Finally...a Marine in place to help run VA: Assistant Secretary Brooks Tucker

He stood by us from the start.

Retired Maine LtCol Brooks Tucker served on North Carolina Senator Burr's staff. He was our first advocate in 2011 and stood with us for years until final victory in June 2015.

Last week Mr. Tucker was confirmed by the Senate as VA Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs. Congratulations!

VA Updates Senate on Disability Claims – promotes Fully Developed Claims (FDC)

VA official outlines progress in reducing claims backlog

By Department of Veterans Affairs News Release | Headquarters Marine Corps | December 13, 2013

WASHINGTON --

A senior Veterans Affairs Department official outlined progress made by the Veterans Benefits Administration in reducing the backlog of veterans' disability compensation and pension claims by 36 percent since March, attributing the success to the combined impact of transformation initiatives and increased employee productivity Dec, 11.

Allison A. Hickey, Undersecretary of Veterans Affairs for Benefits, testified at a hearing of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee.

"We know there is much more work to be done to reach our goal of eliminating the disability claims backlog in 2015," Hickey said. "But I'm encouraged that the improved tools and processes we've put in place so far are having a real impact so that we may better serve our nation's veterans, their survivors and their families." Although she personally opposes C-123 veterans' claims, General Hickey has done much to improve the overall VA claims processing nightmare.

Hickey detailed the elements of the Veterans Benefits Administration's transformation plan, which includes retraining and reorganizing its workforce, streamlining business processes, and building and implementing new technology solutions. With each transformation milestone, she said, VBA is successfully moving away from a paper-bound, manual process to improve benefits delivery through paperless claims processing. She also noted that if full funding is received, mandatory overtime for VBA claims processors, which helped to bring down the backlog this year, will continue for much of 2014.

AF Surgeon's Office Briefs Sen. Burr's Staff & C-123 Veterans

Yesterday, a very well prepared team from the AF Surgeon's Office briefed Senator Burr's staff  about their 27 April 2012 report dealing with C-123 aircrew dioxin exposure. A lot of effort went into their participation and the C-123 Veterans Association extends thanks to the Air Force Surgeon General as well as Senator Burr's staff.

Joining the teleconference were Dr. Richard Clapp (Professor Emeritus Boston University School of Public Health) and Dr. Jeanie Stellman (Professor Emerita Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health). These dedicated scientists, so familiar with Agent Orange issues, helped C-123 veterans better understand both the Air Force report and the earlier VA report.

During this meeting, the Air Force briefers explained:

• the report was prepared by "tens" of experts from various health professions assigned to the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Released over the signature of USAFSAM's commander, the report correctly reflects the professional opinion of each of the various experts who contributed to it. Drafts of earlier versions or of the final staff report submitted to USAFSAM/CC prior to the published version will not be made available
• USAFSAM undertook the project partly to gather all relevant information, provide an analysis, and make it all available to the public
• complete and thorough release of materials from all Air Force sources was provided; no documents were withheld from USAFSAM researchers by any source, including Davis-Monthan and Hill.
• USAFSAM was unable to determine any particular individual or group exposure, lacking an adequate population for an epidemiological study and having to rely on reports done over the decades since concerns first surfaced about C-123 Agent Orange contamination (the aircraft having been since destroyed)
• the briefers twice stressed their report was unable to make a finding about whether or not individual or occupational groups were exposed. Yet in very stark contrast to that claim of indecision or neutrality, the report reads "At this time, we conclude that the discernible information suggests the potential Agent Orange exposures...were unlikely to have exceeded acceptable regulatory standards or to have predisposed persons in either group to experience future adverse outcomes."
• the executive summary's finding of "unlikely" exposure contrasts with the report's conclusion in 4(d), "is is reasonable to conclude that it is not possible to derive quantitative estimates of any increased health risks for those individuals". If that is the case, why did the report earlier deny any likelihood of such exposure? Shouldn't any such indecision result in the benefit of the doubt given the veterans?
• the pivotal 1994 Weisman/Porter survey of Patches for the Air Force Museum concluded the aircraft was "heavily contaminated" but from the perspective of extensive restoration (grinding, ripping out insulation, fabric, etc.)
• the Air Force briefers suggest the report was not written for guidance of other agencies, such as the Veterans Administration, and that the VA would likely evaluate C-123 veterans' claims "on an individual basis." We explained that VA has already cited the AF report as decisive evidence against C-123 veterans' exposure to dioxin and as justification for denying service connection.

Dr. Clapp stressed that the VA and AF need to discuss the issue in a manner similar to the effort he assists at Camp Lejeune, and find an avenue for individual claims to be evaluated more effectively. Dr. Stellman stressed the importance of remembering the tests' confirmation of "military herbicides" and the need to treat C-123 veterans with the same logic, the same fairness, as the VA has treated Vietnam veterans.

Mr. Tucker of Senator Brook's staff stressed that federal agencies need to find a more compassionate approach to evaluation of individual C-123 veterans' dioxin exposure, and that a reasonable benefit of the doubt be applied to the situation.

For C-123 veterans, the day did not go well. Air Force briefers were enthusiastic in presentation of the report and defensive about its conclusions. Although the briefing began with a general statement that their report was unable to reach a conclusion regarding "occupational" exposure, no retreat was made from the actual wording of the report's Executive Summary which states exposure was "unlikely."

Air Force leadership should know that C-123 veterans are respectful of their authority, and we are absolutely dedicated to the Air Force mission and core values. Given our age, these values have been part of our lives longer than with those currently serving.

