C-123 Agent Orange Source Documents List Updated

Updated this week, our C-123 documents are provided here with hyperlinks, and in reverse
chronological order.

Click to download the Word DOC file (300K)

Why Were The C-123s Destroyed by USAF in 2010?

C-123 HAZMAT Quarantine Area

Because they were toxic. Because veterans might learn of the toxic exposures and turn to VA for
medical care (AF agreed this was to be prevented.) Because USAF sworn testimony in federal court was that the airplanes were "a danger to public health" and could never be sold or parted out.

Apparently, being a threat to public health had no bearing on whether the crews who flew them years earlier might need to be alerted to toxins and their health concerns.

And the planes also had to be destroyed...quickly and quietly...because of a threatened $3.4 billion EPA fine. $32,000 per day, per airplane. Good thing the EPA had never been fully informed of the Bone Yard's special C-123 HAZMAT quarantine area, but the toxic airplanes couldn't sit behind that "restricted access" fence forever. There were even concerns that rainwater off the airplanes might contaminate the soil beneath them.

But $3.4 billion was a stand-alone major focus, and compelled action. Unless they could continue the cover up, a $3,400,000,000 for an EPA fine is not a mistake Hill or Davis-Monthan AFB officials wanted to have on their annual efficiency reports – not much efficiency in such a monumental fine. So the planes had to be destroyed, and it had better be done very, very quietly.

And it was. Nobody noticed. Ever. And the exposed veterans didn't notice, either, and didn't know we'd been exposed to harmful levels of dioxin until years later. A great success for Hill AFB Public Affairs.

In 2014, a VA consultant told the Institute of Medicine the C-123s were destroyed "because they were obsolete." He did not mention the fact that in 2009 he'd personally recommended destruction of the airplanes due to their toxicity and to prevent veterans' claims.

Here's the AF memo detailing concerns about the EPA fine:

Questions from USAF PA About C-123 Veterans' Complaints (see last two blog entries)

In response to my inquiries over the last week or so, Air Force public affairs would like some clarification. I have placed their questions immediately below, and the larger type below them is my response.

 A. Questions to C-123 Veterans:

The emails appear to show that Terry Pittman, of Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group Business Affairs, and the Senior Consultant on Agent Orange for the office of the Secretary of Defense, were opposed  to publicizing the planes’ destruction, so why a complaint with Air Force Materiel Command and the Defense Department.

From the documentation you provided, it looks as though the 75^th Air Base Wing spokeswoman Barbara Fisher said the public affairs shop recommended making public that the planes had been destroyed (page 32).

B. My response to USAF PA sent 2/9---------------------------

Gentlemen,

I've added page numbers for clarity as to my references. 

In 2011 I submitted complaints to AF IG. In July 2011 I submitted the attached USAF PA to PA in the Pentagon, not knowing any other address. In 2013 I visited and filed an IG with AFMC at Wright-Patterson (Mr. Dennis Lange dennis.lange.1@us.af.mil,) without any response, but that complaint focused in failure to abide by FOIA requirements. (note 2/10/15: I have retracted this 2013 complaint to AFMC as they have no record and I did not keep a copy) 

USAF PA may have misunderstood that the 309th AMARG (Terry Pittman's memo) is actually a military organization under AFMC--is that perhaps why USAF PA asked why the complaint went to them?  Answer is...because it is an AF unit and an AF press release never released.

When the 2011 USAF IG was denied, I filed a DOD IG complaint...is that what USAF PA is referring to? It, too, was years ago.

Hill PA may have suggested somewhere, somehow outside the FOIA results released to C-123 veterans, a public release but obviously yielded to the improper editing of it and withholding to await inquires which never came...this disserved the commander, the mission and the media, and certainly the veterans. 

The only recommendation for a release I find by 75th ABW PA is on page 32. This is Ms. Fisher's recommendation to Terry Pittman at AMARG for release of the edited press release to Mr Martin Swann. She recommends providing the press release if Mr. Swann inquires again. As one can see, this is a press release about an event about which the media had to already be aware. 

