AF May 2012 C-123 Exposures Report Differs from 1978 Draft of AFHS re: Aircrew Exposure: Command Interference?

Found in a 1982 report (covering Oct 78-Dec 82) of  USAF School of Aerospace Medicine report on Epidemiological Investigation of Health Effects in Air Force Personnel Following Exposure to Herbicides." The report is available in full at the USDA A.L. Young Collection, Item # 01570. Ranch Hand issues, to include comments on C-123 Ranch Hand veterans and non-Ranch Hand veterans, "

No. 01570, pages 21-22

The important observations to make are:

1. The C-123 non-Ranch Hand aircrews are acknowledged as "may have been exposed to significant Herbicide Orange residue in these aircraft. Therefore, this group may not have been truly unexposed to herbicides..."

2. No distinction is made as to routes of exposure

3. The May 2012 USAFSAM C-123 exposure report concluded the AF was unable to determine the amount of exposure post-Vietnam veterans had, and illogically then concluded there was too little exposure to consider them exposed. In VA-speak, this is equipoise, or "as likely to as not."

4. The Ranch Hand study addressed only Ranch Hand personnel. Only RH veterans had serum levels tested, at $1000 per test. As a small population, studies such as have but little epidemiological, especially for want of a proper control group.  The only real cohort to study is the larger body of Vietnam veterans of all services.

5. The Air Force Chief Medical Research Officer, Dr. Richard Albanese*, testified under oath that about 10% of his reports were modified by his supervisors and that about 10% of all reports he was aware of, such as the Ranch Hand Study of which he was principal investigator, also had command interference for policy objectives.

6. Ranch Hand and post-Vietnam C-123 crews are similar only in flying the same toxic airplanes and being exposed to the same military herbicide. They differ in amounts of exposure, duration of exposure, short vs. long term exposure, ages, years flying the toxic airplanes, gender (post-Vietnam crews began including many more female medical technicians and flight nurses, and some maintenance workers.) But again...both cohorts were exposed to the same military herbicide, Agent Orange, although VA policy prohibits testing the post-Vietnam veterans. 

Conclusion: USAFSAM is shown in their 1982 report to have opined that C-123 crews may have been exposed but changes it mind even in the face of additional exposure evidence in their 2012 report, and contradicts itself for reasons of command interference.
* Dr. Albanese later detailed the multitude of failures in the USAF Ranch Hand study.  He went into specifics regarding the interference by a  White House science committee (White House Working Group "WSWG") made up of military and VA representatives...and they don't seem to have changed anything in the last 22 years!
Additional Conclusion: USAFSAM again proved susceptible to command interference with their 2012 C-123 report. "Look

again" was the order from above when preliminary conclusions favored the possibility of aircrew exposures. "Drop it" was the order when one analysis supported the veterans' assertions. This called for an IG complaint to the 75th Air Wing Inspector General. I filed it in person in early 2013, but without any action or response...they dropped it.

No wonder the Air Force has refused to release the 2012 USAFSAM C-123 report materials, despite two years of FOIA requests and our suit in the US District Court of Washington. At least, AF has promised to allow "some" documents to flow by the end of September. 

Like VA, the AF is keeping source documents locked up until after the Institute of Medicine completes its study and report to the Secretary. Neither agency wants any materials likely to help support the veterans' claims to be made available.

Press Deception at Hill – and it WORKED – Public Was Completely Deceived!

Air Force Press Deception. Deliberate deception of the public to prevent veterans' disability claims.

In June 2010, eighteen multi-engine Air Force transports were shredded, and then smelted, ridding the military of one of its last legacies of the Vietnam War use of Agent Orange.

Years of plans for this destruction of eighteen Fairchild UC-123K cargo planes were firmed up in 2009. Included in those plans were suggestions from the Office of Secretary of Defense Senior Consultant emphasizing the need for minimal public attention. Agent Orange, dioxin, TCDD, Operation Ranch Hand are still attention-grabbing words of great concern to the public, and especially, veterans.

Hill AFB Public Affairs cooperated with leaders at Davis-Monthan AFB in creating the overall plan, which included a unique example of dishonest, unethical public deception. Focused on minimizing public awareness of the destruction process but aware absence of the aircraft might be noticed, the Air Force crafted a press release. As the consultant recommended, the press release was to be readied in the event of inquiries.


