Official Records: USAF Misled Senate & The Press. C-123s Destroyed as TOXIC WASTE!

Released today by the Davis-Monthan AFB Freedom of Information Act Manager, after four years of denials, Air Force documents now show clearly that the former Agent Orange spray C-123s, in desert storage for decades, were destroyed specifically as toxic waste.

This is a big deal in the impact it had on blocking veterans benefits. We try to explain it here. The Air Force, up through the Surgeon General's Office, has long-denied that the Vietnam-era transports were contaminated in any way, denied that aircrews and maintenance personnel were ever exposed in any way, and that the aircraft were not destroyed as toxic waste. In October 2012 the Air Force Congressional Liaison Director, Major General Tod Wolters Deputy assured Senator Richard Burr that the Air Force had not destroyed the airplanes to keep the veterans from learning of their exposures by destruction of all the evidence. But the memos, FOIA results and the IOM conclusions now tell a different story looking back from today's perspective: A more complete revelation of the mischaracterization of huge toxic disposal process, mischaracterized to prevent exposed veterans from seeking VA medical care.

Destruction to block veterans' exposure claims was first suggested, not by the veterans, but by the Air Force Agent Orange consultant. In his decision memoranda to Air Force officials, he counseled immediate destruction due to concerns exposed veterans would turn to the VA for help. His warnings were repeated by Air Force officials up the chain of command, and he was credited as being "the foremost proponent all along." (the same man was to insist at the IOM June 16 2024 committee meeting that the C-123s somehow weren't contaminated after all.)

But toxic waste those C-123s most certainly were. That's why Air Force JAG attorneys warned of the threatened EPA fine reaching $3.4 billion, at $30,000 a day. That's why the Air Force Office of Environmental Law directed information about the C-123s "be kept in official channels only." The planes had to go, and couldn't be sold because the Air Force toxicologists who examined the aircraft testified in September 2000 during federal court proceedings that the C-123s couldn't be surplused because the "posed a threat to public safety."

The Air Force had canceled profitable surplus sales and refused further offers from eager buyers, but those transports couldn't sit in the Tucson desert much longer with an EPA threat of $30,000 per day adding up, and veterans starting to ask questions about evolving Agent Orange illnesses.

First, a couple loopholes were identified deep in EPA regulations, dealing with whether the lingering contamination incident was deliberate or accidental, and if the scrap from the destruction could be reduced to cell phone size.

IOM C-123 Report

Solution: If Air Force officials simply changed the way they thought, the way the C-123s' contamination was described, then, thanks to EPA loopholes, the Air Force could skate on the politically sensitive "toxic" label and the role that fact might play in veterans' claims.

Thus began these last five years of the Air Force refusing to admit the C-123s were destroyed as toxic, and the logic trail letting the AF insist none of the veterans were exposed. But the planes were indeed toxic, and January 2015 Institute of Medicine has determined veterans were exposed,  proved that the Air Force Surgeon was mistaken, and the IOM's careful recalculation of formulas the military used in measuring the contamination pointed out the Air Force's scientific errors.

From USAF Position Paper on Immediate Disposal/Recycle of 18 UC-123K/C-123K 'Agent Orange' Aircraf

Today's released FOIA documents tell a far, far more complete story. Air Force officials were presented with only three possible steps forward in dealing with the spray planes. The picked option C ("Dispose of as HAZWASTE") although a Navy contract was found costing Uncle Sam only $1,000 per airplane to shred and smelt the waste.

From USAF Memorandum, "Dioxin Contaminated C-123s" Look – the AF cannot spell "minimum" correctly!

This latest FOIA release again points out the USAF professional failures surrounding the press release prepared by Hill Air Force Base. It actually never was released but held in the event of any inquiries if anybody noticed eighteen transports had disappeared from the Boneyard. Recent HQ USAF PA memos have insisted Public Affairs did everything properly, and that press releases are never released. The Air Force insists it met its professional public affairs responsibilities even though words like Agent Orange, dioxin, and other attention-grabbing words were edited out and the process ended up described as "an environmentally responsible recycling of aged Vietnam-era airplanes." 

Somehow, telling the truth, meeting its regulatory standards, serving the needs of the public to be informed about its armed forces, and raising the journalism standards it sets for itself all fell away in this C-123 Agent Orange story, as Air Force Public Affairs slipped down to the level of "marketing communications"
–selling the product, maintaining the brand name, waiving off accusations of misbehavior. Deceptions falling short of their mission statement, "Provide Airmen with unique Public Affairs resources to document and convey the Air Force mission and legacy."