I offer the example: if reporters don't see columns of smoke rising from the base runway, is PA spared the necessity of a press release about an aircraft downed on takeoff? One they've typed and held ready in the event that plume of smoke is noticed and inquires result? Otherwise, no media inquires = a non-event.

A closer parallel to our C-123 toxic airplanes. If there is a toxic spill in the Childcare Center, is PA spared the uncomfortable necessity of insuring the information is provided those exposed children, parents and staff? Never to be informed, just as our C-123 veterans have never heard from the Air Force. Does PA believe they'd type a press release about a Childcare Center spill and hold it unless parents notice their children sickening and bring their inquiries to PA?

Newsworthy? Here, PA obviously understood a press release was important because one was carefully crafted. Federal lawsuits had happened over these airplanes. Base employees had filed IG complaints reaching the USAF Surgeon General. The Air Staff was involved as well as AFMC leadership. Hundreds of thousands had been spent cocooning and moving the fleet into special HAZMAT storage. The EPA threatened a $3.4 billion fine. The airplanes and their background was historic. AFMC officials traveled to Wisconsin to personally witness and certify the smelting. Individuals kept propellor hubs as souvenirs. The issue of Agent Orange and its toxicity was important to veterans and the public. They felt the importance of the C-123 issue, however, best addressed by keeping it quiet.

The final press release described the destruction as "normal," which it most certainly was not (p.9-10, 20-21)  This was the first and last time such a procedure was used on USAF aircraft at Davis-Monthan. The initial press release (p.11,) more honest and revealing, shows the extent of editing out too much of who/what/when/why/where/how details of concern to the public.

As he is entitled to do, Dr. Young specifically recommended no publicity for the unacceptable reasons he offered. None of the three officials (Major McCrady, Mr. Malmgren, Mr. Boor) to whom his memos were directed took exception and opted to do handle correctly. Indeed, these officials and their organizations cited his memos as their authority for the actions. On page 24, Dr. Downs also agrees with Dr. Young's recommendations. 

Dr. Young, as a contractor, is not at issue here, but actions by Air Force civilian

and military personnel acting on his "decision memos" are. He later told the Washington Post he was acting in an unofficial capacity, yet his recommendations were accepted as instructions and authority for the final shredding and smelting as well as media cover-up.

While these folks were not base or MAJCOM PA officials, my 2011 complaint brought to USAF PA's attention serious concerns about violations of Air Force standards and regulations, requiring response just as to any complaint from any citizen about the Air Force presented to PA. It happens, of course, that PA issues are also in question. 

AFMC decisions are also questioned in my inquiries. The involvement of a large number of others is shown in the distribution of the memo on page 22. The Air Staff and Pentagon are referenced on page 23 and by Mr. Michael Crane's email, as he is on the Air Staff. No action is known to have been taken by any of them regarding the recommended goal "of preventing future liability to the US Air Force and the US Department of Defense." 

Question here, please: what about already exposed veterans...the ones mentioned by Dr. Young? It is clear the intent of this process was to avoid liability to them as well.

As Dr. Young, "Senior Consultant on Agent Orange to the Office of Secretary of Defense" congratulated officials on page 35, this was all done with "minimal publicity". Indeed, there was none at all until exposed C-123 veterans sought care from the Department of Veterans Affairs.

As a former Stan/Eval flight examiner for my crew position, I am not unfamiliar

with the C-123K but rather an expert on it. I believe this, along with an Air Force enlisted and commissioned career, gives me reasonable insight to the issues I've raised and ability to read and understand applicable guidance in the form of operating instructions and regulations. 

I've tried to express myself accurately but suggestions from AF Public Affairs back in 2011 would have been quite helpful to correct any misunderstanding on my part. I welcome it today as well.

Remember: this is not some commercial firm's marketing communications department where press release activity is a sales tool. This is the United States Air Force, informing the public about how the nation's treasure in gold and in the lives our servicemembers is spent. This treasure must be carefully accounted for, which is the only way we insure civilian control over the military through an informed public and their legislature.

Hill AFB PA was not what the nation needed relative to this event, with consequent harm to our health.

   WTC

C-123 Vets AGAIN Request Response to USAF Public Affairs Complaint - 1298 Days Have Passed

Dear Chief and Mr. Clavette,

Gentlemen, may I know your thoughts on the inquiry I've lodged? 

