Official Records: USAF Misled Senate & The Press. C-123s Destroyed as TOXIC WASTE!

Released today by the Davis-Monthan AFB Freedom of Information Act Manager, after four years of denials, Air Force documents now show clearly that the former Agent Orange spray C-123s, in desert storage for decades, were destroyed specifically as toxic waste.

This is a big deal in the impact it had on blocking veterans benefits. We try to explain it here. The Air Force, up through the Surgeon General's Office, has long-denied that the Vietnam-era transports were contaminated in any way, denied that aircrews and maintenance personnel were ever exposed in any way, and that the aircraft were not destroyed as toxic waste. In October 2012 the Air Force Congressional Liaison Director, Major General Tod Wolters Deputy assured Senator Richard Burr that the Air Force had not destroyed the airplanes to keep the veterans from learning of their exposures by destruction of all the evidence. But the memos, FOIA results and the IOM conclusions now tell a different story looking back from today's perspective: A more complete revelation of the mischaracterization of huge toxic disposal process, mischaracterized to prevent exposed veterans from seeking VA medical care.

Destruction to block veterans' exposure claims was first suggested, not by the veterans, but by the Air Force Agent Orange consultant. In his decision memoranda to Air Force officials, he counseled immediate destruction due to concerns exposed veterans would turn to the VA for help. His warnings were repeated by Air Force officials up the chain of command, and he was credited as being "the foremost proponent all along." (the same man was to insist at the IOM June 16 2024 committee meeting that the C-123s somehow weren't contaminated after all.)

But toxic waste those C-123s most certainly were. That's why Air Force JAG attorneys warned of the threatened EPA fine reaching $3.4 billion, at $30,000 a day. That's why the Air Force Office of Environmental Law directed information about the C-123s "be kept in official channels only." The planes had to go, and couldn't be sold because the Air Force toxicologists who examined the aircraft testified in September 2000 during federal court proceedings that the C-123s couldn't be surplused because the "posed a threat to public safety."

The Air Force had canceled profitable surplus sales and refused further offers from eager buyers, but those transports couldn't sit in the Tucson desert much longer with an EPA threat of $30,000 per day adding up, and veterans starting to ask questions about evolving Agent Orange illnesses.

First, a couple loopholes were identified deep in EPA regulations, dealing with whether the lingering contamination incident was deliberate or accidental, and if the scrap from the destruction could be reduced to cell phone size.

IOM C-123 Report

Solution: If Air Force officials simply changed the way they thought, the way the C-123s' contamination was described, then, thanks to EPA loopholes, the Air Force could skate on the politically sensitive "toxic" label and the role that fact might play in veterans' claims.

Thus began these last five years of the Air Force refusing to admit the C-123s were destroyed as toxic, and the logic trail letting the AF insist none of the veterans were exposed. But the planes were indeed toxic, and January 2015 Institute of Medicine has determined veterans were exposed,  proved that the Air Force Surgeon was mistaken, and the IOM's careful recalculation of formulas the military used in measuring the contamination pointed out the Air Force's scientific errors.

From USAF Position Paper on Immediate Disposal/Recycle of 18 UC-123K/C-123K 'Agent Orange' Aircraf

Today's released FOIA documents tell a far, far more complete story. Air Force officials were presented with only three possible steps forward in dealing with the spray planes. The picked option C ("Dispose of as HAZWASTE") although a Navy contract was found costing Uncle Sam only $1,000 per airplane to shred and smelt the waste.

From USAF Memorandum, "Dioxin Contaminated C-123s" Look – the AF cannot spell "minimum" correctly!

This latest FOIA release again points out the USAF professional failures surrounding the press release prepared by Hill Air Force Base. It actually never was released but held in the event of any inquiries if anybody noticed eighteen transports had disappeared from the Boneyard. Recent HQ USAF PA memos have insisted Public Affairs did everything properly, and that press releases are never released. The Air Force insists it met its professional public affairs responsibilities even though words like Agent Orange, dioxin, and other attention-grabbing words were edited out and the process ended up described as "an environmentally responsible recycling of aged Vietnam-era airplanes." 

