Showing posts with label stellman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label stellman. Show all posts

23 April 2019

Skillful Independent Medical Opinion re: Agent Orange & USAF Line of Duty

Here's a terrific independent medical opinion (IMO) written to argue that a post-Vietnam War C-123 veteran should be given a USAF line of duty determination (LOD.)
Why the LOD? Because the VA requires itself to recognize military records when considering a veteran's disability claim. DD-214, OJT records, TDY orders...all these are service medical records establishing a veteran's eligibility for benefits. The LOD is almost as pivotal as the DD-214.
My hope is that the Air Force Board of Correction, or the Federal Circuit Court, will investigate this veteran to determine whether an LOD is warranted. If so, my objective will have been met. I want an example for all post-Vietnam C-123 veterans to anchor their exposure disability back around 1980, so that denies Agent Orange-related VA disability claims submitted between then and now can be reconsidered.
Nothing is certain, even if the AFBCMR issues an LOD. But the example of one C-123 vet getting a retroactive LOD can help everyone else!

05 June 2014

Dow and Monsanto Issue New Defenses of Agent Orange

In papers recently released by the Department of Veterans Affairs (although earlier withheld against Freedom of Information Act requests by stating no such documentation exists,) an article was identified as authored by scientists sponsored by Dow and Monsanto, the wartime manufacturers of Agent Orange. Veterans might recall that Dow and Monsanto are quite defensive when questions arise about their role spreading the toxin worldwide, and their money continues to be spread about to defend themselves.

Authors Ginevan and Ross were retained to focus on the Stellman finding which confirms the C-123 veterans' exposure, and the subsequent Committee of Concerned Scientists and Physicians letter reaching the same conclusion. The chemical firms' writers attack the science used by the independent and unpaid experts...unsuccessfully!

The only news here is that Dow and Monsanto are still spending money whenever and wherever
they can challenge any veterans' hopes of receiving VA medical care for Agent Orange illnesses.

19 April 2014

C-123 Exposure Study by Institute of Medicine – More Details Emerge


The National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine has been handed a contract by the
Department of Veterans Affairs to evaluate the C-123 Agent Orange contamination and exposure concerns raised by veterans. The study has its first committee meeting May 15, and the final on June 16, with a report due back to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs by the end of September. Veterans hope that, with such a narrow study focus, the report might be finished earlier.
A full description of the VA assignment, the IOM plans for its meetings, and committee members is available at the IOM website or here.

28 March 2014

Deceptive VA Poster – Created to Block C-123 Agent Orange Exposure Claims

The 1991 Agent Orange Act, Title 38 and Federal Register publications combine to, in the VA's own words, "make clear" the fact that veterans exposed to military herbicides will be treated the same as Vietnam veterans for presumptive service connection. The key word: exposed.

The VA mission: redefine exposure so veterans' exposures would not be exposures to the VA.

This they did at the 2012 Society of Toxicology. VA surrendered ethics to policy, and redefined exposure to prevent exposure being acknowledged for C-123 veterans' claims. Of course, careful reading of their redefinition makes clear VA can apply it to consideration of any exposure...radiation, other toxins, biological hazards, burn pits...anything.

The was deceptive. Its title promised an historical perspective on Agent Orange and an update. This was done, but the key objective was inserting their deceptive redefinition to block exposure claims by C-123 veterans. Thus, "exposure = contamination field + bioavailability." Wrong. Wrong in every way.

Bad science. The words used by scientists on reading it: ludicrous, unscientific, preposterous!

The words used by VA raters on reading it while considering C-123 claims: Claim denied! Any excuse will suffice to prevent exposure claims at Veterans Benefits Administration.

We make special observation at the title of a key section of VA's poster: "Risk Assessment of Post-Vietnam C-123 Aircraft."

Two points:
1. Actually, who cares from a claims perspective, as risk is irrelevant. The issue is exposure, and thus the section title should have been, "Exposure Assessment of Post-Vietnam C-123 Aircraft."
2. The risk assessment is unscientific, and recently challenged by the Environmental Science article. This means C-123 veterans are at risk for health issues which their civilian and VA physicians must be aware of, yet VA's unscientific poster pretends no health risks exist, a position taken only to save VA the cost of such care and only by pretending VA has the wherewithal to redefine fundamental terms in science for employment against their veteran clients' interests.

So far, job well done! Universal claims denial, with a neat circle of initial invitation to exposed veterans to submit claims, the inquiry to JSRRC with their response (VA edited, and VA-limited as to what can be fed back to VA,) followed by the referral for opinion from Compensation and Pension and their boilerplate denials, concluding in the claim's final denial letter to the veteran.

As both VBA and VHA intend, this wastes as much as two years, and that's a terrific built-in benefit for the VA as it keeps the doors locked against the C-123 vets. It saves VA money, more of us die, and then the BVA appeal is designed to lock those VA hospital doors for another two to three years. More of us die. Then, after what has been a four to seven year process, receive a BVA decision...always affirming...and can survivors walk (if they still can) into the VA hospital and get on the waiting list for treatment of our cancers, heart disease and other ailments we had been suffering when we first applied for care.

All this from their simple, unique redefinition of "exposure." We trust their annual reviews reflected the pride VA had on the skillful wordsmithing and other accomplishments the staff in Post Deployment Health exhibited in responding to the VA agenda of preventing C-123 claims...or perhaps even implementing that policy on their own.

Wouldn't want any papers left laying around for some FOIA miner, would they?

22 March 2014

Dermal Exposure – Denied by VA But Confirmed by Science

VA rejects all C-123 clams based on their selective literature review which was designed to avoid reference to publications not fitting their predetermined objective of preventing any acknowledgement of exposure aboard the C-123s. It is not a "blanket policy" for denials, but instead a 100% rejection with what they call a "claim-by-claim" process. We fail to see the distinction...the fact of the matter is the same, total rejection of all C-123 exposure claims. The Senate was misled with Secretary Shinseki's letter.

The fact that the VA's position was formed against us is based on their obvious decision to ignore publications not fitting VA's objective of pretending no exposure occured. Publications such as Leung and Paustenbach and the many government publications addressing hazards of TCDD exposure were dismissed as through they didn't exist.

As mentioned before, exposure is the only qualification we must meet under the law, but VA overlooks that and denies claims not on exposure facts but their redefinition of exposure to include bioavailability. Not very nice of them, indeed, but VA's objective was met...a barrier was constructed to prevent C-123 exposure claims by redefining away our exposure facts.

No C-123 claims are permitted on their watch because they decided in 2011 to prevent claims. That was Job #1. Job #2 was automatic to these folks...just say "no." Then VA Compensation and Pension simply provided boilerplate denial language for the VAROs to use, and twisted VA21-1MR's requirement for the VAROs to consult C&P into similar orders from DC to deny. 

Deny, deny until they die. It doesn't take long to get that impression, true or not.
Further, VA uses their reinvented concept of exposure which requires proof of bioavailability, yet then forbids testing for TCDD bioavailability. Their experts know it is unlikely that any TCDD would be still found, as one study showed known intensive exposures to twelve people only had two showing TCDD still in the body two decades later.