It has been 1,298 days: Please do not think me impatient.

I am more grievously ill than when I first sought your counsel in 2011, as are many of my surviving crewmates.

The issue continues to affect the lives of over 2100 veterans, fewer alive today than when the question was first raised with AF PA in 2011. The issue, as managed by the PA shops involved, contributed to the Department of Veterans Affairs' delay in addressing veterans' Agent Orange exposure claims....a stated objective of the various memos and emails.

Quite predictably, there has been attendant financial loss, suffering and deaths from this deviation from Air Force regulations, Air Force values, and denial of the First Amendment rights of local media which prevented informing the public of significant government actions...actions destroying toxic airplanes and information about our health.

I request every kindness in expediting an answer to the questions raised, and welcome correction or clarification where helpful as to the supporting documents provided.

Regards,

   Wes Carter, Major, USAF Retired

  

On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 10:47 AM, BAILEY, TIMOTHY R CMSgt USAF AFPAA AFPAA/CCC <timothy.cccccc4@us.af.mil> wrote:

Sir,

I have forwarded your complaint up to the Mr. Larry Clavette, the Director of Air Force Public Affairs Agency. 

v/r

Timothy R. Bailey, CMSgt, USAF

C-123 Vets Renew AF Public Affairs Complaint First Submitted - but ignored - in 2011

Last week leaders of the C-123 Veterans Association renewed our 2011 complaints about Air Force Public Affairs operations at Hill AFB UT and Davis-Monthan AFB AZ. We alleged Air Force deceptions, both by commission and omission, regarding the April-June 2010 destruction of the toxic C-123 fleet stored at Davis-Monthan.

Stored at Davis-Monthan's Boneyard since 1982 and in special HAZMAT quarantine for a decade by orders of the USAF Surgeon General, the airplanes were all quietly shredded and smelted in response to their Agent Orange contamination. The press release, however, did not cover that fact. The press release did not mention Agent Orange at all.

And in fact, the well-crafted press release was never released. A whole fleet of airplanes with a unique 40-year history, considered by many the embarrassment of the Air Force, disappeared and the media took no notice.

They were not meant to. Air Force Public Affairs word-smithed their press release to make it as innocuous as possible, then placed in a desk drawer in case some inquiring reporter raised a question. Base officials and their outside consultant had word-smithed out attention-grabbing words such as "Agent Orange, toxin, TCDD" and other accurate descriptions of the event. Officials also wrote about their concern that, unless the event were kept "below the radar," exposed veterans could apply to Veterans Affairs for treatment of Agent Orange illnesses.

The very mention of this concern...expressed by the consultant, base officials and those up the chain of command...is inappropriate. Instead, the Air Force should have been accurate in its communication with the public, and with the veterans who'd served faithfully but had been exposed to Agent Orange. There is no excuse for such a coverup...no wonder the Air Force fought Freedom of Information Act requests about this for three years, finally releasing mostly redacted white pages, devoid of content.

No questions were raised by local media because they Air Force took pains to insure nobody knew. If somebody found out, a deceptive press release was ready to give them, but no inquiries ever came.

A parallel would be if an aircraft crashed on base and PA typed out a press release saying there'd been an unscheduled mass casualty exercise followed by a test of the unit's voluntary blood donation program, after which the base returned to normal operations. And then put the press release into a drawer in case some newsperson noticed a plume of smoke rising from the base and one less airplane.

This whole scheme abused the First Amendment right of reporters in the area by denying them information about a significant military activity. It abused the duty those reporters had to the public by keeping from their readers information about the conduct of the American military and its expenditure of treasure and peoples' lives. The lives spoken of are ours...the veterans who flew these airplanes, and from whom information was kept from us by deceptions of Air Force Public Affairs at Hill and D-M, which was in violation of Air Force and DOD operating instructions, and also in violation of Air Force ethics and the ethics expected of professional...not marketing communications...public agency public affairs operations.

Lies? Not directly.

Prevarication? Absolutely! In the Air Force, a prevarication is a lie.

Impact? Information about our health kept from us for over a year and the evolution of disability claims with VA delayed for four.