We differ in our opinions regarding aircrew dioxin exposure and trust that future peer-reviewed articles in professional journals will better articulate the basis for our actual and harmful exposure and qualification for VA service connection. We also hope for continued support from universities and federal agencies such as the ATSDR.

AF Delays Brief to Senator Burr re: C-123 Dioxin Exposure

For uncertain reasons, the Air Force briefer scheduled to meet with Senator Burr's staff and teleconference participants has delayed his presentation until 11 July. We hope it is for a serious reconsideration of the mounting evidence from outside AF/VA sources which challenge such an unscientific report.

Thus far, other federal agencies as well as university experts have weighed in...none in support of the VA/AF, all in opposition. They cite the failure to respect the Army's TG312, failure to allow reasonable benefit of the doubt, failure to avoid unscientific assumptions, failure to weigh opinions expressed by the CDC's Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, failure to weigh earlier IOM exposure data regarding dermal and inhalation routes of dioxin, and failure to address the greater degree of contamination prior to the first tests conducted on the aircraft.

It is unfortunate that the issue shifts from an examination of aircrew exposure to dioxin contamination on our aircraft, to a detailed expose of why the heck the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine pumped out such an unscientific document.

Let's hope the Air Force Surgeon gets it right this time! All we ask is the benefit of the doubt, to allow the evidence to reach the VA's "as likely to as not" threshold.

We're grateful for the powerful support of the professional societies. We're profoundly grateful to the American Legion and Vietnam Veterans of America as we continue our struggle. And we look forward to the day we can shut this web site down, go home, and with corrected AF and VA reports, turn to the VA for treatment of our service-connected illnesses.

Senator Burr (NC) to Receive AF Briefing re: C-123K Study

Thanks to the continuing interest by North Carolina's Senator Burr and his staff, leadership of the C-123 Veterans Association has been invited to participate in a teleconference next week as the Air Force briefs the Senator on their recent C-123 Agent Orange study. That report, much to the surprise of aircrews as well as scientists in this field, generally dismissed the likelihood that aircrew, maintenance and aerial port personnel were exposed to dioxin remaining in the aircraft following Vietnam for the decade in which we flew them.

Senator Richard Burr (D-NC) Ranking Member
Senate Veterans Committee

This will be interesting. Questions abound! Questions such as:

1. Who wrote the report? It was signed by Colonel Benjamin, USAFSAM/CC but he is a physician, not the scientists who first contacted us for our input

2. Does the AF repudiate the 1979, 1994, 1996 and 2009 reports in which dioxin was identified as present aboard the C-123?

3. Does the AF admit even a possibility of aircrew exposure, such a possibility being enough to suggest that the VA gives the benefit of the doubt to our claims?

4. What role did the VA have in the report (preparation, editing, approval cycles)?

5. Why did Dr. Ron Porter, co-author of the 1996 survey of Patches, testify as an AF employee in a federal court case that the C-123 "are a danger to public health", a case in which he was called as an expert witness on behalf of the AF and the GSA?

6. Phrases in the AF report and the GSA report explain that dioxin aboard the aircraft was detected by "advanced scientific procedures many years after use." This phrasing suggests that only such advanced procedures were able to identify the TCDD, yet the initial Conway report identified "military herbicides" with standard testing procedures and equipment in 1979 and Porter/Weisman did the same in 1996. In fact, no special, advanced scientific procedures or equipment were necessary to identify the TCDD, so why the evasive wording when standard procedures were all that were needed?Why did the GSA and AF further misdirect public understanding by not allowing that TCDD concentration was likely even more intense in 1972 as we began flying the Provider than it was in later years after decades of storage in desert conditions?

Questions abound. But will the answers?

March 8 Meeting with VA Officials & Sen. Burr's staff:

---more from notes about Thursday's meeting---

But first, unending thanks to Dr. Jeanne Stellman who joined us for the meeting in Washington DC. A powerful voice from a gracious lady and esteemed supporter of veterans' issues, bringing 30 years expertise to the discussion!

Senator Burr of North Carolina, ranking member Senate
Veterans Committee

We had our meeting with VA's Health Benefits Administration in the Hart Senate Office Building, hosted by Sen. Burr's staff, with the following results:
1. the C-123 aircrew/maintainers dioxin exposure issue will be referred to the Institute of Medicine for a special report, hopefully ready by the end of 2012 (note...this promise was broken and unfulfilled for three more years.) VA will prepare a Statement of Work (SOW) without outside input, but IOM will conduct public meetings soliciting comment
2. VA reassured C-123 veterans our herbicide exposure poses no risk to health
3. VA stated no medical care will be allowed even on a presumptive eligibility basis for AO-presumtive illnesses (unless the veteran is otherwise eligible)
4. benefits claims now in for C-123 aircrews and maintainers will most likely be denied
5. VA assured veterans that the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry letter of 26 Jan 2012 has no particular relevance to benefits eligibility of veterans as it was provided outside the realm of the VA itself; apparently, "its the VA's ball" - other government agencies' rulings have no impact on VA refusal to provide veterans' medical care
6. VA defends their apparent "not enough dioxin to harm" newly created threshold, never before established by any US government agency
7. VA didn't realize only about 1500 aircrew and maintenance personnel are involved in this issue, expecting the numbers to be higher
8. VA defended their earlier challenges to and dismissal of the 1979 Conway survey of Patches and the 1994 Weisman/Porter survey of Patches, saying use of standard swipe protocol resulted in inaccurate findings and thus no veterans were affected by either inhalation, ingestion or dermal routes of exposure

9. other than the suggested IOM referral, not a single suggestion was made by the VA, whose duty it is to assist veterans in presenting their claims, to help us present our claims; we were struck by the fact not a single note was taken by them of points we felt important to bring to the discussion