But it was to be a press release not released. And in its creative, but misleading wordsmithing, it remains as much a deception of the press and the public as was failure to distribute the document a deception. In two areas, therefore, it not only violated Air Force regulations governing public affairs, but violated the public trust.

Were there laws broken? Probably not, although EPA should look into some actions. It turns out that the Executive Branch, even the president, has no constitutional obligation to speak the truth. However, most of us consider that part of his/her job description. And we certainly expect truthfulness from military leaders, whose only excuse for deception would be for reasons of security. Not embarrassment.

This entry will take a bit of patience for our readers...there is a great deal of background, all of it relevant. And like colors of painter's palette, the facts come together to form the complete picture. Please give it your patience as the full story comes into view.

The "colors' we'll use for form our picture of Air Force press deception, and Air Force violation of its own strict rules about honesty and openness. Upon those rules rest the public's trust and the trust of our press, and the trust of those wearing the uniform.

The issue begins with the C-123s stored at Davis-Monthan and growing awareness that decades were passing without resolution of the political and environmental problems associated with the warplanes everyone (generals, scientists, attorneys, political leaders) called "the Agent Orange airplanes."

In 2000, base employees filed a complaint with their union, worried about exposure to dioxin on the airplanes which had been moved into HAZMAT quarantine.

Before discussion of the particulars of the C-123 destruction deception, let’s look at what obligations the Air Force sets forth in its public affairs program. While the Executive Branch may not be constitutionally required to be truthful, the military accepts that responsibility...with reservations.

The Air Force regulation governing Public Affairs is AFI 35-101, “Public Affairs Responsibilities and Management.” There we see very interesting statements, including:

a. "The purpose of Air Force PA operations is to communicate timely, accurate, and
useful information.” "The Air Force’s credibility depends on two factors: maintaining professional integrity and communicating timely and truthful information to the public.”
b: "Achieve informed public support for the Air Force and joint operations.”
c. "Information is not withheld merely because it casts criticism on or causes embarrassment to the Air Force."
d. Department of Defense Principles of Information. DOD makes available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the media may assess and understand the
facts about national security and defense strategy.”
e. "A free flow of general and military information will be made available without
censorship or propaganda to the American public.” “Information is not classified or otherwise withheld from disclosure only to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.”
f: The Air Force should provide the public with information on its major programs; they may require detailed PA planning and coordination within DOD and with other  government agencies. The sole purpose of such an activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propaganda has no place in DOD PA programs.”
g. Air Force Commanders: Ensure legally required community involvement in environmental issues is conducted in a thorough and timely manner.”
h: All Air Force Personnel:  each person must strive to make sure public
contacts show the highest standards of conduct and reflect the Air Force’s core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence.

In April 2010 the 75^th ABW, Hill AFB, Utah prepared in advance a press release describing the destruction of the remaining C-123K/UC-123K aircraft at the Davis-Monthan AFB. Management of the information about this process was faulty and greatly harmed Air Force interests.

Throughout the period 2000-2010, intense concern was raised at different agencies, including the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Air Staff, the Air Force Surgeon General, the Air Force Office of Environmental Law, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, HQ Air Force Material Command and more. 

The concern: dioxin contamination left on the aircraft from their Vietnam War service as Agent Orange spray aircraft in Operation Ranch Hand.

1993 seems to be the first time when tests were ordered on Patches, the Air Force Museum’s famous C-123, was tested before positioning inside the museum. It tested positive for dioxin…in the words of the Air Force toxicologists it was “heavily

C-123K "Patches" at USAF Museum

contaminated”.

More tests and correspondence accumulate during the period 1994-2000 with the only concerns expressed being the disposal of the aircraft, safety of personnel at the Boneyard, whether Walt Disney films should be told that two of the C-123s they purchased for movie production were possibly contaminated, whether foreign governments should be informed that the aircraft transferred to them were contaminated, and similar correspondence. 

No mention has ever been found of concern for the aircrews who flew these airplanes and had already been exposed, until 2013 when Air Force leaders reported the information had been withheld from the veterans "to prevent undue distress."