Media and the public which depends on them to be informed about our government? Neither can trust USAF Public Affairs with this as an example of deception possible from military officials. And the veterans affected also have a loss of trust and confidence in our Air Force, knowing it willingly deceives us in issues involving our health to prevent our claims with the VA.

CDC: Full HAZMAT Suits Should Have Been Used on C-123s Due to Agent Orange Contamination

It is official: CDC analyzed test results of C-123s previously flown for spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam, and issued the following conclusion to the Institute of Medicine on June 16. The IOM is reviewing C-123 veterans' Agent Orange exposures.

CDC wrote:

Above: CDC Report to VA/IOM, page 6

Above: AF inspectors at C-123 Quarantine Site, 2009. Wearing HAZMAT protection as 

specified by base safetyofficials. In 2014 CDC concluded full HAZMAT should have been required for 

crews flying and maintaining the C-123s between 1972-1982, however AF elected not to inform 

aircrews of lingering Agent Orange contamination or any safety precautions. (USAF Photo)

VA Argues With Itself Over Agent Orange

Fact: Agent Orange (not all of it) contained a toxin called TCDD, a recognized human carcinogen.

Fact:  Different agencies within VA see it from opposite perspectives: one is from science (VHA) and the other from preventing veterans' claims (VBA)

Here are quotes from the two major VA agencies, VHA and VBA, and the Secretary himself:

-Veterans Health Administration: "TCDD is the most toxic of the dioxins, and is classified as a human carcinogen by the Environmental Protection Agency"(1)

-Veterans Benefits Administration: "In summary, there is no conclusive evidence that TCDD exposure causes any adverse health effects."(2)

-Secretary Shinseki: "The Secretary remains committed to ensuring Vietnam-era Veterans receive benefits they have earned through their service.  This commitment includes determining presumptive service connection related to Agent Orange exposure when appropriate."(3) "TCC is the most toxic of dioxins. TCDD causes cell damage.  TCDD raises IHD rates.  TCDD damages arteries. "(4)

(1) VA web page "Facts About Herbicides"

ACTUAL CDC-Mandated C-123 Flight Suits. Confirmed by
Joint Services Records Research Center to VA May 2014.

(2) Mr T. Murphy, VA Director Compensation and Pension, "Advisory Opinion," denying a C-123 veteran's exposure claim. Mr. Murphy was modifying for VA's purposes the official finding by which the CDC/ATSDR actually concluded C-123 veterans have a 200-fold greater cancer risk, and that if the contamination on the airplanes had been known when they were in service (1972-1982) CDC would either order crews to wear full HAZMAT or ground the C-123s as a toxic hazard. ATSDR considers TCDD a toxic hazard and nothing in the report otherwise.  VA twisted everything! Mr. Murphy's rewrite, over his own signature of the CDC/ATSDR finding was read back and discussed with him face-to-face as well as in several letters and emails.
(3) VA Fact Sheet
(4) Senate Testimony by then-Secretary Shineski

Gosh...don't you wonder why Compensation and Pension skipped all but the Director's personal opinions and instead took the CDC/ATSDR finding that veterans were exposed and dismissed it, taking a official finding and clearly mistating its conclusions? And ignored the Secretary's "committed" approach?

This veteran considers the twisting of the ATSDR finding by Compensation and Pension to be a clear prevarication. On February 28 2013 it was brought to the attention of the Director of C&P who offered no correction then or since. It is still in the veteran's "C File," his Agent Orange claim denied.

It stands as another example of how the Secrretary's trust in the loyality and abilities of his staff was misplaced, leading to his resignation as scandal after scandal began unfolding.

What VA Doesn't Want the Institute of Medicine C-123 Post-Vietnam Agent Orange Exposure Committee to Know:

VA gathered the Institute of Medicine this spring and summer to study the post-Vietnam C-123 transports and the aircrews' Agent Orange exposures. Their report on what the VA should do will be submitted to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs by the end of September 2014. C-123 veterans notified IOM staff and the VA we consider this an an unethical step by VA to prevent currently qualified exposure veterans from receiving care the law now provides, with VA seeking to use IOM to construct a specific barrier in our situation.