USAF PA somehow still feels it best served the Air Force by not telling the public of destroyed toxic warplanes, and by not telling the exposed veterans (through the media) of the event. Tell us now, PA...how'd that deception work out?

From the aircrew's perspective, it didn't work out too well, because four years went by without PA alerting us our that our toxic C-123 exposures caused what the CDC calculated to be our 200-fold greater cancer risk. Four years when we could have been watching our health more closely, had we known what Air Force Public Affairs felt it best not to tell us.

Publicity below the radar was what the Air Force wanted, what the press release was intended to minimize, and it all worked. Real world conclusion: that overworked nasty phrase, "cover up." The Washington Post's August 3 and August 8 2013 articles told the story quite well and managed to avoid use of the phrase.

Until C-123 veterans began associating their years flying these former Agent Orange spray airplanes with their Agent Orange-related illnesses. Veterans had been told since 1979 that the spray planes were safe, and told to clean out remaining dioxin residue by scrubbing with Dawn detergent, and finally were never told of the 1994 tests on "Patches" showing it "heavily contaminated on all test surfaces."

So the April 2010 Air Force press release...their press release so carefully prepared but never released, was deceitful, leaving out the true information about the airplanes' Agent Role. The Air Force Surgeon General was wrong in May 2012 not to notify exposed veterans out of a phony concern to "cause undue distress." – any health warning might have helped veterans take precautions, such as PSA tests. 

There is even a third recent FOIA document set revealing how suddenly what had been for decades "the dioxin contaminated C-123 aircraft" instantly became merely innocent, "aged Vietnam-era transports." Concerns with the toxins which required the USAF Surgeon General to direct civilian employees around the stored airplanes to wear full HAZMAT were dismissed as soon as exposed veterans learned the source of their illnesses, and both AF and VA sought to block further notoriety.

Finally, the Air Force was terribly deceitful to have cooperated

with the VA in efforts to prevent veterans' exposure claims. A final deception to share: Major General Tod Wolters, Air Force Congressional Liaison Director, whose October 2012 letter to Senator Burr flatly dismissed all health concerns veterans had raised, and assured the Senator and his Veterans Affairs Committee that the "The Air Force has not deemed these aircraft as 'heavily contaminated' or 'a danger to public health' in their present configuration."

General Tod Wolters, who signed the report to Senator Burr, insisted the aircraft were safe "in their present configuration" – true, but only because their "present configuration" was as smelted aluminum ingots: all C-123s been shredded and smelted as toxic waste two years earlier!

C-123 Contamination - Hill AFB Deception

Below is one of the source documents about DOD C-123 deception..the actual request to withdraw the C-123s from any recycling and this memo was followed by message traffic approving "the quiet way, the Navy way" for shredding and smelting. Now, AF, DOD and VA all deny that the C-123s remained contaminated after Vietnam. The deception is that the C-123s were "the Agent Orange airplanes" until the first veteran's claim. Then, all the exposure hazards and contamination seem to have been dismissed...magic? Or policy? Or deception? The AF suggests the C-123s were safe between 1972-1982 so crews weren't exposed, but after decades of surplus storage in the desert had to be destroyed "because of Agent Orange contamination during the Vietnam War," as this memo states.

Our Rebuttal of VA Comments to Senator Burr of North Carolina

Our letters to staff of North Carolina's Senator Burr and the staff of Commander, Air Force Reserve, which is supposed to have held a conference call with VA officials (no word back yet on any results). Letter to AF first, letter to Senator second.

--------------------------------------------

Dear Major Broussard,

Senator Burr's staff met with some reps from the VA regarding our C-123K problems, and were told that our Agent Orange exposure didn't happen because the post-Vietnam lifespan of dioxin on metal is short. The VA failed to tell my senator's folks that most of the airplane interior was not bare metal, but painted, and Agent Orange and its dioxin contamination soak into paint, and also soak into the insulation, wiring, web seating, etc, as well as the aviation-grade aluminum (which is more porous and which absorbed dioxin more readily than polished steel). 


They stated that the Air Force was concerned about the Agent Orange contamination of the C-123 in an effort to be overly cautious. They failed to note that the Air Force tests establishing the airplanes as "heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous, extremely contaminated" were done in 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2008, years before the airplanes were determined to be too toxic for a landfill and with smelting them the only option left. These tests did not use timid words like "cautious"...the official Air Force words were instead "extremely dangerous" and "extremely hazardous." 

