More Support for C-123 Veterans' Agent Orange Claims

We learned this week that another major university (not to be specified but it sits along the Charles River in Boston) has brought its expertise to bear on our claims for Agent Orange exposure. Experts from that university in Boston fully endorsed Dr. Jeannie Stellman's perspective - C-123 veterans WERE exposed to deadly TCDD (the toxic element of Agent Orange) in the years 1972-1982. Further, their professional opinion is that our veterans were exposed at a greater rate than ground troops of the Vietnam War.

And they have a great faculty club!

Like Dr. Stellman, this university's experts have previously been acknowledged by the National Academy of Sciences as the go-to source for Agent Orange research.

We still hope for a peer-reviewed article addressing the inadequacies of the VA and AF reports about the C-123, likely focusing on the unscientific assumptions made, the obvious predetermined conclusion, and the fact...the fact...that aircrews and maintenance personnel assigned to this aircraft are due fair consideration by the VA for our Agent Orange exposure claims. Several researchers have utilized our blog's extensive data collection, but we need to get more of the materials gathered by the Air Force during their investigation of the C-123 contamination. Personally, I'd like to know who exactly wrote the report because it was signed by Colonel Benjamin, commander of the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, and I can't see that a physician or major unit commander did this work himself. Typically, such reports are released oner the signatures of the researchers involved. And typically, Air Force reports such as this can be relied upon but in this case it has failed the sniff test.

Jeanne Mager Stellman  Professor and Director of Environmental Health Sciences, SUNY-Downstate "Agent Orange was an important tool that could be used to save the lives of thousands of soldiers who could fight in the jungle more clearly. But at the same time it introduced serious toxic chemicals into the environment and one could also say caused huge ecological disaster by this massive deforestation of a jungle area.

So, fellow veterans, keep calm and await developments. We expect the Air Force to brief Senator Burr on July 11, and our Association's leadership has been invited to attend or participate via teleconference.

Make sure your own VA claims for Agent Orange-type illness are submitted, and thus far the best advice from the American Legion's National Service Officers is to address individual medical issues with specific, expert medical opinions that the issue is "as likely to as not" have been caused by exposure to Agent Orange while an aircrew member (or maintainer, or aerial port) of the C-123.

VA Releases Newest C-123 Exposure Denials

In their most recent Internet posting, the VA's Public Health Division incorporates the results of the Air Force C-123 Agent Orange Report. In it they construct a false argument that crews weren't exposed when in fact, all scientific opinion is that we were! Three AF conclusions are cited by VA in their post and both the VA and AF have twisted scientific FACTS 180 degrees to deny the truth - aircrews WERE indeed exposed! (see their points below):

1. There indeed wasn't enough information or data to conclude how much any individual was exposed, but that cannot truthfully be used to deny that any of us were actually exposed. The lack of abundant data cannot be used to disprove a hypothesis when there is ample data indicating the certainty of exposure
2. Exposure in these aircraft was certainly more intense during Vietnam, and Ranch Hand aircrews were more greatly exposed, but this point cannot be used to create the false impression that post-Vietnam aircrews weren't also exposed - according to experts and testing data over the years, crews were exposed at a level greatly exceeding exposure by ground forces during the war
3. All evidence points to the fact that aircrews and maintenance personnel were indeed exposed to Agent Orange (TCDD) at an unsafe level, according to the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

Conclusion: VA Public Health is dedicated to preventing C-123 veterans' Agent Orange exposure claims, and to preventing any vet's case-by-case evaluation which may introduce the truth!

Here is the VA Internet post of 20 June which incorporates mistakes from the AF Report:

Some Veterans who were crew members on C-123 Provider aircraft, formerly used to spray Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, have raised health concerns about exposure to residual amounts of herbicides on the plane surfaces.

VA’s Office of Public Health thoroughly reviewed all available scientific information regarding the exposure potential. We concluded that the potential of long-term health effects for the post-Vietnam crews that flew or maintained these planes was extremely low and therefore, the risk of long-term health effects is minimal.

Testing for Agent Orange residue on planes used in Vietnam

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) collected and analyzed numerous samples from C-123 aircraft to test for Agent Orange. USAF's recent risk assessment report (April 27, 2012) (2.3 MB, PDF) found that potential exposures to Agent Orange in C-123 planes used after the Vietnam War were unlikely to have put aircrew or passengers at risk for future health problems. The report’s three conclusions:

1. There was not enough information and data to conclude how much individual persons would have been exposed to Agent Orange.