Our exposures, between 1972-1982 were so far back, and TCDD has a half-life in body tissue of about seven years, so testing wouldn't be an effective way to make any conclusion about our own bioavailability.

But studies do support our having had TCDD enter our bodies via dermal contact and inhalation of TCDD-laden dust. 

Check it out. Go to the OSHA Technical Center at Salt Lake City website which states how OSHA wants a surface contamination exposure assessment done.  On pg 2 of the website, in the section titled: Exposure Evaluation:  The fourth reference by Leung and Paustenbach includes a bioavailability dermal factor specific to dioxin and they even included a surface wipe example of dioxin in the paper on pg 194 and use a 1 percent bioavailability factor for dioxin.  


Leung and Paustenbach (1994) Techniques for Estimating the Percutaneous Absoprtion of Chemicals Due to Occupational and Environmental Exposure, Appl. Occup. Environ. Hyg. 9(3) 187-19 cite Shu, et al (1988) Bioavailability of Soil Bound TCDD: Draml Bioavailability in the Rat.  Fund. Appl. Toxicol. 10:648-654 for this bioavailability factor.  In other papers, Paustenbach noted the bioavailability was as high as 1.75% for dioxin.  

So basically, we claim that there is bioavailability of TCDD or dioxin and it was established as early as 1988 and again cited in a peer-review article in 1994 and presented in the OSHA website for how to conduct an exposure assessment of surface contamination of chemical.

And always remember: the law requires only exposure, which we've proven. The VA
pretense that bioavailability is necessary is wrong, but literature supports our having had TCDD bioavailability as well. The most recent scientific article from Environmental Research was "Air Force Aircraft Returned from Vietnam Identified as Source of Post-War Agent Orange Contamination." (Stellman, Berman, Lurker, Clapp)

If you have exposure claims before the VA, consider submitting additional material to counter the VA stacking the deck against us with only half the science. 

Check over the hundred or more source documents on our blog. Submit the rest of the science by including copies of:
  1.  Federal Register 31 August 2010, page 53205
  2. Air Force Aircraft Returned from Vietnam Identified as Source of Post-War Agent Orange Contamination
  3. CDC/ATSDR determination that C-123 crews were exposed and had greater risks of cancer
  4. OSHA Chemical Sampling Card
  5. NIH/National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences C-123 Finding
  6. Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health C-123 Finding
  7. Concerned Scientists and Physicians Letter to Secretary of Veterans Affairs re: C-123 Exposures
  8. US Public Health Service C-123 Exposure Findings
  9. University of Texas Medical School C-123 Exposure Finding
  10. Oregon Health Sciences University Toxicology Department C-123 Exposure Finding
  11. C-123 Aircrew VA Claim Approval (Paul Bailey)
  12. C-123 Maintenance Personnel VA Claim Approval (Rickenbacker–Name Withheld for Privacy)
  13. Washington Post Article, Agent Orange's Reach Beyond the Vietnam War
  14. ATSDR Terminology, including official definition of EXPOSURE
Most likely, your claim will still be denied on order of Compensation and Pension, but you will have ample evidence to show the Board of Veterans Appeals clear error on the VA's part in denying exposure claims.  The BVA and other officials know that C-123 veterans are being required to submit more documents, reach a much higher threshold of "as likely to as not" proof, than any other veterans ever have been.

Further, as with Paul Bailey, your medical evidence and the documents listed above can motivate a claims official to actually do the right thing and concede service connection.

01 March 2014

Press Deception at Hill – and it WORKED – Public Was Completely Deceived!

Air Force Press Deception. Deliberate deception of the public to prevent veterans' disability claims.

In June 2010, eighteen multi-engine Air Force transports were shredded, and then smelted, ridding the military of one of its last legacies of the Vietnam War use of Agent Orange.

Years of plans for this destruction of eighteen Fairchild UC-123K cargo planes were firmed up in 2009. Included in those plans were suggestions from the Office of Secretary of Defense Senior Consultant emphasizing the need for minimal public attention. Agent Orange, dioxin, TCDD, Operation Ranch Hand are still attention-grabbing words of great concern to the public, and especially, veterans.

Hill AFB Public Affairs cooperated with leaders at Davis-Monthan AFB in creating the overall plan, which included a unique example of dishonest, unethical public deception. Focused on minimizing public awareness of the destruction process but aware absence of the aircraft might be noticed, the Air Force crafted a press release. As the consultant recommended, the press release was to be readied in the event of inquiries.


But it was to be a press release not released. And in its creative, but misleading wordsmithing, it remains as much a deception of the press and the public as was failure to distribute the document a deception. In two areas, therefore, it not only violated Air Force regulations governing public affairs, but violated the public trust.

Were there laws broken? Probably not, although EPA should look into some actions. It turns out that the Executive Branch, even the president, has no constitutional obligation to speak the truth. However, most of us consider that part of his/her job description. And we certainly expect truthfulness from military leaders, whose only excuse for deception would be for reasons of security. Not embarrassment.

This entry will take a bit of patience for our readers...there is a great deal of background, all of it relevant. And like colors of painter's palette, the facts come together to form the complete picture. Please give it your patience as the full story comes into view.

The "colors' we'll use for form our picture of Air Force press deception, and Air Force violation of its own strict rules about honesty and openness. Upon those rules rest the public's trust and the trust of our press, and the trust of those wearing the uniform.

The issue begins with the C-123s stored at Davis-Monthan and growing awareness that decades were passing without resolution of the political and environmental problems associated with the warplanes everyone (generals, scientists, attorneys, political leaders) called "the Agent Orange airplanes."

In 2000, base employees filed a complaint with their union, worried about exposure to dioxin on the airplanes which had been moved into HAZMAT quarantine.

Before discussion of the particulars of the C-123 destruction deception, let’s look at what obligations the Air Force sets forth in its public affairs program. While the Executive Branch may not be constitutionally required to be truthful, the military accepts that responsibility...with reservations.

The Air Force regulation governing Public Affairs is AFI 35-101,Public Affairs Responsibilities and Management.” There we see very interesting statements, including:

a. "The purpose of Air Force PA operations is to communicate timely, accurate, and
useful information.” "The Air Force’s credibility depends on two factors: maintaining professional integrity and communicating timely and truthful information to the public.”
b: "Achieve informed public support for the Air Force and joint operations.”
c. "Information is not withheld merely because it casts criticism on or causes embarrassment to the Air Force."
d. Department of Defense Principles of Information. DOD makes available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the media may assess and understand the
facts about national security and defense strategy.”
e. "A free flow of general and military information will be made available without
censorship or propaganda to the American public.” “Information is not classified or otherwise withheld from disclosure only to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.”
f: The Air Force should provide the public with information on its major programs; they may require detailed PA planning and coordination within DOD and with other  government agencies. The sole purpose of such an activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propaganda has no place in DOD PA programs.”
g. Air Force Commanders: Ensure legally required community involvement in environmental issues is conducted in a thorough and timely manner.”
h: All Air Force Personnel:  each person must strive to make sure public
contacts show the highest standards of conduct and reflect the Air Force’s core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence.