The VA people seemed to say because time had passed by the point the aircraft were destroyed thirty years after their retirement, we couldn't have been exposed to dioxin in 1972-1982 (beginning the year after air airplanes' last Agent Orange spray missions during Vietnam), all the tests establishing contamination notwithstanding.

The VA cited the absence of tests done between the retirement of the C-123 in 1982 and their destruction in 2010, failing to note volume upon volume of official Air Force tests as well as Air Force-contracted tests, every single one of which reported positive for dioxin contamination.

A snow job. If it had been done by any military officer aware of the various tests I'm describing, it would be called dishonorable and a prevarication.

Please don't let it happen to you in presenting our concerns to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Even their own staff must have snickered at this effort with Senator Burr's people!

And please, what is happening? I was back in the hospital myself last week, and this week, and I'll be back again today. Like my crewmates, I'm gravely ill and would like to wrap this up before they wrap me up.

Regards,

   Wes Carter

--------------my letter to Senator Burr's staff follows: They are the folks who met with the VA and were told by the VA that our claims about Agent Orange exposure are groundless-----------------------------------

rustysilverwings@gmail.com
11 Oct 2011

Mr. Brooks Tucker
Senior Policy Advisor
Office of Senator Burr, North Carolina

Dear Mr. Tucker,

Thank you for explaining the results of your staff’s meeting with officials from the Veterans Administration regarding our aircrew exposure to Agent Orange during the decade we, as Air Force crewmembers, flew the C-123K/UC-123K “Provider”, previously used for spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam for Operation Ranch Hand. The VA’s characterization of the Air Force test results and the VA’s perspective of the Air Force position relative to the reuse of the surplus airplanes as expressed during your meeting could, perhaps, be described as a greatly overdone abundance of caution.

The Air Force and the General Services Administration, however, have instead officially described their position as cautious regarding the dioxin contamination…and absolutely not dismissive of the threat! In fact, totally the opposite as per their 2000 report to a federal judge in which both the AF and GSA both characterized these airplanes as being "heavily contaminated" by the dioxin on them. These two words were not used by a layman or a government attorney, but instead by the Air Force toxicologists who tested the airplanes. Certainly it should have been reasonable for the Air Force to be “cautious” regarding aircrew dioxin exposure, although it was not known to be contaminating our airplanes until the very first test in 1979 after we’d flown them for seven years. 


I would hope that the Air Force is “cautious” regarding any airplane, any crew, any possible hazard. In our case, the contamination having been established, the word should be alarmed!

Last week I asked experts for help regarding the VA statements that the surface aging of dioxin would make aircrew exposure to the toxin inconsequential. I sought opinions from two members of the Agent Orange Committee of the Institute on Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, and scientists at both Oregon State University and Columbia University.

In particular, I sought the advice of Dr. Fred Berman, head of the Toxicology Department of Oregon Health Sciences University. In his May 2011 report to the Secretary of the Air Force, he evaluated (and validated) the Air Force test results and provided the University’s finding that our aircrews had been exposed during the timeframe 1972-1982. Yesterday, he replied:

Major Carter, Regarding the stance that the VA is maintaining (that dioxins would have degraded within a short time after service in VN had ended), you could reason that, if indeed the dioxins had rapidly degraded, and in light of the fact that dioxins were detected in significant concentrations on and inside Patches in 2000, then aircrews would likely have been exposed to much higher levels of dioxin between 1970-1980 than suggested in my letter to the Secretary of the Air Force (i.e. The dioxin concentrations immediately after service in Viet Nam would have had to have been very very high to begin with). Fred Berman From: Fred  Berman <bermanf@ohsu.edu>

Please, Brooks, in your representation of us to the VA, defend the position that we have indeed been heavily exposed.Air Force tests done in 1994 on Patches, our most famous C-123K/UC-123K which my squadron flew, reported it"heavily contaminated" with 100% of the swipe tests showing positive for dioxin. Not hypothetical...not degraded, not aged, not anything except "heavily contaminated." This test was done twelve years AFTER we last flew the series. Nobody could believe the aircraft was more contaminated in 1994 than it was in 1972-1982...the VA's own faulty information about surface contamination and aging of dioxin would argue against that conclusion! And no laboratory report concluding an aircraft to be "heavily contaminated" could possibly be seen as in agreement with the VA's description of the Air Force's view of dioxin contamination being so insignificant that the Air Force shredded and smelted the entire valuable fleet for a merely hypothetical risk. 

