VA failure in its "duty to assist" veterans claims, particularly with C-123 Agent Orange

Guest article follows: 
My own experience with the VA duty to assist gathering evidence to support veterans' claim was quite painful. For verification of Agent Orange claims the VA turns to the Department of Defense Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) for confirmation of exposures outside Vietnam. Despite the fact that JSRRC serves as the VA research authority, for years VA succeeded in blocking JSRRC input vital to confirm our exposures aboard C-123s. Fortunately, in 2013 VA was provided proof which was made more substantial in 2014 by the JSRRC.

FACT: VA would not accept the JSRRC input, even though it is required to per the VA Adjudication Manual M 21 – 1MR.
FACT: JSRRC was willing to submit the confirmation to VA and Mr. Sampsel but what is required to wait for his request which he never issued, even with my requests.

FACT: even though JSRRC confirmation eventually reached the VA, VA failed to act on it in violation of its own regulations, because individuals at VA were determined to, in the words of its consultant Dr. Alvin Young, "hold the line" against our disability claims. This was on their personal prejudice and their office unofficial personal policy of blocking our claims.

When I first learned that the JSRRC did not have all the material it needed about our aircraft, I had it sent to them by the Air Force Office of Historical Records Research, by the CDC, by the US Public Health Service, by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, by medical schools and schools of public health all across the country. I visited the director of the JSRRC, Mr. Dominic Baldini (a Coast Guard veteran) and was impressed by his desire to serve the needs of America's veterans. That is, if VA would allow him to do so.

The JSRRC is in Fort Belvoir Virginia and I wanted to get there so badly I had to take my wheelchair four miles from the bus drop off point to his office where I was warmly received by Mr. Baldini and his staff. And four wheelchair miles back to my bus after that meeting. 

The VA contact for the JSRRC was Mr. James Sampsel who ran the VA Agent Orange desk, and it was his responsibility to liaise between the two agencies. The problem was Mr. Sampsel kept telling the JSRRC he would not accept input about our exposures for a variety of reasons cited in different ways over the years.

When Mr. Sampsel said he would not accept scientist or physician input except from military officers, we had it provided by commissioned officers of the US Public Health Service who are considered by law serving military officers, including Rear Admiral R. Ikeda MD USPHS. Repeatedly, Mr. Sampsel agreed to internal VA authorities that our veterans proof was persuasive (by law that should have settled things in our favor) yet he failed permit permit himself to be moved, contrary to the pro-veteran responsibility he had.

Then Mr. Sampsel wouldn't accept input because he hadn't specifically requested it from the JSRRC. And he wouldn't, for years. Another method Mr. Sampsel used to block JSRRC confirmation of our exposures was to insist only federal government documentation would suffice. This is despite VA Adjudication Manual 21 – 1MR stating JSRRC is responsible for gathering evidence from all the federal government agencies. Regardless, in his zeal to block C-123 veterans' claims, Mr. Sampsel apparently decided the CDC, USPHS, NIEHS and other federal sources would not suffice because they too directly confirmed the veterans exposures and abused his intent to deny VA medical care and compensation.

Further, although JSRRC and VA are to consider any credible source of scientific and medical information regarding a veteran's exposure, Mr. Baldini was forbidden by Mr. Sampsel to submit evidence from dozens of university medical schools and schools of public health as well as the independent experts VA itself had utilized for such studies. Amazingly, Mr. Sampsel's department even refused to accept input from toxicologists and other scientists from CDC and other federal agencies by stating only physician input would be accepted. This was a blatant abuse of rulings from the US Ninth Circuit Court but was also quite amusing because VA itself frequently used PhD experts whereever appropriate including veterans claims.

By 2013 the JSRRC and poor  Mr. Baldini had suffered enough grief for me about this that they simply force-fed confirmation of my exposure to Mr. Baldini by sending him an email. This didn't seem to help much because Mr. Sampsel simply refused to act on it. The issue finally was resolved only by Secretary McDonald and his interim final rule published in June 2015.