In April 2010 the 75th ABW, Hill AFB, Utah prepared in advance a press release describing the destruction of the remaining C-123K/UC-123K aircraft at the Davis-Monthan AFB. Management of the information about this process was faulty and greatly harmed Air Force interests.

Throughout the period 2000-2010, intense concern was raised at different agencies, including the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Air Staff, the Air Force Surgeon General, the Air Force Office of Environmental Law, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, HQ Air Force Material Command and more. 

The concern: dioxin contamination left on the aircraft from their Vietnam War service as Agent Orange spray aircraft in Operation Ranch Hand.

1993 seems to be the first time when tests were ordered on Patches, the Air Force Museum’s famous C-123, was tested before positioning inside the museum. It tested positive for dioxin…in the words of the Air Force toxicologists it was “heavily
C-123K "Patches" at USAF Museum
contaminated”.

More tests and correspondence accumulate during the period 1994-2000 with the only concerns expressed being the disposal of the aircraft, safety of personnel at the Boneyard, whether Walt Disney films should be told that two of the C-123s they purchased for movie production were possibly contaminated, whether foreign governments should be informed that the aircraft transferred to them were contaminated, and similar correspondence. 

No mention has ever been found of concern for the aircrews who flew these airplanes and had already been exposed, until 2013 when Air Force leaders reported the information had been withheld from the veterans "to prevent undue distress."

In 1996 AFMC’s Office of Environmental Law recommended the contamination be “kept within official channels”, a recommendation endorsed by the writer’s commander, the Director of the Office of Environmental Law.

In 2000 the Air Force joined with the General Services Administration in a court action to stop the contracted sale of some contaminated C123s. The federal judge took their sworn testimony of the aircraft being “heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous, extremely contaminated, danger to the public” and other descriptions, and ordered the sale terminated. (note: In 2012, faced with veterans' claims for exposure, the USAF reversed its opinion, saying the planes were actually no danger to the veterans.)

In 2009 the AMARG/AFMC moved towards disposal of the remaining 21 aircraft, but officials knew the planes couldn’t be buried as they were too toxic for a landfill. The recommendation of the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Senior Consultant was to stop testing the aircraft immediately for toxicity…all four had tested positive (two significant and two trace, but any trace is unsafe) and his suggestion was that that result could be taken two ways:

First, because the first four tested had two that were contaminated, it could be inferred that “only two of the 21 aircraft were toxic."

Or worse, that “50% or more of the remaining aircraft were toxic.” As the testing was costly, base officials, acting on the OSD consultant's authority, opted to shred the entire fleet of C-123s, having discovered a loophole in EPA regulations that shredded metal could avoid being classified as toxic waste. EPA regulations were looked at carefully, due to a threatened $3,400,000,000 fine.

The OSD consultant also recommended that the public affairs at Hill and Davis-Monthan prepare for possible media inquiries. He mentioned an article from Orion Magazine, and discussed the worry that a media “storm” that might develop could inform Air Force Reservists who flew the airplanes between 1972-1982 that their dioxin-related illnesses might be brought to the VA for treatment. 

Various drafts of a press release were offered, and the OSD consultant along with other officials “corrected” the drafts by eliminating words such as “Agent Orange”, “dioxin”,  “contamination” and replacing them with words less likely to alarm the public. Agent Orange and dioxin and contamination were replaced with “herbicide” and “aged Vietnam-era airplanes no longer flown.” 

The consultant's words...his agenda formed the Air Force press release:
The question of adverse publicity related to additional sampling or the immediate destruction of the aircraft is important to address. Clearly the Public Affairs Office needs to be involved in either course of action. The longer this issue remains unresolved, the greater the likelihood of outside press reporting on yet another “Agent Orange Controversy”. I recommend the IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF ALL THE UC-123K AIRCRAFT. Public Affairs should prepare a news release in the event that there is a press inquiry. The key issues to emphasize in a press release are “that these old and obsolete aircraft sprayed defoliants in Vietnam 40 years ago”, “they were retired to Davis-Monthan AFB many years ago”, and “that recent analytical data from sampling a representative number of the aircraft indicated that only negligible levels of contamination could be detected.” Thus, “they were destroyed in an approved method used for the destruction of all obsolete aircraft at Davis-Monthan AFB.”
The last part of the statements was clearly deceptive, given the volumes of Air Force memos about companies desperate to purchase the valuable engines and propellers, and museums which wanted them, and private buyers who wanted them so desperately they unsuccessfully sued in federal court to try to force a sale. And lost, because the planes were shown to be dangerously toxic.

The final version of the UC-123’s story was approved by the necessary authorities at the 75th Air Base Wing. It was not distributed, but held in case of media inquiry. This was a further element of the effort to minimize public awareness of the true story of the event.

Perhaps no lies were told. But there were, indeed, pages of prevarication. Mistruths were constructed to build a story which really had nothing to do with the real news of the event…dioxin contaminated aircraft. Nobody at the 75th ABW PA shop inquired of the managers of the event about the Air Force Reserve aircrews which had been exposed to dioxin on their airplanes for a full decade. Instead, the public affairs officers bent without objection, indeed, apparently with eager willingness, and in complete disregard for Air Force Instruction 35-101, to construct a press release to deceive the media and the public, as well as the Air Force Reservists beginning to wonder why they have cancer, heart disease, acute peripheral neuropathy, ALS, and other dioxin-related illnesses.

A careful reader will note a possibly inappropriate use of a business title implying official actions within and by the Office of Secretary of Defense. That particular consultant was described in several documents from HQ AFMC and the 75th Air Base Wing as Agent Orange “Senior Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense.” 

Later, in an interview with Steve Vogel of the Washington Post, the consultant, Dr. Al Young, said he was acting privately in his work overseeing the C-123 destruction.

This person's attitudes and reactions to Reserve Component aircrews are a specific concern. In his 26 June 2009 position paper regarding the need for speedy destruction of the dioxin-contaminated aircraft, the OSD consultant mentions the media “storm” which might attend the operation and cause aircrews and maintenance workers with dioxin-related illnesses to seek care at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Concerned with the visibility of this event, which he frequently wrote must be low key (and even congratulates base officials on concluding the operation with minimal public attention). 

There has been an obvious careful selection of words to hide the actual event – a prevarication - destruction of dioxin-contaminated aircraft with a potential $3.4 billion dollar EPA or State of Arizona fine. This by presenting a completely misleading press release. There is an ethical standard in preparation of press releases, but it seems to have been ignored here in disregard for AFI 35-101.

The OSD consultant, a retired Air Force officer, in a 10 July 2011 message described the dioxin-exposed Air Force Reserve combat veteran aircrews as “trash haulers, freeloaders looking for a sympathetic Congressman for tax-free dollars.”  This is an inappropriate perspective from a person editing Air Force press releases especially when he helps direct the misinformation concerning events vital to the C-123 veterans' health.