10. one VA official likened our exposure during 1972-1982 to her traveling as a 1976 passenger in Army trucks which may have been used earlier in Vietnam

11. VA agreed it will be appropriate for IOM to form a retrospective view of Patches prior to the 1979 Conway report, as dioxin contamination levels are likely to be higher in the earlier years

74AES Flight Nurses: "not enough
dioxin" to hurt them or their
children--VA

12. VA likened the requirement for employees at Davis-Monthan AFB to wear HAZMAT protection around the quarantined C-123K fleet to the "hysteria" of recent civilian water contamination 

13. the expected USAF School of Aerospace Medicine report wasn't presented, and apparently isn't quite ready for either discussion or presentation - aircrews certainly hope that USAFSAM will take a hard stand confirming our exposure, and that at the very least since they cannot direct VA to provide care, USAF should declare that the aircraft were unsafe to fly during the years we had them, and would certainly be awarded an unsafe to fly designation today

In an outside, casual conversation, making our suggestion that our benefits applications are being stalled to prevent appeals progressing to the more public forum offered by BVA and other courts was not challenged... the VA official simply smiled. The oldest claim we can identify among our veterans is one year old, other than those denied years earlier by BVA due to veterans' inability to identify specific tail numbers of AO-spray aircraft and inability to prove lingering contamination. Note: both such proofs released by the USAF via FOIA in May 2011, but not available to the veterans before their claims were denied in 2007. It is to be expected that claims henceforth will continue to be denied, but with newer reasons created to cite as justification as the old ones are now invalid.

Our thanks to leadership of the American Legion, which hosted us on Wednesday in preparation for the VA meeting. American Legion is solidly behind us and, we hope, will be presenting a resolution to their Spring conference. Also, thanks to Dr. Jeanne Stellman of Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health, and Dr. Fred Berman of Oregon Health Sciences University who presented expert support during Thursday's conference. Both experts generously contributed their time and expertise to supporting our presentation.

Your guy in DC!

Naval Aviator Asks House Veterans Committee to Support US!

I ask my friends to support us by writing their congressional representatives, and am heartened by this letter to Congressman Burr (chair of the Veterans Committee). Earlier, I'd convinced Mike to sign up for the Agent Orange Registry and he was fortunate to discover a previously unknown health problem during the physical! Here's this retired senior Naval officer's letter:

My friend, Major Wesley Carter,  USAF, Ret. Has been spearheading an effort to give aircrews who flew in Agent Orange contaminated aircraft the right to treatment in Veterans’ Administration medical facilities.  As you know, a number of C-123 aircraft that were used to spray Agent Orange during the Viet Nam war were later assigned to CONUS-based reserve squadrons.  Air Force tests show the aircraft remained contaminated, and, in turn, the crews who manned them were exposed to dioxin.  I thank you for the support you have already given to this issue.  I understand from Wes that your staff member, Brooks Tucker has been tireless in his efforts to obtain VA medical support for these aircrews.

I see VA’s adamant refusal to recognize the claims of the aircrews who flew in C-123K aircraft post-Vietnam as just another manifestation of the historic bureaucratic foot-dragging that has been typical these last thirty-odd years.  The VA has fought treating service members exposed to Agent Orange at every step of the way, but I fear we have yet to see the end of the claims resulting from this powerful toxin.  In the spring and summer of 1972, the aircrews from my helicopter detachment were in Da Nang at least every third day.  Out of approximately a dozen pilots,  I know of one with diabetes, another with prostate cancer and one with heart disease.  These diseases are on the list of illnesses attributable to Agent Orange.  Unfortunately, I haven’t been in contact with the remaining aircrew personnel in my unit and there could certainly be more illnesses.

In the coming years, we are going to see efforts to reduce and restrict the benefits available to our active duty and retired military personnel.  In the current fiscal climate, Americans are going to have to make sacrifices.  I often hear the statement, “Thank you for your service.”  The sincerity of that gratitude will be revealed, in part, by whether the American people will demand that military personnel (active and retired) make sacrifices in addition to those already incurred by virtue of their service.   I hope you will continue to “support the troops” both by backing Major Carter’s tireless labors and in broader areas of military benefits.

Thank you.

/Michael N. Lewis/
CAPT, USN, Ret.
Asheville NC 

A Monumental Week! Good and Bad, But Justice Will Triumph!

Is VA Mickey Mouse or What?

We were hit with a board upside the head when the VA announced Thursday that they'd already decided our C-123 aircrews somehow, miraculously, haven't' been exposed to dioxin, despite our decade of flying the contaminated birds.

In their determination to prevent veterans'  Agent Orange exposure claims, the VA has invented a new thing called "dry dioxin transfer" to pevert science and logic to keep us from essential medical care. Yes, they say, the planes were certainly contaminated, but no, dry dioxin transfer by dermal contact was unlikely plus we couldn't have breathed any in via dust...somehow, the special kind of dioxin left in the C-123 didn't hurt us. I'll just bet the VA would be first to state that Agent Orange actually helped us! Made us the men and women we are today, thanks to Dow and Monsanto!

But here's your good news. By coincidence, I was traveling to the Air Force Museum Wednesday when my cell phone rang with a call from the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine. Seems they've been tasked to look into the issue of C-123 aircrew exposure and they wanted to get our materials. "Surprise, Surprise Surprise" as Gomer Pyle used to say. I was going to be at Wright-Patterson AFB on Thursday anyway, so I suggested we meet. What perfect timing.