But Mr. Sampsel can still claim victory because he personally blocked 2100 C-123 veterans claims for four years and locked us out of VA hospitals and denied us compensation for our injuries and illnesses. His great respect for his friend Dr. Young have much to do with his motivation and his shouting throughout the VA for many years that he had "an overwhelming preponderance of evidence" against our claims – evidence consisting only of the VA webpage saying so, plus his preference for input from Dr. Young rather than the CDC, US Public Health Service and dozens of other federal, state, and scientific authorities supporting our claims. He wrote that EVERY proof of our exposure was his "real problem."

In the end the Institute of medicine study clearly established our exposure injuries but it was only a partial victory against the clear victory Mr. Sampsel enjoyed in keeping us from the VA hospital for four years. Contrary to law, his department was anti-claimant, adversarial, and obstructionist. He succeeded in "holding the line" against our claims as recommended by his favored consultant, Dr. Al Young.

CONCLUSION: VA hurt us through intrinsic and extrinsic ethical failures, none of which remain addressed today.

================================================================
Guest Article
==========================================================================

By Kevin Courtney November 22, 2016 Updated: November 22, 2016 10:06pm

The Navy’s Blue Angels performed jaw-dropping maneuvers and inspired our next generation’s service members during San Francisco’s Fleet Week last month. Unfortunately, those future sailors and Marines might end up like today’s veterans, suffering from a failing U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Thanksgiving is a great opportunity to reflect on how we can best serve our veterans and their families.

Veterans’ benefits claims may go undecided for more than a year, an unimaginably difficult year for those who haven’t experienced it. Our newly elected government leaders should address how the VA can better care for our veterans.

Today, the VA has a duty to assist veterans in preparing their claims by getting complete and relevant records from any federal agency. Congress created this “duty to assist” by passing the Veterans Claims Assistance Act in 2000. Under this standard, the VA must “make reasonable efforts to assist the claimant.” But what happens when a reasonable effort falls short of accurate or complete records? Deciding a claim based on inferior records likely requires an appeal, and the veteran will consequently suffer unnecessary financial and emotional stress.

The U.S. Supreme Court believes the VA should be a “pro claimant” and “non-adversarial” department when deciding claims because it is the sole agency responsible for providing federal benefits to veterans and their families. And there are two features built into the VA’s claim process to help veterans: first is the lack of a statute of limitations for bringing disability claims. A statute of limitations is usually the maximum amount of time after an event a veteran can bring his legal claim. The second feature is the VA’s more liberal burden of proof, which should allow it to decide in the veteran’s favor when the evidence supporting his claim is only 50/50. But are VA employees following these standards?

Congress has increased the VA’s budget every year over the past decade, so insufficient funding is not a reason why the VA fails to be “pro claimant.” While VA executives continue to receive performance bonuses, veterans are left waiting for help. It is important for President-elect Donald Trump’s secretary of veterans affairs to change the ethos found within the VA, improve its efficiency and ingrain compassion in employees. There are thousands of dedicated, caring VA employees, but some require a reminder that behind every claim is a veteran who honorably served this country. And they need the VA’s help before it’s too late.

Twenty veterans commit suicide every day in our country. If the VA streamlined its system, then some of these veterans might get the timely help they need.

The VA has an obligation to realize its mission: “To fulfill President Lincoln’s promise ‘To care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan’ by serving and honoring the men and women who are America’s veterans.”

This Thanksgiving holiday, consider the benefits you enjoy thanks to a veteran. Then consider how you want the VA to treat our veterans.

Kevin M. Courtney is a student judge advocate for the U.S. Marine Corps and a second-year law student at UC Berkeley Hastings College of the Law. When the VA denied his claim for his father’s service-connected death, he spent the next four years trying to understand how the bureaucratic system functioned — or failed to function.

Guest article follows: my own experience with the VA duty to help gather evidence to support

veterans' claim was quite painful. For verification of Agent Orange claims the VA turns to the Department of Defense Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) for confirmation of exposures outside Vietnam. Despite the fact that JSRRC serves as the VA research authority, for years VA succeeded in blocking JSRRC input vital to confirm our exposures aboard C-123s to the VA.

FACT: VA would not accept the JSRRC input, even though it is required to at the VA Adjudication Manual M 21 – 1MR. 