His perspective was certainly consistent. He was hired by the VA to report on the C-123 veterans' exposure concerns and in his November 2012 report he recommended against any recognition of their exposure or disability claims. His involvement is also unique: He helped develop Agent Orange as a tactical weapon while in the Air Force. He advised the AF on disposing the airplanes because of their toxicity, he expressed distain for the veterans who flew the warplanes, and then he recommended that, regardless of other scientific proofs (which he opted not to reference in his report) that the VA block the veterans' disability claims. Thus, he had a significant role in each key part of the C-123 contamination story.

Particular concern has been raised with the 12 February 2010 Staff Summary prepared by Mr. Dwight Eagle of the 505th. He noted the OSD consultant’s suggestion that although the UC-123K was principally used to spray Agent Orange, because some of them sometimes sprayed other liquids or conducted other missions, it could thus be described in terms of those missions, rather than the Agent Orange-Ranch Hand missions which were the principal employment for the airplane. Cleverly, the consultant had “clarified that the low levels of contamination are not necessarily attributed to Agent Orange, since not all aircraft were used in defoliant operations. Therefore, according to Dr. Young, the aircraft disposal does not have to be publicly announced as portraying or relating to Agent Orange.”

The Air Force Academy Cadet Honor Code Handbook, and other military volumes dealing with honor, considers this press release word-twisting to be quibbling, evasive, and incomplete…a lie constructed from half-truths, and dishonorable. It is perhaps not in keeping with the requirements of the State of Arizona or the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules and regulations regarding hazardous waste storage and their threatened $3.4 billion fine. The work product of the 75th ABW was not public affairs. It was an exercise in prevarication and public deception.

What was the news? The destruction of Agent Orange spray airplanes. And that was precisely the news to be obscured, twisted, avoided.
Today, thanks to many media reports, this story has changed quite a bit from what it could have been, and should have been – the simple “destruction of Agent Orange contaminated aircraft in an environmentally responsible way” to one where the news value is in the early attempts to keep the information in official channels, to one where Air Force public affairs abused the trust of the public and media by misleading them through a poorly-crafted and deceptive press release. 

It morphed, and grew into a situation where public affairs at both Hill AFB and Davis-Monthan AFB failed to bring to the attention of leadership their military and civil service ethical responsibilities. And, although public affairs professionals with clear guidance provided by AFI 35-101, they failed to alert their leaders as to the negative impact of failing to notify aircrews who’d been exposed to the toxins and the health dangers this press release was designed to conceal from us, our families, the media and the public.

Mission...failed.

C-123s Returned from Vietnam Identified as Postwar Source of Agent Orange Contamination

Air Force Aircraft Returned from Vietnam Identified as Postwar Source of 
Agent Orange Contamination

New evidence published in Environmental Research shows personnel exposed to meaningful levels of Dioxin, contrary to current position held by Air Force and VA

·       BY JOSH HICKS
·       
·       February 26 at 6:00 am
The C-123 transport planes that sprayed Agent Orange during the Vietnam War may have sickened service members who worked with the aircraft after the conflict, according to a new study.
The report, published last week in the scientific journal “Environmental Research,” supports claims that exposure to the toxic defoliant after the war is greater than previously believed.
TCDD-contaminated C-123 Aircraft, Tucson AZ
Columbia University health-policy professor Jeanne Mager Stellman, who authored the study, said the findings conflict with U.S. Air Force and Department of Veterans Affairs conclusions and policies.

“Aircraft occupants would have been exposed to airborne dioxin-contaminated dust as well as come into direct skin contact, and our models show that the level of exposure is likely to have exceeded several available exposure guidelines,” Stellman said.

The VA has said that any postwar contamination on C-123s was not high enough to be linked to disease. But some lawmakers think the agency may be wrong.

Sen. Richard Burr (N.C.), the top Republican on the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, and Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) have asked the VA’s inspector general to review whether the department is inappropriately denying disability benefits to veterans who claim they were sickened by postwar Agent Orange contamination.

 “This is further evidence VA is out of step with the prevailing science — the facts speak for themselves,” Burr said of the report in a statement on Monday.

The VA said it will continue to review new scientific information on the issue as it becomes available and that it has asked the Institute of Medicine to study possible health complications among post-Vietnam C-123 crews.

“VA does not presume by regulation that these veterans were exposed to Agent Orange,” the agency said in a statement. “VA does presume exposure to Agent Orange for veterans who served in Vietnam because of the lack of exposure information that is available. We encourage anyone who believes they were exposed to Agent Orange to file a disability compensation claim or visit a VA health care facility.”

C-123s sprayed Agent Orange in Vietnam from 1962 to 1971 as part of Operation Ranch Hand, and about 1,500 Air National Guard and Reserve crew members flew the planes on cargo missions until 1982.

The study used U.S. Army algorithms and data from surface-wipe samples from aircraft used in Operation Ranch Hand to estimate “dioxin body burden,” comparing the results with available guidelines and standards.

“These models suggest that the potential for dioxin exposure to personnel working in the aircraft post-Vietnam is greater than previously believed and that inhalation, ingestion, and skin absorbtion were likely to have occurred during during post-Vietnam use of the aircraft by aircrew and maintenance staff,” a summary of the report said.

Merkley said in a statement on Monday that he hopes the study “prompts the VA to finally reverse their position and make sure all veterans suffering from Agent Orange exposure get the treatment and compensation they need and deserve.”

The VA in July reversed its denial of benefits for Paul Bailey, a retired Air Force lieutenant [colonel] and postwar C-123 crew member who is sick with cancer. Advocates of the decision have described the move as the first of its kind for veterans seeking compensation for post-Vietnam exposure to the defoliant.

25 February 2014

New Science Supports C-123 Exposure Claims - but automatically dismissed by VA

What happened? What'd they do?
That’s right...dismissed. Automatically, with reasons to be developed later if necessary, but like all other evidence supporting C-123 veterans' claims, refused without evaluation.

The decision was against us was reached a year ago...that all evidence supportive of C-123 claims is to be dismissed...disregarded...ignored.(clarification...VA C&P told us that no evidence would ever be accepted to bring a claim to "as likely to as not" and that "probably" all claims would be denied...as all have been since we were told this by VA's Dr. Michael Peterson)

VA Post Deployment Health as well as Compensation and Pension Service (C&P) will not accept Friday’s Environmental Research article about C-123 veterans' exposures for support of the veterans' claims.

This has already been decided and the C-123 veterans informed of the decision. At our February 2013 meeting with the Compensation and Pension Service Director, he and his staff explained that no amount of support or evidence, such as the recent Environment Research article or even official findings confirming our exposures from CDC or other federal agencies, will be allowed to elevate a C-123 veteran's claim to "as likely to as not."