But the committee doesn't have all the facts before it. The C-123 veterans wish to make known the various reports, studies, and other relevant documents, because the end of June was the committee's cut-off date for formal submission and many new items have been uncovered in the last two months.

Here are new developments or materials not previously submitted to the committee:

1. USAF has withheld hundreds of pages of its post-Vietnam C-123 Agent Orange study from release to veterans and the public, but provided everything to the VA. 
The USAF, through suits filed in the US District Court of Washington DC, has released some of the materials sought under the Freedom of Information Act request we first filed in 2012. Last week, years late and too late for the IOM, USAF released only heavily redacted materials, with nearly every page of the 380 completely blank. The only useful item was a single paragraph in which the USAF research team on post-Vietnam C-123 exposures grouped our exposures with those of Operation Ranch Hand. They then concluded because Ranch Hand veterans are reasonably healthy, the C-123 veterans were somehow not exposed to harmful amounts of Agent Orange. Actually, the AF should have likened our degree of bioavailability to the Vietnam ground troops or even more, according to Dr. Jeanne Stellman of Columbia.

2. VA withheld most pages of its post-Vietnam C-123 Agent Orange activities from release to the veterans and the public.
VA promised through the US District Court requested documents by the end of May, but continues to request postponements and releases nothing except the request for the next postponement. VA references "scientific studies" on its web pages which even the VA Board of Veterans Appeals cites as authority for denying C-123 exposure claims, yet apparently no such studies exist...only the VHA collection of references and selection of those best aimed at preventing veterans' claims. Subsequently in July 2014, VBA officials even denied knowledge of the A.L. Young Consultants $600,000 contract let in 2012, and of all reports, correspondence and other information.

3. Other Federal agencies have concluded the C-123 veterans were exposed and suffered harmful results.
At one point, with the draft provided by a staffer at VBA who'd been a leader in blocking C-123 claims, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs told the Senate that "many independent scientists voluntarily came forward" to argue against C-123 veterans' exposure claims, but it turns out there were only three, and each was paid to offer their opinions, one by VA and the other two by Dow and Monsanto. The Secretary dismissed the dozens of "Concerned Scientists and Physicians" who'd written him through Dr. Stellman as their corresponding scientist, and all of whom were unpaid. The Secretary, writing Senator Burr, dismissed these experts with a minimizing adjective as "some."
Please note that three voices against the veterans are termed "many" but dozens confirming the veterans' exposures are termed, "some."

He ignored input from the National Institutes of Health/NEISH and the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in explaining to the Senate why VA refuses C-123 claims. The Secretary's misleading letter to the Senate, perhaps an example of what the Secretary meant when he resigned because of poor staff work, was prepared by VBA which has opposed C-123 veterans' claims since we first began submitting them in 2011.

4.  Explaining the VA perspective to the IOM C-123 committee was VA's consultant, paid $600,000 for his services, but a detail not revealed to the committee. The Dow and Monsanto-sponsored reports properly noted their chemical industry sponsorship.  All six major veterans service organizations have demanded the VA cease contractual relationships with this firm.

5. As I told told the committee, the legal issue for the benefits claimed by C-123 veterans is exposure itself, and not bioavailability.
The law, regulations, US Code and Federal Register simply specify exposure to be eligible for what VA terms "presumptive service connection" for recognized Agent Orange illnesses. We've established our exposure to the satisfaction of legislators and Yale Law School as well as other federal agencies. Agencies with the actual statutory authority and expertise in exposure issues such as CDC, NIH and the US Public Health Service have informed VA that we've been both exposed and harmed by it. VA currently orders all C-123 exposure claims denied but the Board of Veterans Appeals almost always overturns and awards benefits to the veteran. To address this, VA's office of General Counsel has opined that VA can redefine exposure in any unique manner it wishes to prevent exposed veterans from being able to meet the law's requirement which only states "exposure."