FACT: even though JSRRC confirmation eventually reached the VA, VA failed to act on it in violation of its own regulations, because individuals at VA were determined to, in the words of its consultant Dr. Alvin Young, "hold the line" against our disability claims. This was on their personal prejudice and their office unofficial personal policy of blocking our claims.

When I first learned that the JSRRC did not have all the material it needed about our aircraft, I had it sent to them by the Air Force Office of Historical Records Research, by the CDC, by the US Public Health Service, by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, by medical schools and schools of public health all across the country. I visited the director of the JSRRC, Mr. Dominic Baldini (a Coast Guard veteran) and was impressed by his desire to serve the needs of America's veterans. That is, if VA would allow him to do so.

The JSRRC is in Fort Belvoir Virginia and I wanted to get there so badly I had to take my wheelchair four miles from the bus drop off point to his office where I was warmly received by Mr. Baldini and his staff. And four miles back to my bus after that meeting.

The VA contact for the JSRRC was Mr. James Samsel who ran the VA Agent Orange desk, and it was his responsibility to liaise between the two agencies. The problem was Mr. Sampsel kept telling the JSRRC it would not accept input about our exposures for a variety of reasons cited in different ways over the years.

When Mr. Sampsel said he would not accept scientist or physician input except for military officers, we had it provided by commissioned officers of the US Public Health Service who are considered by law serving military officers.

Then Mr. Sampsel wouldn't accept input because he hadn't specifically requested it from the JSRRC. Another method Mr. Sampsel used to block JSRRC confirmation of our exposures was to insist only federal government documentation would suffice. This is despite VA Adjudication Manual 21 – 1MR stating JSRRC is responsible for gathering evidence from all the federal government agencies. In his zeal to block C-123 veterans' claims, Mr. Sampsel apparently decided the CDC, US PHS, NIESH and other Federal sources would not suffice because they too directly confirmed the veterans exposures and abused his intent to deny VA medical care and compensation.

By 2013 the JSRRC and Mr. Baldini had had enough grief for me about this that they simply force-fed confirmation of my exposure to Mr. Baldini by sending him an email. This didn't seem to help much because Mr. Samsel simply refused to act on it and the issue finally was resolved only by Secretary McDonald and his interim final rule published in June 2015.

But Mr. Sampsel should still claim victory because he personally blocked 2100 C-123 veterans claims for four years and blocked us out of VA hospitals and denied us compensation for our injuries and illnesses. His great respect for his friend Dr. Young have much to do with his motivation and his shouting throughout the VA for many years that he had "an overwhelming preponderance of evidence" against our claims – evidence consisting only of the VA webpage saying so, plus his preference for input from Dr. Young rather than the CDC, US Public Health Service and all the other authorities supporting our claims.

In the end the Institute of medicine study clearly established our exposure injuries but it was only a partial victory against the clear victory Mr. Sampsel enjoyed in keeping us from the VA hospital for four years. Contrary to law, his department was anti-claimant, adversarial, and obstructionist. He succeeded in "holding the line" against our claims as recommended by his favored consultant, Dr. Al Young.

CONCLUSION: VA hurt us through intrinsic and extrinsic ethical failures, none of which remain addressed today.

----------------------------------------------------------

By Kevin Courtney November 22, 2016 Updated: November 22, 2016 10:06pm

The Navy’s Blue Angels performed jaw-dropping maneuvers and inspired our next generation’s service members during San Francisco’s Fleet Week last month. Unfortunately, those future sailors and Marines might end up like today’s veterans, suffering from a failing U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Thanksgiving is a great opportunity to reflect on how we can best serve our veterans and their families.

Veterans’ benefits claims may go undecided for more than a year, an unimaginably difficult year for those who haven’t experienced it. Our newly elected government leaders should address how the VA can better care for our veterans.

Today, the VA has a duty to assist veterans in preparing their claims by getting complete and relevant records from any federal agency. Congress created this “duty to assist” by passing the Veterans Claims Assistance Act in 2000. Under this standard, the VA must “make reasonable efforts to assist the claimant.” But what happens when a reasonable effort falls short of accurate or complete records? Deciding a claim based on inferior records likely requires an appeal, and the veteran will consequently suffer unnecessary financial and emotional stress.