In 1996 AFMC’s Office of Environmental Law recommended the contamination be “kept within official channels”, a recommendation endorsed by the writer’s commander, the Director of the Office of Environmental Law.

In 2000 the Air Force joined with the General Services Administration in a court action to stop the contracted sale of some contaminated C123s. The federal judge took their sworn testimony of the aircraft being “heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous, extremely contaminated, danger to the public” and other descriptions, and ordered the sale terminated. (note: In 2012, faced with veterans' claims for exposure, the USAF reversed its opinion, saying the planes were actually no danger to the veterans.)

In 2009 the AMARG/AFMC moved towards disposal of the remaining 21 aircraft, but officials knew the planes couldn’t be buried as they were too toxic for a landfill. The recommendation of the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Senior Consultant was to stop testing the aircraft immediately for toxicity…all four had tested positive (two significant and two trace, but any trace is unsafe) and his suggestion was that that result could be taken two ways:

First, because the first four tested had two that were contaminated, it could be inferred that “only two of the 21 aircraft were toxic."

Or worse, that “50% or more of the remaining aircraft were toxic.” As the testing was costly, base officials, acting on the OSD consultant's authority, opted to shred the entire fleet of C-123s, having discovered a loophole in EPA regulations that shredded metal could avoid being classified as toxic waste. EPA regulations were looked at carefully, due to a threatened $3,400,000,000 fine.

The OSD consultant also recommended that the public affairs at Hill and Davis-Monthan prepare for possible media inquiries. He mentioned an article from Orion Magazine, and discussed the worry that a media “storm” that might develop could inform Air Force Reservists who flew the airplanes between 1972-1982 that their dioxin-related illnesses might be brought to the VA for treatment. 

Various drafts of a press release were offered, and the OSD consultant along with other officials “corrected” the drafts by eliminating words such as “Agent Orange”, “dioxin”,  “contamination” and replacing them with words less likely to alarm the public. Agent Orange and dioxin and contamination were replaced with “herbicide” and “aged Vietnam-era airplanes no longer flown.” 

The consultant's words...his agenda formed the Air Force press release:

The question of adverse publicity related to additional sampling or the immediate destruction of the aircraft is important to address. Clearly the Public Affairs Office needs to be involved in either course of action. The longer this issue remains unresolved, the greater the likelihood of outside press reporting on yet another “Agent Orange Controversy”. I recommend the IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF ALL THE UC-123K AIRCRAFT. Public Affairs should prepare a news release in the event that there is a press inquiry. The key issues to emphasize in a press release are “that these old and obsolete aircraft sprayed defoliants in Vietnam 40 years ago”, “they were retired to Davis-Monthan AFB many years ago”, and “that recent analytical data from sampling a representative number of the aircraft indicated that only negligible levels of contamination could be detected.” Thus, “they were destroyed in an approved method used for the destruction of all obsolete aircraft at Davis-Monthan AFB.”

The last part of the statements was clearly deceptive, given the volumes of Air Force memos about companies desperate to purchase the valuable engines and propellers, and museums which wanted them, and private buyers who wanted them so desperately they unsuccessfully sued in federal court to try to force a sale. And lost, because the planes were shown to be dangerously toxic.

The final version of the UC-123’s story was approved by the necessary authorities at the 75^th Air Base Wing. It was not distributed, but held in case of media inquiry. This was a further element of the effort to minimize public awareness of the true story of the event.

Perhaps no lies were told. But there were, indeed, pages of prevarication. Mistruths were constructed to build a story which really had nothing to do with the real news of the event…dioxin contaminated aircraft. Nobody at the 75th ABW PA shop inquired of the managers of the event about the Air Force Reserve aircrews which had been exposed to dioxin on their airplanes for a full decade. Instead, the public affairs officers bent without objection, indeed, apparently with eager willingness, and in complete disregard for Air Force Instruction 35-101, to construct a press release to deceive the media and the public, as well as the Air Force Reservists beginning to wonder why they have cancer, heart disease, acute peripheral neuropathy, ALS, and other dioxin-related illnesses.

A careful reader will note a possibly inappropriate use of a business title implying official actions within and by the Office of Secretary of Defense. That particular consultant was described in several documents from HQ AFMC and the 75^th Air Base Wing as Agent Orange “Senior Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense.” 