While this seemed extraordinary when we were told by the Director, Compensation and Pension, subsequent conversations with the Acting Chief Consultant Post Deployment Health did make things clearer. We learned, through Post Deployment Health, that none of the C-123 veterans were ever exposed.

As simple as that. Change the definition and the problem goes away. That is, their problem...our diseases still sit on our doorstep, if not theirs. The benefit to the VA is that the infamous backlog gets reduced, it goes into the appeals backlog which nobody cares about, and the decisions due the veterans are postponed for years, with tremendous savings in VA medical care denied in the interim which can be as much as five to seven years.

No dental, no vision, no audiology, no prosthetics, no pharmacy, no rehab, no surgery, no anything. Years with the veteran either doing without these services or paying privately, unless otherwise eligible for VA care for other wounds or injuries.

Any civilian or Civil Service employees out there willing to wait seven years to be treated for an on-the-job injury? Hello? Hello??

Which is why Post Deployment Health directed the regional medical centers to refuse requests from C-123 veterans to receive the Agent Orange Registry exam – VA has already decided these vets were not exposed, by having redefined exposure, so no need for the physical. This was double-checked with Post Deployment Health leadership who explained the policy.

Perhaps...it depends how you define the word exposure? To paraphrase a former president.

Post Deployment Health ruling was made based on her group’s internal redefinition of exposure (Exposure = contamination field + bioavailability.)

Thus, even though C-123 veterans have clearly qualified under the law for Agent Orange exposure benefits, no claims will be approved and, in fact, all claims will be ordered denied by C&P, which even provides the rating officials proper boilerplate language to use.

We're reminded of the Secretary's assurances to the Senate that claims will be carefully, individually evaluated without any blanket policy against C-123 veterans. Instead, claims are carefully, individually evaluated and all denied by policy, whatever name it goes by.

And even though C-123 veterans have clearly met scientific criteria for claiming Agent Orange exposure and proved their exposure as well as increased cancer risk and other health impacts, no claims will be approved. Just ask Post Deployment Health.

At first the C-123 veterans concluded that this was a blanket policy against our claims. Both the
Secretary and the Under Secretary for Benefits assured us and our legislators that VA has no blanket policy against C-123 claims. Apparently, VA uses a different word for blanket policy and can thereby nullify the law providing for our benefits.

No C-123 claims will be permitted to be approved, per VHA. They're right...none ever have been approved, although one denied claim was "reconsidered" once enough attention was generated by newspapers and legislators...LtCol Paul Bailey of Bath, NH. His claim was denied in Feb 2013 and reconsidered in August 2013, just after he entered hospice.

The VA blanket policy (I don't know the word VA uses to describe their universal denial of C-123 claims so I'll use that word for now) leaves only legislative relief, which is unlikely given our ages and illnesses, or federal court action. Court action is also unlikely due to the cost and well-known determination of VA to fight claims as far as possible, thus outspending any resources we might muster for the effort.

Nothing will ever help our claims get approved unless the Secretary takes notice of what has been done to us, or if DOD designates the C-123 spray planes retrospectively as Agent Orange Exposure Sites.

Even then, we can expect Compensation and Pension to fight every claim with passion. That’s their job, their mission. They do it well and with pride.

22 February 2014

Hill AFB and Davis-Monthan Officials Deceived Public & Media

In June 2010 the Air Force managed quite well a non-event. Press releases were prepared to not be released.

That's right...press releases were wordsmithed and approved, just in case the media made inquiries. But nobody did. It was a total non-event, just as planed.

The non-event was the destruction as toxic waste of the surplus fleet of obsolete former Agent Orange spray airplanes, the C-123. Davis-Monthan AFB's famous Boneyard had stored them for decades. Something had to be done with what the AF leaders, medical folks and scientists all called "the Agent Orange airplanes."

Why destroy them? Because the EPA was a constant threat...if EPA found out about the earlier base civilian employee complaints, or if the inspectors were able to locate the special HAZMAT quarantine storage area the planes had been moved to, a potential $3.4 billion fine could be levied against the USAF.

$30,000 a day, warned Air Force officials to each other!

So destruction of the C-123 fleet was approved, and accomplished by shredding and smelting the scraps in April-June 2010. All very hush-hush.

The idea was spelled out in base memos...keep everything below the radar. Of particular concern to the Office of Secretary of Defense Consultant was his worry that veterans who'd flown the C-123s after Vietnam, and who were already exposed to Agent Orange residue, would turn to the VA for treatment of their Agent Orange-associated illnesses.

Logical enough from the veterans' perspective. Must be prevented, from base officials' perspective.

The consultant guided base public affairs in eliminating those attention-grabbing words like "Agent Orange." "dioxin," "toxin," and instead created a masterpiece of PA manipulation and press deception..."the airplanes were recycled in an environmentally safe manner to free up desert storage space."

The news was that Agent Orange airplanes were being destroyed by special process because they were too toxic for landfill and too poisonous to be sold. The news was that veterans...already exposed....were to be kept from news that they'd been exposed to the Agent Orange residue left in the warplanes after Vietnam.

At first this was all innocent...nobody seemed to know the planes had remained contaminated. But that fact became known in 1994 when USAF toxicologists learned the planes were heavily contaminated and a danger to public health...their words in sworn federal court testimony.

The AF decided not to tell the veterans. According to senior Air Force leaders, the decision to keep mum was "to prevent undue distress."

Now, the VA and AF both deny the possibility of the veterans having become exposed. VA did this by redefining the word "exposure" in 2012 to require veterans to prove that Agent Orange had affected them..decades after the fact that's an impossibility. The AF opted to simply say it couldn't decide one way or the other, but probably no exposure occurred.

Anything to prevent another 2000 or so veterans burdening the overtaxed VA medical facilities!

Fortunately for the veterans, researchers Drs Jeanne Stellman, Peter Lurker, Fred Berman and Richard Clapp published their article, "Post-Vietnam Military Herbicide Exposures in UC-123 Agent Orange Spray Aircraft." This appeared in the Journal of Environmental Research, and establishes the fact of the veterans' exposures. Not only did the authors contradict the AF and VA positions, they also sharply criticized both agencies' lack of scientific basis for obstructing veterans' claims.

Sometimes, scientists deserve a salute, too!




21 February 2014

Environmental Research Journal Proves C-123 Veterans Exposed!

The journal Environmental Research released its article  "Post-Vietnam military herbicide exposures in UC-123 Agent Orange spray aircraft" today. It proves post-Vietnam aircrews were exposed to Agent Orange, previously denied by both the USAF and the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Authors Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Dr. Richard Clapp, Dr. Peter Lurker and Dr. Fred Berman have established that C-123 aircrews and maintenance workers were exposed. That word "exposed" is critical...the law requires veterans claiming Agent Orange outside Vietnam to prove exposure. This article does that!

Dr. Lurker is particularly familiar with the 2012 Air Force Consultant Report which concluded aircrews were probably not exposed. This suggests the report from the Air Force was faulty...the Air Force report was not subjected to critical outside peer review, as was this article released today.