Please note also that the airplane tested last sprayed Agent Orange in 1969, yet it still tested 100% positive for dioxin, "heavily contaminated" on every single surface examined in 1994. The test did not reveal modest contamination,hypothetical contamination, degraded contamination, significant contamination, or any contamination other thanHEAVILY contaminated. The C-123K’s were even MORE heavily contaminated when we flew them over a decade earlier. Please compare this finding with the suggestions from the VA reps who you met with and you'll see the error of their logic and the blatant effort at disinformation. One should consider their argument here a clear prevarication and deception.

Lieutenant General John Hudson, USAF Retired and Director of the National Museum of the Air Force, wrote me that "before my tenure as Director the aircraft (Patches, Tail 362) was found to be contaminated with dioxin (and) was decontaminated by a contractor." The decontamination, to make it safe for the airplane to be brought inside the Museum, cost $52,000, and required striping all paint from the exterior, removing all insulation and other dioxin-laden materials, and sealing the airplane for all but very limited interior access.

Please remember that we flew Patches, and our other dioxin-contaminated aircraft, in our normal lightweight flight suits, without hazmat protection, without respirators, and without post-flight decontamination. We flew the airplanes for hundreds of hours, we worked on them in flight and on the ground for thousands of hours. We ate in them. slept in them, and were very, very exposed in them. Further, in flight the incessant vibration of the aircraft caused particles to become airborne and thus inhaled.

In 1996 the 355th AMDS/SGPB at Davis-Monthan AFB contracted with Alta Labs to evaluate the aircraft stored at Davis-Monthan, and nearly all tested positive for dioxin (some results were lost, and some were tested incorrectly with the lab determining that actual dioxin contamination might actually be higher than their test results first indicated). In 1997 Armstrong Labs from the Air Force Institute for Operational Health completed tests on C-123K’s stored at Davis-Monthan with similar results but adding the Lab’s concern that the dioxin toxicity could be severe enough to also contaminate the ground beneath the airplanes. AMARC employees were at this point in time directed to wear rubber gloves, a face shield, at least a half-face respirator, and Tyvek coveralls to avoid dioxin exposure, per instructions of Dr. Ronald Porter, Air Force toxicologist.

In 1997, aware of the health threat posed by the toxin, HQ AFMC directed via their memo that

the surplus “dioxin contaminated aircraft” (their words) be sealed and relocated within a “fenced area within the…security area. They will be completely out of view.” (their words). The quarantine effort, necessary for preventing additional personnel exposure, was also done with the specified goal of reducing the public awareness of the 21 remaining “dioxin airplanes”. This effort cost $160,000. Mr. Thomas Lorman, HQ/AFMC/LG-EV, wrote in 1997 that these airplanes are “likely to be contaminated with dioxin from defoliation operations…The Air Force can be up front and warn owners of possible contamination. JAV states the Air Force is at great risk.” (emphasis mine). Certainly this leaps the VA’s barrier of “as likely to as not” regarding any C-123K aircrew veteran’s disability claims! The Air Force’s description of these planes as too toxic for a landfill should also mean that the VA’s barrier of “as likely to as not” regarding our exposure has been greatly exceeded.

In 2008, four aircraft were selected at random and each tested positive for trace levels (or higher) of dioxin, and the test cycle was halted to save the $750-1500 cost per airplane, as well as to prevent characterization of the surplus fleet as "100% contaminated." Messages were exchanged stating that because of the high visibility of "the Agent Orange airplanes", this round of testing could state that four of eighteen aircraft tested positive, rather than continuing the testing and getting an even higher and more visible percentage. Further, AFMC had already decided to destroy all the remaining aircraft.

Please remind the Air Force and the VA that the quarantine of the contaminated aircraft, in which they were placed in a separately fenced area with HAZMAT signs prohibiting access, cost over $150,000. This was not done "just in case" the airplanes were contaminated, but because the base safety officials required it, and both the base medical organization and the AF Surgeon General dictated that workers wear hazmat clothing, respirators, head covers and decontaminate after working. This level of protection is appropriate for "heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous" contamination...just as these airplanes were described by Air Force test results.

Remind the VA that the General Services Administration as well as the Air Force testified before a federal judge in 2000 concerning the government's cancelation of a C-123 sale. Both agencies told the judge that these airplanes represented a danger to public health. They were characterized by the Air Force toxicologist, Dr. Ronald Porter, as “extremely hazardous waste requiring special handling, and his recommendation was to decontaminate each airplane (this recommendation submitted 16 years after we last flew them, 16 years in which their degree of contamination was reduced) at a cost of $15,000 apiece. They did not state that the danger was hypothetical, “overly cautious” or that the danger existed only in Vietnam. These officials testified that the airplanes were contaminated and should not be sold. As you know, two had already been sold to Disney for movies. Continuing on Page 11 of the judge’s ruling, the Air Force reminded the federal judge, and the judge cited as a finding, eight dangers of dioxin contamination from these airplanes, crediting the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the United States Public Health Service.