Later, in an interview with Steve Vogel of the Washington Post, the consultant, Dr. Al Young, said he was acting privately in his work overseeing the C-123 destruction.

This person's attitudes and reactions to Reserve Component aircrews are a specific concern. In his 26 June 2009 position paper regarding the need for speedy destruction of the dioxin-contaminated aircraft, the OSD consultant mentions the media “storm” which might attend the operation and cause aircrews and maintenance workers with dioxin-related illnesses to seek care at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Concerned with the visibility of this event, which he frequently wrote must be low key (and even congratulates base officials on concluding the operation with minimal public attention). 

There has been an obvious careful selection of words to hide the actual event – a prevarication - destruction of dioxin-contaminated aircraft with a potential $3.4 billion dollar EPA or State of Arizona fine. This by presenting a completely misleading press release. There is an ethical standard in preparation of press releases, but it seems to have been ignored here in disregard for AFI 35-101.

The OSD consultant, a retired Air Force officer, in a 10 July 2011 message described the dioxin-exposed Air Force Reserve combat veteran aircrews as “trash haulers, freeloaders looking for a sympathetic Congressman for tax-free dollars.”  This is an inappropriate perspective from a person editing Air Force press releases especially when he helps direct the misinformation concerning events vital to the C-123 veterans' health.

His perspective was certainly consistent. He was hired by the VA to report on the C-123 veterans' exposure concerns and in his November 2012 report he recommended against any recognition of their exposure or disability claims. His involvement is also unique: He helped develop Agent Orange as a tactical weapon while in the Air Force. He advised the AF on disposing the airplanes because of their toxicity, he expressed distain for the veterans who flew the warplanes, and then he recommended that, regardless of other scientific proofs (which he opted not to reference in his report) that the VA block the veterans' disability claims. Thus, he had a significant role in each key part of the C-123 contamination story.

Particular concern has been raised with the 12 February 2010 Staff Summary prepared by Mr. Dwight Eagle of the 505^th. He noted the OSD consultant’s suggestion that although the UC-123K was principally used to spray Agent Orange, because some of them sometimes sprayed other liquids or conducted other missions, it could thus be described in terms of those missions, rather than the Agent Orange-Ranch Hand missions which were the principal employment for the airplane. Cleverly, the consultant had “clarified that the low levels of contamination are not necessarily attributed to Agent Orange, since not all aircraft were used in defoliant operations. Therefore, according to Dr. Young, the aircraft disposal does not have to be publicly announced as portraying or relating to Agent Orange.”

The Air Force Academy Cadet Honor Code Handbook, and other military volumes dealing with honor, considers this press release word-twisting to be quibbling, evasive, and incomplete…a lie constructed from half-truths, and dishonorable. It is perhaps not in keeping with the requirements of the State of Arizona or the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules and regulations regarding hazardous waste storage and their threatened $3.4 billion fine. The work product of the 75th ABW was not public affairs. It was an exercise in prevarication and public deception.

What was the news? The destruction of Agent Orange spray airplanes. And that was precisely the news to be obscured, twisted, avoided.

Today, thanks to many media reports, this story has changed quite a bit from what it could have been, and should have been – the simple “destruction of Agent Orange contaminated aircraft in an environmentally responsible way” to one where the news value is in the early attempts to keep the information in official channels, to one where Air Force public affairs abused the trust of the public and media by misleading them through a poorly-crafted and deceptive press release. 

It morphed, and grew into a situation where public affairs at both Hill AFB and Davis-Monthan AFB failed to bring to the attention of leadership their military and civil service ethical responsibilities. And, although public affairs professionals with clear guidance provided by AFI 35-101, they failed to alert their leaders as to the negative impact of failing to notify aircrews who’d been exposed to the toxins and the health dangers this press release was designed to conceal from us, our families, the media and the public.

Mission...failed.

Getting There Slowly - still hoping for VA to do the right thing!

The Old Sarge puts his faithful but tired C-123 out of its misery!

Support Comes In - Pressure Mounts on VA

C-123 veterans have been favored with strong support this month from Mr. John Rowan, National President of the Vietnam Veterans of America. Also, Independent Scientific Opinions were offered by Oregon Health Sciences University and by Columbia University.