Congratulations to the authors on their contribution to toxicological scholarship. And our thanks as well as for their scientific expertise and assistance to veterans of the C-123 seeking VA medical care and other benefits, thus far denied.

Every veteran submitting an Agent Orange exposure claim, or who has a claim in process, or who has a denied claim being appealed, needs to submit this article to substantiate the fact that our "boots on the airplane" meant Agent Orange exposure. 

Confirmed!

19 July 2013

VA Views on Agent Orange Conflict With Other Experts!


note: TCDD=dioxin=2,3,7,8 (toxins in Agent Orange)

"There is no scientific evidence that a Veteran's presence in an aircraft containing solidified TCDD can lead to adverse long-term health effects."
            
                 - Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 7 June 2013 letter to US Senate

In my opinion, it is highly likely that you and other crew members were exposed to the herbicides and to their highly toxic contaminant, dioxin.
        - Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Profesor Emerata, Columbia University
Given the available information, I believe that aircrew operating in this, and similar environments, were exposed to dioxin.
       - Dr. Christopher Portier, Director, CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry


09 July 2013

Office of Secretary of Defense Linked to C-123 Agent Orange Evidence Destruction

Air Force documents uncovered recently via the Freedom of Information Act link the Office of Secretary of Defense to the actions by Air Force Material Command to destroy toxic C-123 transport aircraft, specifically to prevent veterans from learning of their exposure to Agent Orange. Revealed
were procedures untaken to bar Agent Orange benefits from already exposed aircrews and maintenance veterans, procedures involving press manipulation and destruction of the evidence which would support claims for Agent Orange benefits by over 1560 men and women.

C-123 transports, used earlier in Vietnam for spraying Agent Orange, remained contaminated with deadly dioxin for the decade the planes remained in service after the war, until they became obsolete and were retired in 1982. Although toxicologists first established the hazardous condition in 1979 the Air Force opted not to spend the necessary money (estimated at over $40,000 per aircraft) to properly decontaminate the fleet of C-123s and instead ordered base maintenance workers to wipe interior surfaces (those that could be accessed) with Dawn detergent and to cover the intense stench which sickened aircrews with area deodorants. Using paint scrapers and even dental picks, maintenance personnel scraped Agent Orange residue where it had caked up during Vietnam, but huge amounts remained inaccessible in the wings, under the cargo deck, and in portions of the landing gear wells. Agent Orange had even soaked into the paint, wood, leather, fabrics, ceramics, adhesives and other surfaces inside the C-123, little of which could be removed.

In 1994, twelve years after the fleet was retired to desert surplus storage in Arizona, more tests firmly detailed the toxicity of these medium assault transports in 1994 as the Air Force examined an aircraft ("Patches") being moved into the USAF Museum. Results: "Heavily contaminated on all test surfaces" and "A danger to public health," confirmed toxicologists from the highly-respected
USAF Armstrong Laboratories. At this time, either through oversight or a specific decision, the Air Force opted not to inform the veterans who'd flown these airplanes, veterans who'd previously been assured there was no risk of Agent Orange exposure, that in fact they'd been exposed for a full decade.

A more deliberate act by the Air Force to hide information from veterans about their exposure to Agent Orange was undertaken in 1996 by the USAF Office of Environmental Law. JAG attorney Major Ursula Moul directed that all information about C-123 contamination be "kept in official channels only," a deception costing the exposed veterans nearly two decades of awareness of their exposures. Two decades during which at least minor health precautions could have been observed, such as monitoring PSA numbers or limiting dietary fat intake.

After decades in storage the surplus fleet of C-123 transports needed to be eliminated as they couldn't be sold, parted out, or even buried as toxic waste. Seeking input, in 2009 the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) offered the Air Force the name of Dr. Al Young. Young is also a retired Air Force colonel, and his career has focused on use of Agent Orange from the earliest days of its use in Vietnam.

Young then guided the AF to the decision to destroy the old airplanes and in at least three memos to three different officials, introduced the point that if veterans learned of the airplane contamination, the old aircrews and maintenance folks would approach the VA for what Dr. Young called "presumptive compensation," meaning compensation for exposure illnesses and VA medical care as well. This apparently was something he felt should be prevented, even though the veterans had already been exposed and were presumably eligible for such care. His recommendation to destroy the airplanes to prevent veterans' awareness was repeated up the Air Force chain of command and finally approved by the Air Staff. All remaining C-123s were destroyed as toxic waste in June 2010. Young even helped Air Force Public Affairs craft a press release minimizing references to "Agent  Orange" and such attention-grabbing words - a press release never released but held in the event of media attention. There was none.

He was also mentioned in the letter from VA's Secretary Shinseki to Senator Richard Burr, Ranking Member of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee. The Secretary commented on Dr. Young's having volunteered details (even though he was under a $600,000 VA post-Vietnam Agent Orange consulting contract) analyzing the details of the dioxin the test results. C-123 veterans note that VA's Compensation Services has uniformly rejected expert independent evidence from toxicologists and other scientists, with the claim that such professionals, even though from an allied health profession, are unqualified to comment on medical nexus or exposures. Included in the rejected list are the Director of the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Rear Admiral Robin Ikeda MD, as well as the Director National Institutes of Health/National Toxicology Center, and physicians from the US Public Health Service. All unqualified because their degrees are not in medicine (Compensation Service ignored those experts who were physicians, illogically grouping them instead in the unacceptable non-physician pile).

Is the VA cherry-picking their experts, accepting only those supporting the VA against C-123 veterans? Is the VA cherry-picking experts because, as Veterans Health Administration puts it, she "cannot permit" C-123 veterans' claims?

Veterans invite our fellow citizens to consider the CVs of experts who've weighed in on this issue. Google them...see who has the expertise and reputation to speak out on this subject.

For Veterans' Exposure: Dr. Linda Birnbaum, Dr. Christopher Portier, Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Dr. Aubrey Miller, Dr. Arnold Schecter, Dr. Fred Berman, Dr. Wayne Dwernychuk, Rear Admiral Robin Ikeda MD (US Public Health Service), Dr. Tom Sinks, Dr. Mark Garzotto, others from universities and federal agencies identified to the VA as members of the Concerned Scientists and Physicians. Please note all opinions were offered without compensation.

02 May 2013

C-123 & VA Science. Really science, or "weird science?"




Can something from the Veterans Affairs be called “scientific” if written solely to insure a group of veterans is excluded from coverage? Can something be called scientific if “researched” only to give voice to the policy requirements of the agency, cloaked in cherry-picked articles and not with an even-handed attitude of “let’s see where the evidence takes us?”  No…the VA didn’t want to allow the C-123 veterans to qualify for Agent Orange exposure benefits and set out to write a few Internet pages to give themselves a foundation for that injustice. So here VA gives us not science, but weird science. Science by policy. Science skirting around truth.

In this instance, C-123 Air Force veterans find it difficult to understand the “scientific review” and “investigation” to which the VA refers in their various Internet pages which deal with C-123
exposure, because those pages provide little detail and our Freedom of Information Act Request brought back the curious response that the VA insists it has no documentation dealing with the issue…and VA even denied their own Internet pages exist.