6. VA, and the consultant explaining VA perspectives to the IOM committee, did not reveal that its spokesperson at the June 16 IOM was personally involved in ordering destruction of the toxic C-123s in 2010 (and as he stressed, to prevent potential veterans' claims), a unique element of his personal background which should have led VA to select another consultant regarding these veterans' health.
In a 2009 series of "Decision Memoranda" to Air Force leaders, the consultant, in his capacity as Senior Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense, recommended cessation of all further testing and the immediate destruction of the toxic C-123s, then in quarantine storage at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ. Citing the consultant's unique authority from the Office of Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wm. Boor requested and received from the Air Staff approval for destruction.

This has provided the consultant a unique historical role over four decades:

7. VA Expenditures Regarding C-123 veterans' exposure claims:
    -Support Veterans' Claims: $0.00
    -Prevent Veterans' Claims: $600,000 plus contractor expenses, VA staff salaries, travel & benefits
    -Contract extension with Institute of Medicine: unknown but language of the charge is considered to direct a negative response regarding the legal question of exposure and to force an inconclusive response regarding degree of harm, as this has been the result of previous IOM, unless the committee opts to exceed its charge and act with independence. Dow & Monsanto also sponsored letters opposing C-123 veterans' exposure claims at the June 16 2014 Institute of Medicine hearing.

8. In 2013 the USAF Assistant Surgeon General informed the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee that the USAFSAM C-123 Consultative Letter should not be used by VA in denying C-123 veterans' claims.

Still, VA cites it as the foundational document in preventing all C-123 veterans claims. VA further cites its own "scientific study" which is actually only a single page point paper typed in 2011 in preparation for the initial teleconference between VHA, VBA,C-123 veterans, and several scientists. The VA "scientific study" pointedly ignored every finding and opinion supporting C-123 veterans' claims...only publications which could be interpreted to argue against exposure were cited. This "scientific study" was thus only a policy statement.

In its response to the Senate, the AF illogically also reported that its conclusion aircrews were not exposed was "consistent" with the ATSDR finding that aircrews were exposed, and AF simply disregarded the ATSDR finding that the aircrew cancer risks were greatly increased.

9. The Air Force Ranch Hand Study considered non-Ranch Hand C-123 aircrews as potentially exposed from flying converted spray airplanes.
From the early study:

"Another possible control group, the non-Ranch Hand C-123 population, is known to be too small (approximately 3000) to provide flexibility and replacement under the proposed best match variable concept (see below and Section VI,A). Many of the Ranch Hand aircraft were reconfigured for transport and insecticide missions and thus, non-Ranch Hand crews responsible for these other missions, may have been exposed to Herbicide Orange residues in these aircraft. This group may not be considered truly unexposed to herbicides..."

VA's Agent Orange Consultant: Also Had 2006 DOD Contract to Identify Exposure Sites

Here's one we didn't know about. We knew the consultant Dr. Al Young had a distinguished Air Force career, helping develop Agent Orange as a military herbicide weapon. We knew that he had a role opposing early veteran demands for recognition of their Agent Orange illnesses in different assignments with the AF, VA and White House, we didn't know the rest of the story until more recent years.

Once we started learning about Patches and the other C-123s' record of spraying Agent Orange during Vietnam, we filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the USAF, and uncovered a large part...but only part of Dr. Young's involvement guiding VA (where his office was "Agent Orange Projects Office" at 810 Vermont...VA HQ!) and USAF in addressing veterans' exposure claims. It goes back through the decades. The same song, playing over and over. Remember Groundhog Day?

In 2006, the Department of Defense also contracted with him to produce a list of Agent Orange exposure sites. Although testing had identified Agent Orange residue in the C-123s stored at Davis-Monthan, the aircraft weren't mentioned.

In 2009 the AF sought advice and was reminded of Dr. Young's services by the Office of Secretary of the Army. Young's advice is mentioned in various documents from those years, but the significant ones are three "Decision Memorandum" he wrote to officials, including Major Carol McCrady, Mr. Jim Malmgren and Mr. Buddy Boor. In each, he recommended the immediate destruction, without further testing, of the former Agent Orange spray C-123 aircraft. Dr. Young also reminded AF officials that exposed veterans could seek care for their Agent Orange disabilities, and discussed the need to keep the destruction process "below the radar."