Somehow, telling the truth, meeting its regulatory standards, serving the needs of the public to be informed about its armed forces, and raising the journalism standards it sets for itself all fell away in this C-123 Agent Orange story, as Air Force Public Affairs slipped down to the level of "marketing communications"
–selling the product, maintaining the brand name, waiving off accusations of misbehavior. Deceptions falling short of their mission statement, "Provide Airmen with unique Public Affairs resources to document and convey the Air Force mission and legacy."

USAF PA somehow still feels it best served the Air Force by not telling the public of destroyed toxic warplanes, and by not telling the exposed veterans (through the media) of the event. Tell us now, PA...how'd that deception work out?

From the aircrew's perspective, it didn't work out too well, because four years went by without PA alerting us our that our toxic C-123 exposures caused what the CDC calculated to be our 200-fold greater cancer risk. Four years when we could have been watching our health more closely, had we known what Air Force Public Affairs felt it best not to tell us.

Publicity below the radar was what the Air Force wanted, what the press release was intended to minimize, and it all worked. Real world conclusion: that overworked nasty phrase, "cover up." The Washington Post's August 3 and August 8 2013 articles told the story quite well and managed to avoid use of the phrase.

Until C-123 veterans began associating their years flying these former Agent Orange spray airplanes with their Agent Orange-related illnesses. Veterans had been told since 1979 that the spray planes were safe, and told to clean out remaining dioxin residue by scrubbing with Dawn detergent, and finally were never told of the 1994 tests on "Patches" showing it "heavily contaminated on all test surfaces."

So the April 2010 Air Force press release...their press release so carefully prepared but never released, was deceitful, leaving out the true information about the airplanes' Agent Role. The Air Force Surgeon General was wrong in May 2012 not to notify exposed veterans out of a phony concern to "cause undue distress." – any health warning might have helped veterans take precautions, such as PSA tests. 

There is even a third recent FOIA document set revealing how suddenly what had been for decades "the dioxin contaminated C-123 aircraft" instantly became merely innocent, "aged Vietnam-era transports." Concerns with the toxins which required the USAF Surgeon General to direct civilian employees around the stored airplanes to wear full HAZMAT were dismissed as soon as exposed veterans learned the source of their illnesses, and both AF and VA sought to block further notoriety.

Finally, the Air Force was terribly deceitful to have cooperated

with the VA in efforts to prevent veterans' exposure claims. A final deception to share: Major General Tod Wolters, Air Force Congressional Liaison Director, whose October 2012 letter to Senator Burr flatly dismissed all health concerns veterans had raised, and assured the Senator and his Veterans Affairs Committee that the "The Air Force has not deemed these aircraft as 'heavily contaminated' or 'a danger to public health' in their present configuration."

General Tod Wolters, who signed the report to Senator Burr, insisted the aircraft were safe "in their present configuration" – true, but only because their "present configuration" was as smelted aluminum ingots: all C-123s been shredded and smelted as toxic waste two years earlier!

USAF Agent Orange Consultant Confirms C-123 Dioxin Contamination WAS Greater When First Flown in 1972-1982

In his 24 February 2009 recommendation "Decision Memorandum for Contaminated UC-123K Aircraft" that dioxin-contaminated C-123s stored at Davis-Monthan AFB be destroyed, the DoD consultant commented that the aircraft were less contaminated when tests were conducted in 1994, 1996, 2000 and 2009, than when aircrews flew and maintained them in the years 1973-1982!

OSD'S consultant is the gentleman so familiar with Agent Orange. At first, in the Air Force, he helped develop the military herbicide for use in Vietnam.

One must read his memo of February 2009 carefully! His memo is the most direct smack-down any war veteran could fear! Here is urged the prompt destruction of contaminated surplus C-123 transports stored at Davis-Monthan. He specifically urges the Air Force to attend to likely publicity the event would cause, stating "carefully-worded statements for the media" should be prepared. In other documents, OSD directs that instead of alarming words such as Agent Orange or dioxin in such statements, more benign descriptors of "aged Vietnam-era" aircraft, and that destruction was done because "this action is selected on the basis that these are old aircraft and have been in storage for many years" with little resale potential. Of course, on behalf of the Air Force, William Boor, Director of the 505th ACSS at Hill AFB, UT in November 2009 arranged the prohibition of any further sale of these valuable aircraft specifically "Because of Agent Orange contamination during the Vietnam War"!