The U.S. Supreme Court believes the VA should be a “pro claimant” and “non-adversarial” department when deciding claims because it is the sole agency responsible for providing federal benefits to veterans and their families. And there are two features built into the VA’s claim process to help veterans: first is the lack of a statute of limitations for bringing disability claims. A statute of limitations is usually the maximum amount of time after an event a veteran can bring his legal claim. The second feature is the VA’s more liberal burden of proof, which should allow it to decide in the veteran’s favor when the evidence supporting his claim is only 50/50. But are VA employees following these standards?

Congress has increased the VA’s budget every year over the past decade, so insufficient funding is not a reason why the VA fails to be “pro claimant.” While VA executives continue to receive performance bonuses, veterans are left waiting for help. It is important for President-elect Donald Trump’s secretary of veterans affairs to change the ethos found within the VA, improve its efficiency and ingrain compassion in employees. There are thousands of dedicated, caring VA employees, but some require a reminder that behind every claim is a veteran who honorably served this country. And they need the VA’s help before it’s too late.

Twenty veterans commit suicide every day in our country. If the VA streamlined its system, then some of these veterans might get the timely help they need.

The VA has an obligation to realize its mission: “To fulfill President Lincoln’s promise ‘To care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan’ by serving and honoring the men and women who are America’s veterans.”

This Thanksgiving holiday, consider the benefits you enjoy thanks to a veteran. Then consider how you want the VA to treat our veterans.

Kevin M. Courtney is a student judge advocate for the U.S. Marine Corps and a second-year law student at UC Hastings College of the Law. When the VA denied his claim for his father’s service-connected death, he spent the next four years trying to understand how the bureaucratic system functioned — or failed to function.

C-123 Veterans 5th Submission to JSRRC

As we promised JSRRC during our conversation this morning, the C-123 veterans' collection of official  USAF, GSA, EPA, NIH, CDC/ATSDR and other government agency documentation establishing our aircraft contamination and exposure to veterans therein was submitted, along with 17MB of specific data...much more data exists to prove the point, but in an effort to respond to Mr. Baldini's request only a representative document was included to address each of the JSRRC questions.

---our letter to JSRRC-----

Dear Mr. Baldini,

Thank you again for your wake-up call this morning…nice to know we are on your list. Our little group of veterans is grateful for the opportunity to detail our issues before the JSRRC.

The fundamentals of our issue are simple. The C-123 aircraft we flew included many ships which previously sprayed Agent Orange in Vietnam. These airplanes remained contaminated through their destruction as toxic waste in 2010. The airplanes’ contamination resulted in exposure to dioxin (TCDD) of the aircrews, maintenance and aerial port personnel assigned to them.

In an earlier conversation with you, we discussed the fact that a wing’s flying squadrons had assigned to them their own crews, and attached to them for flying duties were other wing personnel such as flight surgeons, flying crew chiefs, aeromedical evacuation crews – these personnel would show formal assignment to their units with attachment to the flying squadron for flying duties. If this needs clarification please contact any Air Force unit. We need JSRRC not to contest a situation where, perhaps, a flight surgeon assigned to the 439^th Tactical Hospital, will also claim to be attached to the 731^st TAS for flying duties and thus part of the population we address. Let the veteran’s own official documentation, such as flight orders, address that peculiarity.

As to an individual veteran’s claims, we can leave it to the individual to establish duties with the aircraft using flight orders, Form 5s, or other documentation. Our concern here is to make clear that the aircraft were contaminated and the veterans exposed, in order that JSRRC might more completely advise the VA when queried.

The first element of the issue is the history of the C-123 aircraft which were used for Ranch Hand. In general, this is established by the 2011 report from Ms. Betty Kennedy[1], AFRC/HO who explained “The C-123 aircraft in the 731^st TAS fleet had been used to dispense chemical defoliants over Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.” Further details of specific aircraft are provided by the AMARC list of C-123 aircraft tested and eventually destroyed and other commonly available lists of C-123 aircraft that flew in Vietnam.[2]

The second element is to establish the contamination by military herbicides of C-123 aircraft flown in Vietnam and also flown by post-Vietnam squadrons. Only one aircraft had extensive documentation of such testing, Tail #362, and detailed in two toxicological exams performed by the USAF Armstrong Labs in 1979[3] and 1994[4].