Our meeting with USAFSAM did indeed take place the next morning at 0900 at the new building for the 711th Human Performance Wing and included the project leader, his deputy, an AF physician and a bioenvironmental engineer. I provided the project's OIC our large binder with 320 pages of research, plus a DVD of the many source documents. That gentleman was ready with a DVD for us as well, materials he'd researched and some of which we've never seen before. GREAT!!! Unlike our October 27 teleconference with the VA, these guys asked questions instead of telling us where to get off. And even in the face of the VA's new stand against us, on Friday the Air Force has been told to proceed with their investigation. Thanks, Mr. Secretary!

I also was invited to put him him touch with Prof. Jeanne Stellman at Columbia University School of Medicine, researchers at Portland State University who contributed to the Blue Water Navy Institute of Medicine Study, and Dr. Fred Berman who heads the Toxicology Department at Oregon Health Sciences University. These prestigious scientists refute the VA stand! With other scientists and with us, they maintain that the C-123 aircrews have indeed been exposed.

So, fellow veterans, take heart. We've actually moved ahead a step or two because we always knew the VA would oppose any application from us, and now we have their position defined. In addition to the reasons BVA Judge Cohn invented back in 2007 to deny Tim Olmsted (731st TAS) his service connection (couldn't prove his C-123 was used for AO spray in Vietnam and couldn't prove it remained contaminated - both now answered with Air Force documents released under FOIA),  they new invent new objections which we can now begin to research and answer.

Hang in there. Support each other, keep pushing your state and national representatives to not let the VA get away with this injustice. I task each of you to personally walk the halls of your state university to present our cause to the department of medicine or the department of environmental studies to get them to support our position and challenge the stupidity of the VA invention of "dry dioxin transfer."

I love this fight! If it was easy, they'd get some other jerk to do it so why not me?


Get off your butts. You are warriors. You never give up. You never leave an airman behind. You cover your wingman.

Our cause is just and it is important to us and our comrades in arms.

You will prevail. God bless.

Tally Ho!

VA Teleconference re: C-123 & Agent Orange

Conference with VA Officials Held 1100 Hrs 27 Oct

We had our conference with the VA's Environmental Health and Benefits Administration folks today, and boy, I got handed my head on a plate.


But most graciously! Thanks to Brooks Tucker, Sen. Burr's staffer and Mr. Carter Moore from the VA's Congressional Liaison Office, Dr. Michael Peterson, Chief of the VA's Environmental Health and reps from the Veterans Benefits Office, supported by many of their very knowledgeable professionals, discussed the wide range of C-123 Agent Orange issues. Bottom line: they feel we have no basis for argument.


For over an hour these folks explained the finer details of dioxin exposure and answered, with grace and patience, my layman's questions. It was great to learn that Dr. Peterson is a retired AF 06, Brooks and Carter are combat veterans, and another physician on Peterson's staff is herself a "tanker doc"...former AF flight surgeon.


Dr. Peterson noted that I'd developed the same type cancer as my father and that familial history plays a role, meaning medical issues. I interjected that indeed it does...I have our family history of five generations of military service, of being warriors, and that I am more proud of that than worried about familial medical trends. 


Are these nice folks against us? No, they are not. However, not a single suggestion was made about how we can get help, other than to go back to the Air Force. The references to "gray area" seemed always to mean not that the benefit of the doubt would rest with the veteran but instead, the VA.


Are they going to help us? No, they are not. They will create every obstacle possible to prevent our claims, having promised "We cannot permit C-123 claims." Not unless convinced of new scientific evidence, or in response to new laws, or in response to the Air Force stating that our aircraft were contaminated with dioxin when we flew and that we were contaminated thereby. Again, not a single suggestion of how anything can be interpreted in support of our position. Their mission yesterday was to oppose us, not support us.


As followers of our blog know, we point to the 1994 AF study of Patches which reports 100 of the swipe samples positive for dioxin, and describes Patches as "heavily contaminated." VHA dismisses that with an explanation that samples were taken using solvents, and the hazmat precautions recommended were because restoration personnel were likely to be grinding metal and doing other dust-creating activities. 


They were not receptive to our response that solvents were used to gather swipe samples because that was the testing protocol selected by the investigators back in 1994, not receptive to the argument that even our skin has solvents on it to which which dioxin would love to attach, or that dioxin-laden dust would be ingested from the dust constantly created in working the aircraft, in its vibration aloft, hard landings and other workaday causes. 


Dr. Peterson explained, along with VBA, that the VA has to look at PROBABILITY. In big, capital letters. Unlike "boots on the ground" Vietnam veterans and Blue Water Navy vets, both of which groups have their presumptive exposure established by law, we must prove the probability that, not only were the aircraft contaminated, but that we were actually exposed thereby. That there was somehow physical introduction of dioxin into our bodies. A vector.


And that they maintain is a case yet to be made. The VA dismisses the 1994 Weisman-Porter study of Patches, saying it has no specific relevance to our 1972-1982 duty days (tests from the other years were not discussed). 


I kept asking whether or not a veteran is obliged to prove only two points...dioxin contamination and Agent Orange presumptive illness, and I believe their negative answer is built around the big obstacle...probability. Not possibility.


My points offered: multiple AF tests stressing the aircraft being "heavily contaminated, extremely hazardous, extremely dangerous, extremely contaminated" and "a threat to public health". Two authors of four reports the VA provided us stated, yesterday by telephone, that no inference could be drawn one way or the other regarding aircrew exposure 1972-1982, leaving most of the cards on the table being the Air Force's own tests.


It seems to boil down to the Air Force. We'd hoped to have two very knowledgeable experts join the teleconference to explain what they earlier told me was their continuing belief that their tests had relevance to our aircrew exposure years earlier. The two gentlemen did not call in to participate. We were offered the skillful and generous support of Dr. Fred Berman, head of the Toxicology Department of Oregon Health Sciences University who contributed mightily to our position.