This smack-down of C-123 veterans, aircrews whom this OSD consultant and retired USAF colonel publicly labeled "trash-haulers, freeloaders looking for a tax-free dollar from sympathetic congressmen", escalated to the point he recommended destruction of the contaminated C-123s to prevent veterans from learning about their exposure and subsequently approaching the VA for Agent Orange illness treatment. His February 2009 memo detailed the protection which the VA allows for other Agent Orange veterans and stressed media coverage of the destruction he recommended would alert C-123 veterans who did not know of their exposure, and might lead them to seek VA "presumptive compensation."

Does he believe veterans should be barred from such treatment of their exposures? Apparently, both the USAF and the VA eagerly received Young's guidance with the C-123 veterans. In response,  a grateful Major General Busch (the officer who approved destruction of the contaminated C-123s in 2010) promptly labeled Dr. Al Young "one of America's Best." Busch's letters even carried the subject line "Agent Orange airplanes".

Seems the C-123s were no longer Agent Orange airplanes once our veterans started worrying about our illnesses and deaths!

Our C-123 Effort an Embarrassment to the USAF? I hope NOT!

A esteemed gentleman scientist who has kindly guided some of our efforts to gain VA recognition for C-123 aircrews and maintenance troops mentioned that the uncovering of this dioxin problem might be an embarrassment to the USAF. I hope not. I believe not!

The mission is to fly and fight. The mission of the Air Force Medical Service is to maintain the fighting strength, and that is done with world-class health care and by protecting personnel from hazards. Not all hazards of military service can be avoided, but those which can be must be addressed if possible.

This protection should be in place before personnel are at risk. I have never met an airman, NCO or officer who would fail to take every action to protect both civilian and military personnel. I do not believe any Air Force leaders deliberately endangered aeromedical evacuation personnel, aircrews or maintenance personnel.

But, it happened. It happened years earlier than the first signs that our airplanes were toxic, and it was discovered only years after we'd retired the last of them to HAZMAT storage at Davis-Monthan. During the years 1972-1982 there simply wasn't much known about the hazards of TCDD and even less known about how the Provider fleet, once back in CONUS, remained heavily contaminated.

The problem, however, arose when somewhere, somehow...a decision was reached to "keep this information in official channels only" (to quote the AF Office of Environmental Law). Perhaps the need to avoid unnecessary public scrutiny was the reason. Perhaps there was sensitivity to the fact that Disney Films had been sold two toxic airplanes and the dread of a possible headline reading "USAF SELLS DISNEY AGENT ORANGE POISON AIRPLANES" was a concern. Maybe the USAF Security Assistance Center was concerned about visibility for selling toxic airplanes to South Korea and Thailand.

We do know, as the Senior Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense detailed in memos to officials at Hill AFB, there was a concern about preventing already-exposed aircrews from finding out and turning to the VA for medical care. This point was also mentioned by Hill officials, as part of the justification for smelting the airplanes and for minimizing the publicity of the final destruction. This last one is most offensive.

This last one really bothers me. Why the heck is the Air Force (with decisions endorsed at the Air Staff level) taking actions in 2010 to prevent veterans injured in 1972-1982, decades after the fact? Why the heck was a consultant who considered the exposed crews "trash-haulers and freeloaders" allowed to make recommendations with such a prejudice against the population involved? Would anyone accept care from a health professional who viewed his/her patients in that way?

So is this an embarrassment? No. There can be no embarrassment about eventually righting a wrong. That's why we wear wings showing unique qualification and acceptance of very important responsibility. Righting a wrong is what responsibility and leadership are all about. What honor is about. That's what the Air Force is supposed to be about! That's what accepting an officer's commission is about. So lets get the facts, understand them, and set things right at least. This can only be done with the Air Force Medical Service supporting the C-123K veterans in our Agent Orange claims before the Department of Veterans Affairs.

This can only be done by the USAF declaring that, even though it is something which is long past, the C-123K was unsafe for flight at the time we flew and subjected our aircrews to a then-unknown toxic hazard. 

The officers and NCOs (almost all now retired) who have taken on this mission have been trained by the best...we are retirees but a core element of the United States Air Force, and we are meeting our moral duty by pursuing this issue with all our strength. Eventually, the lesson will be that the USAF always does the right thing, if given a few chances to think about it :) As officers our commissions continue as do our responsibilities to the Nation and the men and women who serve it.