Both tests confirmed “military herbicides” with the 1994 test characterizing the airplane as “heavily contaminated on all test surfaces” utilizing standard test techniques. It confirmed contamination by dioxin, but dioxin was not tested for in the 1979 test. The aircraft was subsequently decontaminated to permit restoration.

This aircraft is identified in the HA AFRC/HO report as assigned to the 731^st TAS during the period 1972-1982. Six to eleven other former spray aircraft were also assigned.

Other C-123 aircraft assigned to the 731^st were not tested for contamination until many years later, after long years of storage at Davis-Monthan AFB AZ, and all still reported between trace and low levels of dioxin contamination.[5] All were quarantined in HAZMAT storage in 1997.[6] Testing was accomplished many times between the 1982 date most entered AMARC storage and their 2010 destruction, with either trace or low levels of contamination remaining on about half of the aircraft. 42% of the C-123 aircraft remaining in USAF inventory in 1982, upon their retirement, were Ranch Hand aircraft.

The remaining issue is actual exposure to “military herbicides.” No mention is made in law nor C.F.R.s regarding the amount of exposure, the duration of exposure, the type of exposure, nor any other qualification…only the word “exposure.” In every other instance, the US Government has treated contamination issues to have also been exposure issues, but in this instance the VA has merely allowed that some contamination might have remained on the airplanes but that no exposure could have occurred. Again, there is no qualification in the law regarding how much contamination. VA seems fixated on the "years after their service" before the planes were tested, and "sophisticated testing" - yet only standard tests were performed, nothing special required.

When VA promulgated its herbicide presumption in 2001, the issue of herbicide exposure outside Vietnam was also addressed.  66 Fed. Reg. 23166 (May 8, 2001).  VA explained if a veteran did not serve in Vietnam but was exposed to an herbicide agent defined in 38 C.F.R. §3.307(a)(6) during active military service and has a disease on the list of presumptive service connection (which includes diabetes mellitus type II and ischemic heart disease), VA will presume that the disease is due to the exposure of herbicides.  See 66 Fed. Reg. 23166; 38 C.F.R. §3.309(e).[7]

When asked, an executive of the EPA reminded me of the simple definition, both scientific and generic, of “exposure” which is “the contact between a chemical or biological agent and the outer boundary of an organism.” Thus, we prove our claim to exposure…our skin came into contact with what even the VA suggests is “dry dioxin” and thus led to contamination. Experts other than the VA, experts who do not have a mindset to automatically deny veterans’ claims, dispute the VA’s literature review which led to the VA opting to refuse service connection and decry it as “unscientific.”

Mr. Baldini, the veterans of the C-123 Veterans Association have done as asked of us this morning: we have identified official government documents detailing our C-123 aircraft fleet’s Vietnam service. We have identified official government documents detailing the contamination of the C-123 fleet, based on the only aircraft extensively tested over a long period of time and which remains existent at the USAF Museum, while nearly all others were destroyed as toxic waste. And finally, we have identified numerous government documents from a variety of federal agencies that confirm specifically that C-123 veterans were exposed to military herbicides aboard the contaminated C-123 fleet. Not detailed here are numerous independent scientific opinions submitted to JSRRC earlier from reputable institutions such as Columbia University and University of Texas Medical School reaching the same conclusion.

I trust we have fulfilled your assignment given me this morning. The many gigabytes of official USAF, EPA, CDC, NIH and GSA information in the DVDs submitted to you last month and in print since 2011 go into this with even far greater detail, with numerous additional supporting official documents all reaching the same conclusion. Many of these experts are members of the National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, well-qualified to address this issue even though not perhaps part of your examining of the issue. Still, you can see there is a general agreement in science and medicine regarding our claims.