Do you see the question raised? How can “scientific review” and “investigation” be done adequate to compel the VA to take such a severe position as to deny service connection claims, and yet VA insists there are no documents, emails, marginal notes, presentations, publications, studies, investigations, reviews, letters…nothing at all on the subject! 

VA’s Public Health and Post-Deployment Health experts maintain C-123 veterans weren’t exposed to C-123 dioxin because there was no “bioavailability” – and yet have no materials at all. How can VA claim to have dealt with this issue “scientifically” and yet bar review of their materials for peer review? How does the VA's "Public Health", which is part of their Health Benefits Administration, come up with a conclusion veterans weren't exposed, yet the United States Public Health Service says veterans were?

No, this wasn’t science. Their "scientific review" was merely a policy statement wrapped around a prejudice against C-123 veterans. The VA has had enough of Agent Orange-exposed veterans lined up for care and benefits to which they are entitled, and VA managers clearly want to bring this to an end. How? By pretending no other veterans were exposed, regardless of evidence to the contrary and by simply citing VA “studies” which are instead policy announcements.

But lets look into what can be found. The only sources of the VA’s work on C-123 veterans’ exposure are their few Internet pages, and correspondence with veterans, congressional representatives, and outside experts.

So, lets first look at their Internet pages. The basic one is titled “Scientific Review of Agent Orange in C-123 Aircraft. Here VA Office of Public Health claims to have “reviewed” existing scientific studies and says post-Vietnam War veterans’ are unlikely to have been exposed at levels to affect health.

The first and most glaring issue is that none of the studies which might prove the C-123 veterans case are listed. Carefully, the VA selected only articles and studies they felt best destroyed the veterans’ case. Ignored were countless peer-reviewed articles, which we’ll detail in a moment or two. Next, the VA attacked and dismissed the multitude of Air Force tests over the decades that established dioxin contamination of the C-123 fleet. “Heavily contaminated” read one report, and “A danger to public health” another.  Even 29 years after their last Agent Orange spray missions the airplanes stored in the Air Force desert bone yard still showed trace to low levels of contamination of dioxin, for which any detectable levels are considered unsafe.

Therefore, to minimize or dismiss the most relevant evidence for veterans’ exposure, VA simply declared the Air Force tests, completed by both commercial expert firms and the military’s own toxicologists, to have been done incorrectly and in a manner that released toxins otherwise not available to expose the aircrews. Dismissed was the fact that the tests were completed by highly reputable experts with doctorates in the field, and that the tests were done using well-established standard procedures called hexane wipes. In tests completed in the 2000-2009 time frame, water wipes were also used with similar results, so the VA ignores these results so as to better focus on the hexane wipes which they then dismissed to provide a basis for trashing all the contamination test reports.

Having constructed such a barrier around the evidence, VA then turned to a claim to have consulted peer-reviewed literature. The first thing that stands out is the age of some VA references, ranging between ten to thirty years old. The next observation is the name of Dr. Al Young, well-known indeed among Agent Orange victims for his career spent developing military applications for Agent Orange, and also for his decades spent claiming Agent Orange is fairly harmless to humans. Dr. Young’s article cited by the VA was actually his claim that Vietnam veterans weren’t exposed and if they were, such exposure would allow little bioavailability. This point, and ones made subsequently in Dr. Young’s article, form the basis grasped by the VA to deny C-123 veterans’ disability claims,

Importantly, Dr. Young claims that actually no veterans were “exposed” or had “bioavailability” other than the crews actually handling or having direct contact with liquid herbicide. Of course, the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine challenges this and Young’s position is not at all the generally accepted view among toxicologists and epidemiological scientists, but it provided VA something to wave as its “proof.”

Dr. Al Young has another point of contact regarding C-123 veterans. In 2010 the Air Force needed to resolve storage concerns about contaminated C-123s in storage. Dr. Young’s input was sought and he recommended immediate destruction of the airplanes and reminded Air Force leaders that unless the destruction was done quietly, veterans might learn of the contamination and their exposure in earlier years, and seek medical care for their Agent Orange illnesses.

Again that important point – these veterans had already been exposed and Dr. Young’s official recommendation, as the Senior Agent Orange Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense, was to quietly destroy the evidence before the victims learned anything. Dr. Young’s advice was repeated along the Air Force chain of command and provided the “final solution” for these toxic, aged warplanes in 2010.

Dr. Young’s advice was seemed NOT that of a neutral, independent observer in any of his activities. Referring to the C-123 veterans again, Dr.Young described them as “trash-haulers, freeloaders looking for a tax-free dollar from a sympathetic congressman. I have no respect for them.”

C-123 veterans, most of whom saw combat, and indeed, any scientist considering Dr. Young’s writings, must critically evaluate conclusions from this man who flaunts such a tainted perspective about the veterans he writes about.

What about the other references? Veterans managed to locate Professor (now Emeritus) L.W. Weber at Oregon State University, but Dr. Weber stated his study had nothing to contribute to any understanding of aircrew exposure and asked it not be used in that context.

Another reference cited was written by Dr. Linda Birnbaum, who is famous in the field of dioxin research, and now Director, National Institutes of Health/NEIHS and Director, National Toxicology Program. Dr. Birnbaum in recent years reviewed the Air Force test reports and other contemporary studies such as Technical Guide 312 from the Department of Defense, and has concluded that the C-123 veterans actually were exposed! So that has left the VA citing Dr. Birnbaum’s article to support their pretense veterans weren’t exposed, yet Dr. Birnbaum herself states veterans were indeed exposed!

The last element of the VA’s “scientific review” was the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine C-123 Consultative Letter released May 2012. Here the Air Force basically disowned its own decades of testing and posited that C-123 crews were unlikely to have been exposed. This report has received very close scrutiny from scientists such as Dr. Birnbaum and others, who fault it for the basic statement of unlikely exposure yet also the Air Force statement that they didn’t have enough information or data to make any conclusion. So how could a conclusion be reached that veterans weren’t exposed when the Air Force admits not having enough data to make such as conclusion at all. Continuing examination of this Consultative Letter led to the Air Force Surgeon General stating that it must not be used by the VA to deny benefits to any veteran! Challenges to the Air Force C-123 Consultative Letter continue from many corners, including the National Institutes of Health and even the Air Force itself, and leave the whole issue an embarrassment for the Air Force and its earlier reputation for scientific integrity.

Now lets examine the errors of the VA’s “Scientific Review of Agent Orange in C-123 Aircraft” point-by-point. It might be helpful while watching this video to have first downloaded and printed the article, easily Googled using that title.