No challenge or question has been raised about the dioxin contamination of the old Provider, nor about our aircrew exposure to all that dioxin which remained on the aircraft.

Next week, the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine runs their findings of a three-month investigation past Senate staffers who've been tracking our concerns (Mr. Brooks Tucker of Sen. Burr, NC) and we anticipate solid support from the Air Force. Last month the CDC's Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry issued with everyone has been calling a "game changer"...directly challenging the VA's position against us, the ATSDR's official letter found that aircrews DID fly in a heavily contaminated aircraft, DID become exposed to the dioxin remaining from the Vietnam War, and DID suffer a 200-times greater cancer threshold. Further, ATSDR said the exposure was likely even more intense in the years 1972-1982 than when tests were finally done in 1994.

How much more of a case does a veteran have to make to the VA to get medical care for Agent Orange presumptive illnesses? We have had our flying buddies rejected by the VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals because no proof was available about the aircraft use in VN nor the specific aircraft contamination - because all such proof was withheld by the USAF Office of Environmental Law until released via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2011. Now that the information cited has been found, the VA develops new objections to allowing our crews and maintenance troops vital medical care. Now they say we weren't exposed to "enough" dioxin. Well, folks, the Institute on Medicine reports that there is no safe level of dioxin exposure. None. And in our case, tests show Patches and the other birds were exposing us to 200 times the safety threshold.

And what a delaying act the VA presents! This writer's own Agent Orange application for service connection (cancer, heart disease, diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, misdiagnosis, bad attitude) has been on the so-called "VA Fast Track" for 329 days. Thank goodness I'm already 100% for other issues or I'd have been devastated financially by now.

My senator's office called to say the VA was waiting for papers from another agency??? Huh? Takes a year to drop a memo to somebody and get a reply? Fast track? Off the track?

Our Rebuttal of VA Comments to Senator Burr of North Carolina

Our letters to staff of North Carolina's Senator Burr and the staff of Commander, Air Force Reserve, which is supposed to have held a conference call with VA officials (no word back yet on any results). Letter to AF first, letter to Senator second.

--------------------------------------------

Dear Major Broussard,

Senator Burr's staff met with some reps from the VA regarding our C-123K problems, and were told that our Agent Orange exposure didn't happen because the post-Vietnam lifespan of dioxin on metal is short. The VA failed to tell my senator's folks that most of the airplane interior was not bare metal, but painted, and Agent Orange and its dioxin contamination soak into paint, and also soak into the insulation, wiring, web seating, etc, as well as the aviation-grade aluminum (which is more porous and which absorbed dioxin more readily than polished steel). 


They stated that the Air Force was concerned about the Agent Orange contamination of the C-123 in an effort to be overly cautious. They failed to note that the Air Force tests establishing the airplanes as "heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous, extremely contaminated" were done in 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2008, years before the airplanes were determined to be too toxic for a landfill and with smelting them the only option left. These tests did not use timid words like "cautious"...the official Air Force words were instead "extremely dangerous" and "extremely hazardous." 

The VA people seemed to say because time had passed by the point the aircraft were destroyed thirty years after their retirement, we couldn't have been exposed to dioxin in 1972-1982 (beginning the year after air airplanes' last Agent Orange spray missions during Vietnam), all the tests establishing contamination notwithstanding.

The VA cited the absence of tests done between the retirement of the C-123 in 1982 and their destruction in 2010, failing to note volume upon volume of official Air Force tests as well as Air Force-contracted tests, every single one of which reported positive for dioxin contamination.

A snow job. If it had been done by any military officer aware of the various tests I'm describing, it would be called dishonorable and a prevarication.

Please don't let it happen to you in presenting our concerns to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Even their own staff must have snickered at this effort with Senator Burr's people!

And please, what is happening? I was back in the hospital myself last week, and this week, and I'll be back again today. Like my crewmates, I'm gravely ill and would like to wrap this up before they wrap me up.