If JSRRC for some reason, despite these official documents and the others submitted to you over the years, remains unconvinced that the VA should be informed that our veterans were exposed aboard the contaminated C-123 aircraft, I can only suggest you contact the following federal or state officials, each of whom has already provided their agency’s conclusion in confirmation of our exposure claims:

a.     Dr. Linda Birnbaum, Director, National Toxicology Program and Director, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences “According to the narrative [the 1979 & 1994 USAF tests], exposure is assumed based on wipe-tests demonstrating high dioxin concentrations in the C-123K’s.”[8]

b.     Dr. Tom Sinks, Deputy Director, CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry “I believe aircrews operating in this, and similar, environments were exposed to TCDD.”[9]

c.     Dr. Fred Berman, Director Toxicology Program. Oregon Health Sciences University (State of Oregon), “It is my professional opinion that Major Wesley Carter (and likely, other aircrew veterans who flew these aircraft in the same time period) was exposed to harmful levels of dioxin the course of his aircrew duties.”[10]

I cannot imagine if there was this volume of evidence that somehow existed to argue against our claim, how we could possibly persuade. That’s not the situation however. Instead, we submit gigabytes of confirming evidence. Official government historical record and agency opinions and qualified independent expert opinion…and lots of it.

How much additional confirming proof could JSRRC possibly require? How much additional evidence should any veteran be required to research himself to provide to JSRRC and the Department of Veterans Affairs to receive medical care for the hazards of military service long-ago concluded? The airplane was contaminated. We were exposed. We call upon JSRRC to say so.

The VA can make its call on whether we meet their requirements, but they should not do so based on an inaccurate or misinformed JSRRC response.

I trust that JSRRC will consider that the twenty years of official USAF descriptions by staff officers, general officers, heads of agency, GSA, the Air Staff and Judge Advocates General attorneys of these C-123s as “the Agent Orange airplanes” did not change until 2011 with the first C-123 veteran’s Agent Orange exposure claim.

Respectfully,

/s/  Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF Retired

Working with the Joint Services Records Research Center

The VA is required by law to "assist" a veteran in gathering claim evidence. They meet this requirement (in their own minds) by collecting DOD and VA medical records, requesting same from civilian practitioners. In particular, VA turns to a DOD agency called "Joint Services Records Research Center," headed by Mr. Dominic Baldini.

Today, Mr. Baldini called to review the 4GB of government data we provided JSRRC to substantiate the C-123 dioxin contamination. He asked for a more focused and strictly government document based summation. Today, I will prepare exactly that and trust that soon JSRRC will more accurately inform VA of our exposure!

VA & Army Seek C-123 Source Documents

In his letter to The C-123 Veterans Association dated 4 December 2012, the Director of the Army's Joint Services Records Research Center defended his agency's responses to inquiries about C-123 issues from the Veterans Administration. [CLICK HERE for our response, mailed 31 Jan 2013]

Director Dominic Baldini explained that when JSRRC is asked to provide information about  veteran's service they consult unit histories to form their response. Baldini further explained "it is not the JSRRC's mission to conduct scientific studies or research of this nature or comprehensive scientific literature or documentation reviews." He does, however, promise "if during the course of unit records reviews in individual claims, the JSRRC finds information, however indicative, to any degree, of AO exposure to C-123 air crew members, we would immediately notify our VA contacts."

This is reassuring. What is not reassuring, however, is the fact that twice our Association has provided just those essential source documents to the JSRRC! Of course, because concerns about Agent Orange were not known in the 1972-1982 timeframe when unit histories would have made mention of the issue, we had to turn to other official documents. We provided flight orders showing tail numbers of aircraft, AFMC records from Davis-Monthan detailing which aircraft were known to be spray aircraft, reports from other federal agencies such as the CDC/ATSDR stating that C-123 aircrews were exposed! How much more could Mr. Bonomi demand?

Further, I am confused about how JSRRC could have ignored the initial, 1979 testing on Patches, so clearly documented at both AMC and USAFSAM. The additional testing at The Air Force Museum further substantiated the contamination, and that report was overlooked also. As was all the documentation from Hill AFB and Davis-Monthan.

Confusing.

Conclusion: Get them even more data. Get it from our members, from the 439th and other units which flew the post-Vietnam C-123 fleet, and get it from HQ AFRC. To do this well, I need EVERYONE's collection of official documents, such as flight orders, Form 5s and anything showing tail numbers and units to which the airplanes were assigned. Now, if you can...pretty please?

