veteran or the survivor of a Vietnam veteran  who claimed death benefits) dies before the VA is ready to make the payment,  the VA does not get to keep the money; instead, the VA must make the payment  to the surviving spouse, surviving children, or surviving parent of the deceased  individual, or, if no such surviving family member exists, to the individual’s estate. What follows are:           The new regulation – which is 38 C.F.R. § 3.816; and The VA’s detailed explanation of the meaning of these rules, which the VA published on January 28, 2003, when it first proposed the new regulation.THE NEW VA REGULATION -- 38 C.F.R. § 3.816 § 3.816—Awards under the Nehmer Court Orders for disability or death caused  by a condition presumptively associated with herbicide exposure.               (a) Purpose. This section states effective-date rules required by orders of a United  States district court in the class-action case of Nehmer v. United States Department  of Veterans Affairs, No. CV-86-6160 TEH (N.D. Cal.).                    (b) Definitions. For purposes of this section-              (1) Nehmer class member means:            (i) A Vietnam veteran who has a covered herbicide disease; or              (ii) A surviving spouse, child, or parent of a deceased Vietnam veteran who died  from a covered herbicide disease.               (2) Covered herbicide disease means a disease for which the Secretary of Veterans  Affairs has established a presumption of service connection before October 1, 2002  pursuant to the Agent Orange Act of 1991, Public Law 102-4, other than chloracne.  Those diseases are:               (i) Type 2 Diabetes (Also known as type II diabetes mellitus or adult-onset diabetes).                 (ii) Hodgkin's disease.             (iii) Multiple myeloma.               (iv) Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.             (v) Acute and Subacute peripheral neuropathy.           (vi) Porphyria cutanea tarda.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | Next>>