Regards,

   Wes Carter

--------------my letter to Senator Burr's staff follows: They are the folks who met with the VA and were told by the VA that our claims about Agent Orange exposure are groundless-----------------------------------

rustysilverwings@gmail.com
11 Oct 2011

Mr. Brooks Tucker
Senior Policy Advisor
Office of Senator Burr, North Carolina

Dear Mr. Tucker,

Thank you for explaining the results of your staff’s meeting with officials from the Veterans Administration regarding our aircrew exposure to Agent Orange during the decade we, as Air Force crewmembers, flew the C-123K/UC-123K “Provider”, previously used for spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam for Operation Ranch Hand. The VA’s characterization of the Air Force test results and the VA’s perspective of the Air Force position relative to the reuse of the surplus airplanes as expressed during your meeting could, perhaps, be described as a greatly overdone abundance of caution.

The Air Force and the General Services Administration, however, have instead officially described their position as cautious regarding the dioxin contamination…and absolutely not dismissive of the threat! In fact, totally the opposite as per their 2000 report to a federal judge in which both the AF and GSA both characterized these airplanes as being "heavily contaminated" by the dioxin on them. These two words were not used by a layman or a government attorney, but instead by the Air Force toxicologists who tested the airplanes. Certainly it should have been reasonable for the Air Force to be “cautious” regarding aircrew dioxin exposure, although it was not known to be contaminating our airplanes until the very first test in 1979 after we’d flown them for seven years. 


I would hope that the Air Force is “cautious” regarding any airplane, any crew, any possible hazard. In our case, the contamination having been established, the word should be alarmed!

Last week I asked experts for help regarding the VA statements that the surface aging of dioxin would make aircrew exposure to the toxin inconsequential. I sought opinions from two members of the Agent Orange Committee of the Institute on Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, and scientists at both Oregon State University and Columbia University.

In particular, I sought the advice of Dr. Fred Berman, head of the Toxicology Department of Oregon Health Sciences University. In his May 2011 report to the Secretary of the Air Force, he evaluated (and validated) the Air Force test results and provided the University’s finding that our aircrews had been exposed during the timeframe 1972-1982. Yesterday, he replied:

Major Carter, Regarding the stance that the VA is maintaining (that dioxins would have degraded within a short time after service in VN had ended), you could reason that, if indeed the dioxins had rapidly degraded, and in light of the fact that dioxins were detected in significant concentrations on and inside Patches in 2000, then aircrews would likely have been exposed to much higher levels of dioxin between 1970-1980 than suggested in my letter to the Secretary of the Air Force (i.e. The dioxin concentrations immediately after service in Viet Nam would have had to have been very very high to begin with). Fred Berman From: Fred  Berman <bermanf@ohsu.edu>

Please, Brooks, in your representation of us to the VA, defend the position that we have indeed been heavily exposed.Air Force tests done in 1994 on Patches, our most famous C-123K/UC-123K which my squadron flew, reported it"heavily contaminated" with 100% of the swipe tests showing positive for dioxin. Not hypothetical...not degraded, not aged, not anything except "heavily contaminated." This test was done twelve years AFTER we last flew the series. Nobody could believe the aircraft was more contaminated in 1994 than it was in 1972-1982...the VA's own faulty information about surface contamination and aging of dioxin would argue against that conclusion! And no laboratory report concluding an aircraft to be "heavily contaminated" could possibly be seen as in agreement with the VA's description of the Air Force's view of dioxin contamination being so insignificant that the Air Force shredded and smelted the entire valuable fleet for a merely hypothetical risk. 

Please note also that the airplane tested last sprayed Agent Orange in 1969, yet it still tested 100% positive for dioxin, "heavily contaminated" on every single surface examined in 1994. The test did not reveal modest contamination,hypothetical contamination, degraded contamination, significant contamination, or any contamination other thanHEAVILY contaminated. The C-123K’s were even MORE heavily contaminated when we flew them over a decade earlier. Please compare this finding with the suggestions from the VA reps who you met with and you'll see the error of their logic and the blatant effort at disinformation. One should consider their argument here a clear prevarication and deception.

Lieutenant General John Hudson, USAF Retired and Director of the National Museum of the Air Force, wrote me that "before my tenure as Director the aircraft (Patches, Tail 362) was found to be contaminated with dioxin (and) was decontaminated by a contractor." The decontamination, to make it safe for the airplane to be brought inside the Museum, cost $52,000, and required striping all paint from the exterior, removing all insulation and other dioxin-laden materials, and sealing the airplane for all but very limited interior access.