Dr. Berman has spent months studying the Air Force reports and written the Secretary of the Air Force that aircrew dioxin exposure aboard the C-123 was "most likely." Not just possible or theoretical, but MOST LIKELY. Columbia University School of Public Health and others concur.


This hour-long conference concluded with an understanding that the next move belongs to the Air Force. Without DOD stating that the crews were aboard dioxin-contaminated aircraft, VA won't budge towards service-connection. Without the Air Force stating that their tests "most likely" indicate the probability of aircrew exposure, the VA sticks with its view that no exposure happened.

So remember, dear readers, that the Air Force (Secretary of the Air Force as well as Surgeon General of the Air Force) has directed us to turn to the VA to get help on our C-123 aircrew dioxin exposure. The VA has told us to turn to the Air Force to get help on our C-123 aircrew dioxin exposure. Catch 22. 


That's right...there's only one catch: Catch 22. The VA would consider allowing us Agent Orange medical care if the AF says we've been exposed. The AF says "Go talk to the VA!"

Yossarian - frustrated C-123 flyer!

When Brooks Tucker asked if the VA and AF were talking, there seemed to have been such conversations. When I asked if the VA would directly solicit an Air Force response, that wasn't of interest. 


If only we'd had the authors of the Patches study on the phone with us. Hopefully, we can ask for their input, then ask the AF to stand behind all the reports that Brooks and the School of Aerospace Medicine have done over the years. I know both of them care and are sincere.

The folks from the VA are extremely experienced at dealing with Agent Orange issues. One gets the feeling they are expert enough to construct a truthful argument one way or the other if they wanted to. They have decades of background, not only in their professions, but in explaining to Congress and veterans the whys and wherefores of dioxin exposure. They can always toss bigger missiles against us.


So we turn back to AFRC/CC General Stenner and the AF Chief of Staff and ask that they not leave our flyers alone in this struggle.  Where's our wingman? 


Air Force, get behind us, ask the report authors to explain the relevance of their studies to aircrew exposure, and simply get VA to designate "boots on the airplane" as adequate presumptive eligibility for our crews! 

Our Rebuttal of VA Comments to Senator Burr of North Carolina

Our letters to staff of North Carolina's Senator Burr and the staff of Commander, Air Force Reserve, which is supposed to have held a conference call with VA officials (no word back yet on any results). Letter to AF first, letter to Senator second.

--------------------------------------------

Dear Major Broussard,

Senator Burr's staff met with some reps from the VA regarding our C-123K problems, and were told that our Agent Orange exposure didn't happen because the post-Vietnam lifespan of dioxin on metal is short. The VA failed to tell my senator's folks that most of the airplane interior was not bare metal, but painted, and Agent Orange and its dioxin contamination soak into paint, and also soak into the insulation, wiring, web seating, etc, as well as the aviation-grade aluminum (which is more porous and which absorbed dioxin more readily than polished steel). 


They stated that the Air Force was concerned about the Agent Orange contamination of the C-123 in an effort to be overly cautious. They failed to note that the Air Force tests establishing the airplanes as "heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous, extremely contaminated" were done in 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2008, years before the airplanes were determined to be too toxic for a landfill and with smelting them the only option left. These tests did not use timid words like "cautious"...the official Air Force words were instead "extremely dangerous" and "extremely hazardous." 

The VA people seemed to say because time had passed by the point the aircraft were destroyed thirty years after their retirement, we couldn't have been exposed to dioxin in 1972-1982 (beginning the year after air airplanes' last Agent Orange spray missions during Vietnam), all the tests establishing contamination notwithstanding.

The VA cited the absence of tests done between the retirement of the C-123 in 1982 and their destruction in 2010, failing to note volume upon volume of official Air Force tests as well as Air Force-contracted tests, every single one of which reported positive for dioxin contamination.

A snow job. If it had been done by any military officer aware of the various tests I'm describing, it would be called dishonorable and a prevarication.

Please don't let it happen to you in presenting our concerns to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Even their own staff must have snickered at this effort with Senator Burr's people!

And please, what is happening? I was back in the hospital myself last week, and this week, and I'll be back again today. Like my crewmates, I'm gravely ill and would like to wrap this up before they wrap me up.

Regards,

   Wes Carter

--------------my letter to Senator Burr's staff follows: They are the folks who met with the VA and were told by the VA that our claims about Agent Orange exposure are groundless-----------------------------------

rustysilverwings@gmail.com
11 Oct 2011

Mr. Brooks Tucker
Senior Policy Advisor
Office of Senator Burr, North Carolina

Dear Mr. Tucker,

Thank you for explaining the results of your staff’s meeting with officials from the Veterans Administration regarding our aircrew exposure to Agent Orange during the decade we, as Air Force crewmembers, flew the C-123K/UC-123K “Provider”, previously used for spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam for Operation Ranch Hand. The VA’s characterization of the Air Force test results and the VA’s perspective of the Air Force position relative to the reuse of the surplus airplanes as expressed during your meeting could, perhaps, be described as a greatly overdone abundance of caution.

The Air Force and the General Services Administration, however, have instead officially described their position as cautious regarding the dioxin contamination…and absolutely not dismissive of the threat! In fact, totally the opposite as per their 2000 report to a federal judge in which both the AF and GSA both characterized these airplanes as being "heavily contaminated" by the dioxin on them. These two words were not used by a layman or a government attorney, but instead by the Air Force toxicologists who tested the airplanes. Certainly it should have been reasonable for the Air Force to be “cautious” regarding aircrew dioxin exposure, although it was not known to be contaminating our airplanes until the very first test in 1979 after we’d flown them for seven years. 