Otherwise, JSRRC will happily continue to screw every single C-123 claim we submit to the VA!

DoD records agency torpedoes C-123 Claims!

JSRRC, Alexandra, Virginia

This week I had the opportunity to review my "C" file at the local regional office. Lesson learned...should have done so much earlier! It turns out that the Joint Services Records Research Center, the DoD agency responsible for informing the VA about any veteran's individual PTSD or Agent Orange claim, was totally off base and helped torpedo my VA claim.

In my case, which is likely the same as every other C-123 veteran who has approached the VA for service connection, the VA regional office did a fair job summarizing my claim and boiled down to a single question what was needed from JSRRC: "We are requesting a determination as to whether herbicide (sic) were found as alleged." An accurate answer would be vital, confirming my own description of the situation or leaving it unfounded.

JSRRC has boxes and boxes of supporting information collected in their normal course of activities. They gather unit histories, combat action reports, deployment orders...all that sort of stuff. But for some reason, last year when I was referred to JSRRC for information to support the C-123 exposure issue, they responded in the negative...nothing available, per their chief, Mr. Dominic Baldini.

So I oped to provide Mr. Baldini a large collection of what our C-123 veterans had collected since April 2011. I sent JSRRC flight logs, toxicological tests, contemporary news articles, "buddy letters", expert independent scientific opinions, findings by other federal agencies, photographs, emails and official correspondence. Enough any historian would agree to answer that question"was herbicide found as alleged." Sometimes historian want original source documents, and everything I sent is still readily available today from the various agencies if Mr. Baldini felt he couldn't accept what I sent as official enough for their purposes.

Faced with their mission objective of helping the VA help veterans substantiate claims, the JSRRC completely failed me and all other C-123 veterans. Instead of responding to the VA's inquiry about me with a summation of testing done on Patches and the rest of the fleet, supported by all the official documentation which thus far totals over 300 pages, the JSRRC simply torpedoed  us!

In respond to the VA question, the JSRRC uselessly and in error wrote:

"Unfortunately, the JSRRC in unable to verify or document that an (sic) air crewmembers were (sic) exposed to Agent Orange resulting from Agent Orange residue or dioxin contaminated aircraft or aircraft parts. Please refer to your (VA) website and the VA's determination for this information."

Four problems here which would ruin any C-123 veteran's hopes for a fair deal from the VA:
1. JSRRC did not address the question posed by the VA but instead said it couldn't "verify or confirm" aircrew Agent Orange exposure
2. JSRRC referred the VA back to the VA for supporting information (with the referral back to the VA's C-123 press release from VA Public Health) - ridiculous in the extreme to tell the VA  seeking source documents to read their own (erroneous) web page!
3. JSRRC was incorrect in their answer anyway, as ample information was available at JSRRC to establish aircrew Agent Orange exposure - in particular, the expert scientific opinion from Dr. Tom Sinks, Deputy Director, CDC Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, who stated:

"Given the available information, I believe that aircrew operating in this, and similar, environments were exposed to TCDD"

Dr. Sinks, speaking on behalf of his agency which is responsible for making such decisions, coudn't have been any clearer. His letter certainly was one item of verifying documentation JSRRC had to offer. His answer should have been adequate.
4. Finally, once JSRRC responded the VA did nothing to challenge  either the failure to address the original VA question, or to challenge the JSRRC response which clearly was in error - the VA had the same documentation from ATSDR and other sources

Another VA Claim Sunk - for inadequate proof!

Observation: We all need to personally visit our Veterans Affairs Regional Office (VARO) to review our records. Discuss with the staffer who will sit with you while going through the records any errors, omissions, whatever. You can request copies which they may be courteous enough to offer, but if not, simply FOIA the entire collection. Remember this "C" file at the VARO is separate from your medical records and you need to make sure both are complete and accurate. In my visit I uncovered three very important issues to address which will help make my case successful...well worth the trip downtown to keep them from letting your application be torpedoed!

This is terrifying. JSRRC and the VA can't be counted on to meet their own mission of accurately gathering and evaluating evidence of our Agent Orange exposure, and then when challenged by veterans simply ignore us!