2.   It is expected that exposure to Agent Orange in these aircraft after the Vietnam War was lower than exposure during the spraying missions in Vietnam.

3.  Potential Agent Orange exposures were unlikely to have exceeded standards set by regulators or to have put people at risk for future health problems.

How Veterans may have been exposed

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Air Force used C-123 aircraft to spray Agent Orange to clear jungles that provided enemy cover in Vietnam. At the end of the spraying campaign in 1971, the remaining C-123 planes were reassigned to reserve units in the U.S. for routine cargo and medical evacuation missions spanning the next 10 years.

Crew members aboard one of these post-Vietnam C-123 planes reported smelling strong odors, which raised concerns about Agent Orange exposure – but Agent Orange is odorless. These odors may have come from various chemicals associated with aircraft.

Health effects of Agent Orange residue

The health effects of exposure to Agent Orange residue on airplanes differ from direct contact with liquid Agent Orange. In liquid or spray form, Agent Orange can enter the body through inhalation or ingestion (such as hand-to-mouth contact or getting into food). But in the dry form – for example, adhered to a surface – Agent Orange residue cannot be inhaled or absorbed through the skin, and would be difficult to ingest.

The potential for health effects depends on the amount of Agent Orange present, as well as its ability to enter the body. After reviewing available scientific reports, VA has concluded that the exposure potential in these planes was extremely low and therefore, the risk of long-term health effects is minimal. Even if crew exposure did occur, it is unlikely that sufficient amounts of dried Agent Orange residue could have entered the body to have caused harm.

Research studies on Agent Orange

Research on the health effects of Agent Orange has been extensive and it continues. Diverse populations have been studied, including herbicide sprayers and manufacturers, other Vietnam-era Veterans, and those exposed during industrial accidents. This information helps us to determine what potential health effects may be related to different levels of exposure.

Find out more about research on health effects of Agent Orange.

VA benefits

If you have health concerns about Agent Orange, talk to your health care provider or local VA Environmental Health Coordinator.

Veterans not enrolled in the VA health care system, find out if you qualify for VA health care.

Although the risk of long-term health problems from exposure to Agent Orange residue on post-Vietnam C-123 airplanes is minimal, Veterans who believe they have exposure-related health problems may file a claim for disability compensation. These claims will be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Senator Burr (NC) to Receive AF Briefing re: C-123K Study

Thanks to the continuing interest by North Carolina's Senator Burr and his staff, leadership of the C-123 Veterans Association has been invited to participate in a teleconference next week as the Air Force briefs the Senator on their recent C-123 Agent Orange study. That report, much to the surprise of aircrews as well as scientists in this field, generally dismissed the likelihood that aircrew, maintenance and aerial port personnel were exposed to dioxin remaining in the aircraft following Vietnam for the decade in which we flew them.

Senator Richard Burr (D-NC) Ranking Member
Senate Veterans Committee

This will be interesting. Questions abound! Questions such as:

1. Who wrote the report? It was signed by Colonel Benjamin, USAFSAM/CC but he is a physician, not the scientists who first contacted us for our input

2. Does the AF repudiate the 1979, 1994, 1996 and 2009 reports in which dioxin was identified as present aboard the C-123?

3. Does the AF admit even a possibility of aircrew exposure, such a possibility being enough to suggest that the VA gives the benefit of the doubt to our claims?

4. What role did the VA have in the report (preparation, editing, approval cycles)?

5. Why did Dr. Ron Porter, co-author of the 1996 survey of Patches, testify as an AF employee in a federal court case that the C-123 "are a danger to public health", a case in which he was called as an expert witness on behalf of the AF and the GSA?

6. Phrases in the AF report and the GSA report explain that dioxin aboard the aircraft was detected by "advanced scientific procedures many years after use." This phrasing suggests that only such advanced procedures were able to identify the TCDD, yet the initial Conway report identified "military herbicides" with standard testing procedures and equipment in 1979 and Porter/Weisman did the same in 1996. In fact, no special, advanced scientific procedures or equipment were necessary to identify the TCDD, so why the evasive wording when standard procedures were all that were needed?Why did the GSA and AF further misdirect public understanding by not allowing that TCDD concentration was likely even more intense in 1972 as we began flying the Provider than it was in later years after decades of storage in desert conditions?

Questions abound. But will the answers?