I would hope that the Air Force is “cautious” regarding any airplane, any crew, any possible hazard. In our case, the contamination having been established, the word should be alarmed!

Last week I asked experts for help regarding the VA statements that the surface aging of dioxin would make aircrew exposure to the toxin inconsequential. I sought opinions from two members of the Agent Orange Committee of the Institute on Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, and scientists at both Oregon State University and Columbia University.

In particular, I sought the advice of Dr. Fred Berman, head of the Toxicology Department of Oregon Health Sciences University. In his May 2011 report to the Secretary of the Air Force, he evaluated (and validated) the Air Force test results and provided the University’s finding that our aircrews had been exposed during the timeframe 1972-1982. Yesterday, he replied:

Major Carter, Regarding the stance that the VA is maintaining (that dioxins would have degraded within a short time after service in VN had ended), you could reason that, if indeed the dioxins had rapidly degraded, and in light of the fact that dioxins were detected in significant concentrations on and inside Patches in 2000, then aircrews would likely have been exposed to much higher levels of dioxin between 1970-1980 than suggested in my letter to the Secretary of the Air Force (i.e. The dioxin concentrations immediately after service in Viet Nam would have had to have been very very high to begin with). Fred Berman From: Fred  Berman <bermanf@ohsu.edu>

Please, Brooks, in your representation of us to the VA, defend the position that we have indeed been heavily exposed.Air Force tests done in 1994 on Patches, our most famous C-123K/UC-123K which my squadron flew, reported it"heavily contaminated" with 100% of the swipe tests showing positive for dioxin. Not hypothetical...not degraded, not aged, not anything except "heavily contaminated." This test was done twelve years AFTER we last flew the series. Nobody could believe the aircraft was more contaminated in 1994 than it was in 1972-1982...the VA's own faulty information about surface contamination and aging of dioxin would argue against that conclusion! And no laboratory report concluding an aircraft to be "heavily contaminated" could possibly be seen as in agreement with the VA's description of the Air Force's view of dioxin contamination being so insignificant that the Air Force shredded and smelted the entire valuable fleet for a merely hypothetical risk. 

Please note also that the airplane tested last sprayed Agent Orange in 1969, yet it still tested 100% positive for dioxin, "heavily contaminated" on every single surface examined in 1994. The test did not reveal modest contamination,hypothetical contamination, degraded contamination, significant contamination, or any contamination other thanHEAVILY contaminated. The C-123K’s were even MORE heavily contaminated when we flew them over a decade earlier. Please compare this finding with the suggestions from the VA reps who you met with and you'll see the error of their logic and the blatant effort at disinformation. One should consider their argument here a clear prevarication and deception.

Lieutenant General John Hudson, USAF Retired and Director of the National Museum of the Air Force, wrote me that "before my tenure as Director the aircraft (Patches, Tail 362) was found to be contaminated with dioxin (and) was decontaminated by a contractor." The decontamination, to make it safe for the airplane to be brought inside the Museum, cost $52,000, and required striping all paint from the exterior, removing all insulation and other dioxin-laden materials, and sealing the airplane for all but very limited interior access.

Please remember that we flew Patches, and our other dioxin-contaminated aircraft, in our normal lightweight flight suits, without hazmat protection, without respirators, and without post-flight decontamination. We flew the airplanes for hundreds of hours, we worked on them in flight and on the ground for thousands of hours. We ate in them. slept in them, and were very, very exposed in them. Further, in flight the incessant vibration of the aircraft caused particles to become airborne and thus inhaled.

In 1996 the 355th AMDS/SGPB at Davis-Monthan AFB contracted with Alta Labs to evaluate the aircraft stored at Davis-Monthan, and nearly all tested positive for dioxin (some results were lost, and some were tested incorrectly with the lab determining that actual dioxin contamination might actually be higher than their test results first indicated). In 1997 Armstrong Labs from the Air Force Institute for Operational Health completed tests on C-123K’s stored at Davis-Monthan with similar results but adding the Lab’s concern that the dioxin toxicity could be severe enough to also contaminate the ground beneath the airplanes. AMARC employees were at this point in time directed to wear rubber gloves, a face shield, at least a half-face respirator, and Tyvek coveralls to avoid dioxin exposure, per instructions of Dr. Ronald Porter, Air Force toxicologist.

In 1997, aware of the health threat posed by the toxin, HQ AFMC directed via their memo that

the surplus “dioxin contaminated aircraft” (their words) be sealed and relocated within a “fenced area within the…security area. They will be completely out of view.” (their words). The quarantine effort, necessary for preventing additional personnel exposure, was also done with the specified goal of reducing the public awareness of the 21 remaining “dioxin airplanes”. This effort cost $160,000. Mr. Thomas Lorman, HQ/AFMC/LG-EV, wrote in 1997 that these airplanes are “likely to be contaminated with dioxin from defoliation operations…The Air Force can be up front and warn owners of possible contamination. JAV states the Air Force is at great risk.” (emphasis mine). Certainly this leaps the VA’s barrier of “as likely to as not” regarding any C-123K aircrew veteran’s disability claims! The Air Force’s description of these planes as too toxic for a landfill should also mean that the VA’s barrier of “as likely to as not” regarding our exposure has been greatly exceeded.