Please remember that we flew Patches, and our other dioxin-contaminated aircraft, in our normal lightweight flight suits, without hazmat protection, without respirators, and without post-flight decontamination. We flew the airplanes for hundreds of hours, we worked on them in flight and on the ground for thousands of hours. We ate in them. slept in them, and were very, very exposed in them. Further, in flight the incessant vibration of the aircraft caused particles to become airborne and thus inhaled.

In 1996 the 355th AMDS/SGPB at Davis-Monthan AFB contracted with Alta Labs to evaluate the aircraft stored at Davis-Monthan, and nearly all tested positive for dioxin (some results were lost, and some were tested incorrectly with the lab determining that actual dioxin contamination might actually be higher than their test results first indicated). In 1997 Armstrong Labs from the Air Force Institute for Operational Health completed tests on C-123K’s stored at Davis-Monthan with similar results but adding the Lab’s concern that the dioxin toxicity could be severe enough to also contaminate the ground beneath the airplanes. AMARC employees were at this point in time directed to wear rubber gloves, a face shield, at least a half-face respirator, and Tyvek coveralls to avoid dioxin exposure, per instructions of Dr. Ronald Porter, Air Force toxicologist.

In 1997, aware of the health threat posed by the toxin, HQ AFMC directed via their memo that

the surplus “dioxin contaminated aircraft” (their words) be sealed and relocated within a “fenced area within the…security area. They will be completely out of view.” (their words). The quarantine effort, necessary for preventing additional personnel exposure, was also done with the specified goal of reducing the public awareness of the 21 remaining “dioxin airplanes”. This effort cost $160,000. Mr. Thomas Lorman, HQ/AFMC/LG-EV, wrote in 1997 that these airplanes are “likely to be contaminated with dioxin from defoliation operations…The Air Force can be up front and warn owners of possible contamination. JAV states the Air Force is at great risk.” (emphasis mine). Certainly this leaps the VA’s barrier of “as likely to as not” regarding any C-123K aircrew veteran’s disability claims! The Air Force’s description of these planes as too toxic for a landfill should also mean that the VA’s barrier of “as likely to as not” regarding our exposure has been greatly exceeded.

In 2008, four aircraft were selected at random and each tested positive for trace levels (or higher) of dioxin, and the test cycle was halted to save the $750-1500 cost per airplane, as well as to prevent characterization of the surplus fleet as "100% contaminated." Messages were exchanged stating that because of the high visibility of "the Agent Orange airplanes", this round of testing could state that four of eighteen aircraft tested positive, rather than continuing the testing and getting an even higher and more visible percentage. Further, AFMC had already decided to destroy all the remaining aircraft.

Please remind the Air Force and the VA that the quarantine of the contaminated aircraft, in which they were placed in a separately fenced area with HAZMAT signs prohibiting access, cost over $150,000. This was not done "just in case" the airplanes were contaminated, but because the base safety officials required it, and both the base medical organization and the AF Surgeon General dictated that workers wear hazmat clothing, respirators, head covers and decontaminate after working. This level of protection is appropriate for "heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous" contamination...just as these airplanes were described by Air Force test results.

Remind the VA that the General Services Administration as well as the Air Force testified before a federal judge in 2000 concerning the government's cancelation of a C-123 sale. Both agencies told the judge that these airplanes represented a danger to public health. They were characterized by the Air Force toxicologist, Dr. Ronald Porter, as “extremely hazardous waste requiring special handling, and his recommendation was to decontaminate each airplane (this recommendation submitted 16 years after we last flew them, 16 years in which their degree of contamination was reduced) at a cost of $15,000 apiece. They did not state that the danger was hypothetical, “overly cautious” or that the danger existed only in Vietnam. These officials testified that the airplanes were contaminated and should not be sold. As you know, two had already been sold to Disney for movies. Continuing on Page 11 of the judge’s ruling, the Air Force reminded the federal judge, and the judge cited as a finding, eight dangers of dioxin contamination from these airplanes, crediting the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the United States Public Health Service.