1 May be detected by sophisticated laboratory techniques many years after its use.” How deceptive! VA says “sophisticated equipment” is necessary to detect dioxin on these airplanes, yet standard equipment by qualified technicians is all that’s required…and that’s exactly what was done over the decades in which C-123 aircraft consistently tested positive, and “heavily contaminated” with Agent Orange. VA was also deceptive in using the word “may” when in fact, the proper word should be “was”. “May” in scientific reports implies only a possibility, or a vagueness or basic “less likely to than not” but the actual record with C-123 Agent Orange exposure reads WAS DETECTED! And “residual TCDD,” regardless of being residual or whatever was meant by that phrase, is still TCDD.

Finally, VA states that the available reports and studies lead their own Public Health officials to conclude there was a “low probability” of exposure. This was their objective, and so they concluded, as was their objective in the first place. Clearly, VA spent much more time with their clever wording of this Internet page than they did actually studying the potential for C-123 claims having any validity!

2.  The next point in the VA sheet is “unlikely to have occurred at levels that could affect health.” Here they have no foundation for the statement other than Young’s tainted views. In fact, other federal agencies such as the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the National Toxicology Program and the US Public Health Service disagree and opine C-123 veterans’ health is affected. ATSDR even states these veterans have a 200-fold greater cancer risk than the screening value! And in any case, the 1991 Agent Orange Act and other requirements only read “exposed” with no mention of levels, colors, flavors, kinds, bioavailability…nothing other than a statutory requirement to establish exposure. And the VA here agrees that inhalation of dust particles to which dioxin had become bound is at least a “low probability” – which other, more independent scientists maintain to be a high probability.
3.  Regarding routes of exposure, veterans claim dermal, inhalation and ingestion routes to have happened. VA dismissed inhalation of TCDD as an aerosol, yet dioxin binds readily to dust, which was ever-present. VA dismissed dermal exposure but there is a plethora of articles expressing scientific agreement for the skin being a likely route and both the Army and Air Force use dermal exposure models. Here VA uses more deceptive wording, stating that a solvent (hexane) was required to dislodge the dioxin in tested airplanes. In fact, hexane is the standard wipe test used in all such situations – for instance, it would be used today at Wal-Mart, at the Post Office, the local high school, or at any other setting where a surface contaminant needed to be studied. Further, testing by the Air Force and contracted laboratories done between 2000 and 2009 used both hexane and water wipes with similar confirming results.
4.  The VA claims it will continue to review new findings relevant to this issue as they become available. Many indeed have become available, including expert opinions confirming C-123 veterans’ exposure from a large number of other agencies, universities and independent medical and scientific experts. Ignored by the VA, or grouped by them in what they call “unacceptable lay evidence” are the following:
H: EPA – “concur with ATSDR” re: veterans were exposed

It strikes the observer that here, that so many conclude veterans have been exposed. None of these agencies have policies about exposure one way or another, and none of the persons providing opinions was paid to do so, unlike the VA staff paid to construct their barrier to veterans claims.

But, there’s more. In other VA Internet pages about the C-123, they claim to have “thoroughly reviewed all available scientific information.” Ignored, however, were all opinions, findings and other documents that would have supported the veterans’ claim for exposure, such as the standard guide for surface contamination, Technical Guide 312, considered the gold standard in this field. Other experts, using TG312, conclude C-123 veterans were indeed exposed. Ignored, also, was the CDC Dioxin Bulletin “Current Intelligence Bulletin 40. Perhaps the VA, eager to prove C-123 veterans could not have been exposed via dermal routes, did not favor the CDC observation that exposure was possible by simple contact, or the CDC observation that both water and hexane wipes are appropriate surface testing procedures. Nope…the CDC bulletin did nothing to support the VA position and everything to support that of C-123 veterans, so the VA authors of “A Scientific Review” obviously felt it best to be ignored to help make their point against veterans….consulted without mention perhaps, but ignored and not mentioned once it worked against the VA case.

Google Scholar and many other Internet resources provide more than enough support for the C-123 veterans’ claim for dioxin exposure, so VA didn’t cite them. In particular, to make sure dermal exposure was eliminated as a route of dioxin harming the veterans, even though most peer-reviewed scientific articles, such “Dioxins – Toxicological Overview” emphasize the dangers of inhalation, ingestion AND dermal exposure.  You can do it yourself…Google “dermal dioxin exposure” and you’ll see articles from EPA, NIH, foreign governments, state governments, commercial laboratories…the list is so very long!

Further, but totally ignored by the VA writers, dioxin articles frequently stress the fact that dioxin accumulates over time, and long-term exposure is more harmful than short-term, because the body can’t rid itself of the toxin fast enough before reintroduction by re-exposure. Why is this important to C-123 veterans? Because they flew the C-123 for ten years. Not only flew it, but ate in it, repaired it, loaded and unloaded, slept aboard during tactical deployments (so much more comfortable than some Army tent in the dirt alongside a runway!) Exposed and re-exposed, for a full decade.

In November of 2012, sixteen concerned physicians and scientists joined Dr. Jeanne Stellman of Columbia University in bringing their professional concerns about the scientific basis for VA decisions regarding C-123 veterans exposure to military herbicides. They explained problems with the VA approach denying dermal absorption, because dermal exposure to dioxin is well-proven and indeed skin absorption is a primary occupational route of exposure. In general, this respected group dismissed the entire VA policy prohibiting C-123 veterans exposure claims. 
“Unfortunately,’ they wrote, “the VA Public Health Office, in turn, bases its conclusion on several erroneous assumptions about routes of entry of dioxin to the body, as well as other scientific misapprehensions.” “We have carefully examined ‘Scientific Review of Agent Orange in C-123 Aircraft’ and find it seriously flawed. We feel obliged to point out the scientific shortcomings in the VA appraisal.”

VA’s Compensation Service rebuffed their letter. Noted for his denial of a veteran’s Agent Orange claim because, as C&P wrote, "no long-term harm has been shown to be caused by Agent Orange," the scientists were told that VA would stand by its C-123 position, regardless of any university, independent expert or other federal agency saying otherwise.

Clearly, however, C-123 veterans have established the validity of their Agent Orange claims to the satisfaction of the medical and scientific communities, and to the satisfaction of other federal agencies as well…including those with the statutory responsibility for making the call about the exposure! We earned combat pay for going to war in our airplanes over the decades we flew for the Air Force, but we didn’t know perhaps we should have asked for “Agent Orange Exposure Pay” for that hazard as well for the years we flew the toxic C-123!

A hard copy of this discussion can be downloaded at www.c123kcancer.blogspot.com, including hotlinks to cited references. The C-123 veterans don’t need any new laws or regulations, because we are fully qualified to receive VA medical care under the 1991 Agent Orange Act, various CFRs and in particular, the 8 May 2001 Federal Register in which VA explains that non-Vietnam veterans who were exposed to military herbicides will be treated the same as the Vietnam veterans.

We need your help. Your senators and congressional representatives need to contact Mr. Brooks Tucker of Senator Richard Burr’s staff. Senator Burr has taken the lead on this bicameral and bi-partisan issue with Mr. Tucker doing the hard work. Ask your representatives to insist to the VA that our veterans need only one thing from that agency
– that VA OBEYS the law!