In 2008, four aircraft were selected at random and each tested positive for trace levels (or higher) of dioxin, and the test cycle was halted to save the $750-1500 cost per airplane, as well as to prevent characterization of the surplus fleet as "100% contaminated." Messages were exchanged stating that because of the high visibility of "the Agent Orange airplanes", this round of testing could state that four of eighteen aircraft tested positive, rather than continuing the testing and getting an even higher and more visible percentage. Further, AFMC had already decided to destroy all the remaining aircraft.

Please remind the Air Force and the VA that the quarantine of the contaminated aircraft, in which they were placed in a separately fenced area with HAZMAT signs prohibiting access, cost over $150,000. This was not done "just in case" the airplanes were contaminated, but because the base safety officials required it, and both the base medical organization and the AF Surgeon General dictated that workers wear hazmat clothing, respirators, head covers and decontaminate after working. This level of protection is appropriate for "heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous" contamination...just as these airplanes were described by Air Force test results.

Remind the VA that the General Services Administration as well as the Air Force testified before a federal judge in 2000 concerning the government's cancelation of a C-123 sale. Both agencies told the judge that these airplanes represented a danger to public health. They were characterized by the Air Force toxicologist, Dr. Ronald Porter, as “extremely hazardous waste requiring special handling, and his recommendation was to decontaminate each airplane (this recommendation submitted 16 years after we last flew them, 16 years in which their degree of contamination was reduced) at a cost of $15,000 apiece. They did not state that the danger was hypothetical, “overly cautious” or that the danger existed only in Vietnam. These officials testified that the airplanes were contaminated and should not be sold. As you know, two had already been sold to Disney for movies. Continuing on Page 11 of the judge’s ruling, the Air Force reminded the federal judge, and the judge cited as a finding, eight dangers of dioxin contamination from these airplanes, crediting the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the United States Public Health Service.

The director of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Dr. Christopher Porter, wrote me on August 11, 2011, saying our collection of dioxin contamination materials concerning the C-123K is “remarkable”, and recommending that the information be “carefully considered by the Department of Defense”. Because his Agency was cited in 2000 as part of the scientific proof that the surplus C-123K fleet was dioxin contaminated, I strongly recommend that Dr. Porter be consulted for his specific recommendation that the aircraft were indeed contaminated a decade earlier when we flew them!

I personally will pay the travel expenses for Dr. Fred Berman, Dr. Christopher Porter, Dr. Jeanie Stellman of Columbia, or any other reputable expert to be by your side at any future meeting with the VA. Invite them and let me know their expenses. Dr. (name removed) is on the Agent Orange Committee of the Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Science... very, very familiar with the C-123K situation, has studied the multitude of tests done on the airplanes, and states that the aircrews were exposed. As you probably know, members of the Agent Orange committee cannot independently publish on the topic, but they certainly can answer questions...so ask (name removed) at (email address removed for privacy)

Please also remember that Judge Stephen Cohn of the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the late Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Olmsted's VA claim for Agent Orange exposure. Aaron ("Tim") Olmsted's VA claim was denied by Judge Cohn who cited two deficits in the claim: As reported by Connecticut Public Television, in summarizing Olmsted's denial, Judge Cohn ruled:

 1. Olmsted couldn’t prove that the airplanes he flew were the ones used for spraying Agent Orange during Vietnam and

 2. Olmsted couldn’t prove that there was any (my emphasis) dioxin contamination on the airplanes.

He should have had available both proofs...the tail numbers of contaminated airplane assigned to our squadrons have been researched and confirmed by AFRC, and the contamination is established by multiple Air Force tests, although these documents were not available to Olmsted when he filed because they were "kept in official channels only." Denying a veteran necessary documents to approach the VA for medical care cannot be characterized, as the VA has done to you, as "an overabundance of caution." 

I remind you that I was a Stan/Eval flight examiner in my crew position, certified by the Air Force as one of the three most knowledgeable individuals in my AFSC, yet neither I nor any other crew member ever was "official channels" enough to be told of this contamination. It was manifestly my duty to have known everything affecting my aircrew and my student’s health and safety. I have spoken to several state fire marshals who agree with Oregon’s state fire marshal that withholding this kind of information about toxin-endangered employees is a crime. Consider having a senior firefighter from the D.C. department or the Pentagon sit in with your next VA meeting. The only concern I'd have if having genuine toxicology or public health experts with you as the VA "explains things" is that the laughter from them over VA efforts at misinformation would disrupt your otherwise serious meeting.

As you know, the Air Force in 2010 finally smelted the toxic aircraft. In their approval memo, AMARG officials (505 ACSS and 74 CEG) stated “this can be done discretely. This option avoids all contact with or exposure to the public and the aircraft are not made available for commercial sale. This option can happen quickly. Smelting is necessary for these 18 aircraft so the Air Force will no longer be liable for ‘presumptive compensation’ for anyone who ever works around this “Agent Orange” metal…If the Air Force wants quick and quiet disposal, the Navy option is preferable.”

I am offended that these individuals took “quick and quiet” actions to prevent our veterans’ justified claims for “presumptive compensation”, especially considering that our exposure had already taken place.

Senator Burr and Mr. Tucker, you can see that our aircrews worked with this “Agent Orange” metal for a decade. We have been sickened by it as well as by the VA’s construct of any argument at hand, twisted out of context as much as necessary, to insure denial of our proven exposure. I am amazed that they can twist the Air Force initial test results ofPatches being “heavily contaminated” into merely, as you put it, “an overly cautious mindset.” In all the documents I’ve uncovered from the Air Force, there has been no such timid phrase used…the phrases used by the Air Force have been “Agent Orange airplanes”, “extremely contaminated,” “heavily contaminated”, “extremely dangerous”, “danger to the public” and similar language. These should be the words also used by the Department of Veterans Affairs in addressing our concerns.