The director of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Dr. Christopher Porter, wrote me on August 11, 2011, saying our collection of dioxin contamination materials concerning the C-123K is “remarkable”, and recommending that the information be “carefully considered by the Department of Defense”. Because his Agency was cited in 2000 as part of the scientific proof that the surplus C-123K fleet was dioxin contaminated, I strongly recommend that Dr. Porter be consulted for his specific recommendation that the aircraft were indeed contaminated a decade earlier when we flew them!

I personally will pay the travel expenses for Dr. Fred Berman, Dr. Christopher Porter, Dr. Jeanie Stellman of Columbia, or any other reputable expert to be by your side at any future meeting with the VA. Invite them and let me know their expenses. Dr. (name removed) is on the Agent Orange Committee of the Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Science... very, very familiar with the C-123K situation, has studied the multitude of tests done on the airplanes, and states that the aircrews were exposed. As you probably know, members of the Agent Orange committee cannot independently publish on the topic, but they certainly can answer questions...so ask (name removed) at (email address removed for privacy)

Please also remember that Judge Stephen Cohn of the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the late Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Olmsted's VA claim for Agent Orange exposure. Aaron ("Tim") Olmsted's VA claim was denied by Judge Cohn who cited two deficits in the claim: As reported by Connecticut Public Television, in summarizing Olmsted's denial, Judge Cohn ruled:

 1. Olmsted couldn’t prove that the airplanes he flew were the ones used for spraying Agent Orange during Vietnam and

 2. Olmsted couldn’t prove that there was any (my emphasis) dioxin contamination on the airplanes.

He should have had available both proofs...the tail numbers of contaminated airplane assigned to our squadrons have been researched and confirmed by AFRC, and the contamination is established by multiple Air Force tests, although these documents were not available to Olmsted when he filed because they were "kept in official channels only." Denying a veteran necessary documents to approach the VA for medical care cannot be characterized, as the VA has done to you, as "an overabundance of caution." 

I remind you that I was a Stan/Eval flight examiner in my crew position, certified by the Air Force as one of the three most knowledgeable individuals in my AFSC, yet neither I nor any other crew member ever was "official channels" enough to be told of this contamination. It was manifestly my duty to have known everything affecting my aircrew and my student’s health and safety. I have spoken to several state fire marshals who agree with Oregon’s state fire marshal that withholding this kind of information about toxin-endangered employees is a crime. Consider having a senior firefighter from the D.C. department or the Pentagon sit in with your next VA meeting. The only concern I'd have if having genuine toxicology or public health experts with you as the VA "explains things" is that the laughter from them over VA efforts at misinformation would disrupt your otherwise serious meeting.

As you know, the Air Force in 2010 finally smelted the toxic aircraft. In their approval memo, AMARG officials (505 ACSS and 74 CEG) stated “this can be done discretely. This option avoids all contact with or exposure to the public and the aircraft are not made available for commercial sale. This option can happen quickly. Smelting is necessary for these 18 aircraft so the Air Force will no longer be liable for ‘presumptive compensation’ for anyone who ever works around this “Agent Orange” metal…If the Air Force wants quick and quiet disposal, the Navy option is preferable.”

I am offended that these individuals took “quick and quiet” actions to prevent our veterans’ justified claims for “presumptive compensation”, especially considering that our exposure had already taken place.

Senator Burr and Mr. Tucker, you can see that our aircrews worked with this “Agent Orange” metal for a decade. We have been sickened by it as well as by the VA’s construct of any argument at hand, twisted out of context as much as necessary, to insure denial of our proven exposure. I am amazed that they can twist the Air Force initial test results ofPatches being “heavily contaminated” into merely, as you put it, “an overly cautious mindset.” In all the documents I’ve uncovered from the Air Force, there has been no such timid phrase used…the phrases used by the Air Force have been “Agent Orange airplanes”, “extremely contaminated,” “heavily contaminated”, “extremely dangerous”, “danger to the public” and similar language. These should be the words also used by the Department of Veterans Affairs in addressing our concerns.

We are gravely ill from this disaster. Please defend us with all your ability.

Respectfully,

For the Veterans of the C-123K

Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF Retired

Medical Service Corps