The director of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Dr. Christopher Porter, wrote me on August 11, 2011, saying our collection of dioxin contamination materials concerning the C-123K is “remarkable”, and recommending that the information be “carefully considered by the Department of Defense”. Because his Agency was cited in 2000 as part of the scientific proof that the surplus C-123K fleet was dioxin contaminated, I strongly recommend that Dr. Porter be consulted for his specific recommendation that the aircraft were indeed contaminated a decade earlier when we flew them!

I personally will pay the travel expenses for Dr. Fred Berman, Dr. Christopher Porter, Dr. Jeanie Stellman of Columbia, or any other reputable expert to be by your side at any future meeting with the VA. Invite them and let me know their expenses. Dr. (name removed) is on the Agent Orange Committee of the Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Science... very, very familiar with the C-123K situation, has studied the multitude of tests done on the airplanes, and states that the aircrews were exposed. As you probably know, members of the Agent Orange committee cannot independently publish on the topic, but they certainly can answer questions...so ask (name removed) at (email address removed for privacy)

Please also remember that Judge Stephen Cohn of the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the late Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Olmsted's VA claim for Agent Orange exposure. Aaron ("Tim") Olmsted's VA claim was denied by Judge Cohn who cited two deficits in the claim: As reported by Connecticut Public Television, in summarizing Olmsted's denial, Judge Cohn ruled:

 1. Olmsted couldn’t prove that the airplanes he flew were the ones used for spraying Agent Orange during Vietnam and

 2. Olmsted couldn’t prove that there was any (my emphasis) dioxin contamination on the airplanes.

He should have had available both proofs...the tail numbers of contaminated airplane assigned to our squadrons have been researched and confirmed by AFRC, and the contamination is established by multiple Air Force tests, although these documents were not available to Olmsted when he filed because they were "kept in official channels only." Denying a veteran necessary documents to approach the VA for medical care cannot be characterized, as the VA has done to you, as "an overabundance of caution." 

I remind you that I was a Stan/Eval flight examiner in my crew position, certified by the Air Force as one of the three most knowledgeable individuals in my AFSC, yet neither I nor any other crew member ever was "official channels" enough to be told of this contamination. It was manifestly my duty to have known everything affecting my aircrew and my student’s health and safety. I have spoken to several state fire marshals who agree with Oregon’s state fire marshal that withholding this kind of information about toxin-endangered employees is a crime. Consider having a senior firefighter from the D.C. department or the Pentagon sit in with your next VA meeting. The only concern I'd have if having genuine toxicology or public health experts with you as the VA "explains things" is that the laughter from them over VA efforts at misinformation would disrupt your otherwise serious meeting.

As you know, the Air Force in 2010 finally smelted the toxic aircraft. In their approval memo, AMARG officials (505 ACSS and 74 CEG) stated “this can be done discretely. This option avoids all contact with or exposure to the public and the aircraft are not made available for commercial sale. This option can happen quickly. Smelting is necessary for these 18 aircraft so the Air Force will no longer be liable for ‘presumptive compensation’ for anyone who ever works around this “Agent Orange” metal…If the Air Force wants quick and quiet disposal, the Navy option is preferable.”

I am offended that these individuals took “quick and quiet” actions to prevent our veterans’ justified claims for “presumptive compensation”, especially considering that our exposure had already taken place.

Senator Burr and Mr. Tucker, you can see that our aircrews worked with this “Agent Orange” metal for a decade. We have been sickened by it as well as by the VA’s construct of any argument at hand, twisted out of context as much as necessary, to insure denial of our proven exposure. I am amazed that they can twist the Air Force initial test results ofPatches being “heavily contaminated” into merely, as you put it, “an overly cautious mindset.” In all the documents I’ve uncovered from the Air Force, there has been no such timid phrase used…the phrases used by the Air Force have been “Agent Orange airplanes”, “extremely contaminated,” “heavily contaminated”, “extremely dangerous”, “danger to the public” and similar language. These should be the words also used by the Department of Veterans Affairs in addressing our concerns.

We are gravely ill from this disaster. Please defend us with all your ability.

Respectfully,

For the Veterans of the C-123K

Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF Retired

Medical Service Corps