We are gravely ill from this disaster. Please defend us with all your ability.

Respectfully,

For the Veterans of the C-123K

Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF Retired

Medical Service Corps

VA Deceives Sen. Burr's Staff re: Agent Orange & C-123

Correspondence Thursday regarding a meeting in which senior staff of North Carolina's Senator Burr (ranking member of the House Veterans Affairs Committee) discussed our C-123 Agent Orange issues with representatives of the Veterans Administration. The VA put forth an argument denying the possibility of our exposure during the years 1972-1982 by saying that the surface contamination of the aircraft decades later when stored at Davis-Monthan would have lessened.

Does that make sense to anyone? To say that airplanes MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN contaminated in 2010 so they therefore weren't contaminated in 1972? What about the multiple Air Force tests done over the decades between 1972-2008 in which every single test reported POSITIVE for the presence of dioxin.

The VA wonks are using a hypothetical argument that dioxin would have decayed over the decades to claim we couldn't have been exposed the very year after the last spray mission. I'm working here to find a word other than "liar" to fairly describe such a statement!

Here is the response we sent Sen. Burr's office to the summation they provided of their meeting with the VA:
-------------

To: Tucker, Brooks (Burr)
 Subject: Sen. Burr's Staff report - meeting with VA and VA position re: C-123 Agent Orange

Thanks for responding.  They mislead you. Please remind them that Air Force tests, done in 1994, determined the aircraft "heavily contaminated"...Air Force words! Further, additional tests done in 1996, 1998 and 2000 showed continued contamination. These tests cannot be ignored! The VA can't pick and chose which facts to use to deny us service connection 

Hypothetical dioxin degradation on surfaces in direct sunlight hasnothing to do with our flying these airplanes right after their last spray flights...nothing to do with the contamination throughout each aircraft. A half-baked VA concept of surface dioxin degradation cannot trump multiple Air Force tests PROVING contamination. To accept the VA position one would have to say each of the scientific Air Force tests done over the decades didn't exist, or were in error.  Professor Jeanie Stellman of Columbia University School of Public Health has told the VA that Agent Orange can degrade as the volatiles age, but not dioxin! It remains. On some surfaces, it can remain for decades.   

Tell them that we flew the airplanes NOT decades after Vietnam, but just ONE YEAR after they stopped spraying Agent Orange. We started flying them in 1972 and flew them for a full decade. The contamination of the dioxin on the aircraft was not only on metal surfaces, but in nooks and corners, ducting, hollow tubing, insulation, fabrics (this old airplane had fabric everywhere!) and pooled under the floor as well as in the wings.  

IMPORTANT: Dioxin contamination of painted surfaces is also much more dangerous than dioxin on plain metal, and nearly every metal surface in our aircraft was painted, thus retaining dioxin longer because the toxins soak into paint more readily than into solid metal. This is why complete paint removal is required as part of the dioxin decontamination, as was done on Patches.

 Finally, they may have an opinion which they leap to in preventing our claims, but the Oregon Health Sciences University Toxicology Department and the School of Public Health at Columbia have reviewed the Air Force tests, concluded that they are scientifically acceptable even though a decade or more old AND THAT OUR AIRCRAFT WERE CONTAMINATED AND OUR CREWS WERE EXPOSED!   

The VA and Dod have as their usual source of the surface lifespan info Dr. Alvin Young, who is the gentleman who sarcastically described our Agent Orange-contaminated C-123 crews as "trash haulers, freeloaders", "looking for a sympathetic congressman for tax-free dollars." His attitude must disqualify him from influence regarding our claims.  

In the case of our aircraft stored at Davis-Monthan (the Boneyard), perhaps decades of the aircraft sitting in the desert sun did degrade the dioxin present on the exterior surfaces of the C-123K/UC-123K airplanes...but that hypothetical degrading did not take place between 1972-1982 when we flew, and it did not take place INSIDE the aircraft where our duties placed us for thousands of hours. Further, tests done during the decades the aircraft were store continued to show their toxicity. The aircraft did not go into storage until 1981-1982. Our exposure was over a decade BEFORE the first Air Force test on Tail #362 reported 100% of the swipe tests as positive for presence of dioxin. Our exposure was two decades BEFORE the first Air Force test on Tail #362 directed personnel not enter or work around the aircraft without hazmat protection.  

You mention "the lack of testing on the C-123s in the years following the Vietnam War". CORRECTION: there were tests, many of them, each of which established the toxins present. Air Force tests done in 1979, Air Force tests done in 1994, Air Force tests done in 1996, Air Force tests done in 2000, Air Force tests done in 2008, Air Force tests done in 2010...what lack of tests are they talking about? All these tests showed Agent Orange present. No tests done FAILED to show Agent Orange present. The words used by the Air Force..."HEAVILY CONTAMINATED, EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, EXTREMELY CONTAMINATED"...perhaps these should be strong enough to convince the VA that it is "as likely to as not". 

And I assure you, even accepting their thought that Agent Orange has a very short lifespan...we flew them within a year of their last spray missions! We flew them with dioxin contamination.  If the Air Force prohibited sale of the aircraft in 2000 to prevent a risk to public health, it is impossible to avoid the absolute fact that OUR health was affected decades earlier, with the contamination more intense. Further, Ranch Hand aviators flew their missions for 11 months while in-country. We flew our missions in these contaminated aircraft for A DECADE! Our exposure may have been less intense but it was over a much longer period. Please press as strongly as you can on this. 

We need you and Senator Burr to help us. An expert in dioxin contamination from any reputable laboratory or university would have laughed those guys out of your office! 

          Regards,    

Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF, Retired    http://www.c123kcancer.blogspot.com-