Dr. Young next appears on our radar when one of his correspondents shared an exchange in which the exposed C-123 veterans were denigrated by this retired Air Force officer in 2011 emails.

Then, he again enters the scene in 2012 as the VA consultant awarded an unsolicited $300,000/year contract to prepare articles on post-Vietnam Agent Orange situation. You guessed it...his first articles were to target C-123 veterans claiming post-Vietnam AO exposures aboard these former Ranch Hand warplanes.

In 2013, the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense again found him invaluable in the investigation to insure no Agent Orange was found on Okinawa, site of many barrels of Dow chemical burial. I don't know that situation well enough to comment.

But what really rubs salt into our Agent Orange wounds is the VA's acceptance of his reports for use against us at the June 16 Institute of Medicine committee hearing. Is it a coincidence that his contract runs through the end of the IOM C-123 process, September 27, 2014?

I was there. We shared a hour-long panel discussion, and I felt his genuine passion, defending a point of view he's kept unchanged for decades. But this was a scientific gathering of experts to provide input to the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Science. I was representing the veterans, and we were the only ones in the room entitled to express ourselves passionately!

I didn't make a big deal about his use of web site photos from recent restoration of a privately-owned C-123 to represent the same airplane being "restored and refurbished" in 1973. I didn't mention his foul slurs about us. I didn't even object to his failure to completely answer Professor Lu's question about why the C-123s were destroyed and his decision to avoid mention of own role recommending exactly that.

And if I made mistakes he graciously didn't make too big a deal of them, either. It seemed a civil discourse, but I remain critical most especially of his failure to mention to the committee his VA contract for $600,000. He was under contract to the VA running before, during and after his presentation to the IOM, yet neither he nor the VA properly informed the committee. By the way, the VA didn't pay me anything to carry my side of the argument, but the IOM paid my airfare to get to Washington, DC.

We've been asked if we see this as sinister? No, but certainly not pro-veteran, not pro-benefit of the doubt, hardly non-adversarial, and most definitely, unscientific. The consultant's papers, which were not peer-reviewed, were heavily slanted against Agent Orange being harmful, against any Agent Orange being present, and, if there was Agent Orange present, it somehow was the kind which couldn't expose anyone.

The VA did not simply place a stack of documents before the IOM representing all available information. Instead, they contracted out for $600,000 to prevent our claims. They accepted input from Dow and Monsanto who sponsored scientists to write to the Under Secretary to argue against us. They chose which documents to release to the VA...and withheld others.

The folks from VHA Office of Public Health were adversarial and, after submitting the charge to the IOM, then strongly argued against it instead of keeping their distance...letting the IOM search out the truth. Perhaps this added to the reasons behind the six major veterans' service organizations joint letter to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, objecting to the historical role of this consultant regarding veterans and Agent Orange.

Eastern Oregon Site of Early Agent Orange Tests!

Department of Defense documents recently released details of testings conducted by the Air Force in Eastern Oregon, under the management of Oregon State University. On pages 65-66 of the "The History of the US Department of Defense Programs for the Testing, Evaluation, and Storage of Tactical Herbicides" was a review of the 1973-1974 testing which covered over 300 acres with five drums of concentrate Agent Orange, diluted with kerosene for effective spraying.
report,

The disturbing document was a summary of world-wide US military use and storage of the wartime defoliant, infamous for its lingering toxic impact.

It was generated by contract with Batelle Columbus, which subcontracted for actual research and writing to a retired Air Force colonel. He directed much of the post-Vietnam denial posture adopted by both the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense.

At various times he seems to also have served as Senior Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense, and he continues writing projects about Agent Orange ordered by VA under a long-term contract. In 2010 he happens to had a role in directing that obsolete, desert-stored C-123 transports all be destroyed as toxic waste. He also insists the former Agent Orange spray aircraft were somehow safe.

The OSU effort was led by Professor M. Newton, now Professor Emeritus. Although he later suggested that his research shouldn't be used relative to exposure claims by C-123 veterans, In 2011 Professor Newton wrote to a military-oriented publication and offered his startling opinion that inhalation of dioxin by veterans is not a concern, surface contact with contaminated surfaces is not a concern, and assured readers that only individuals who've actually handled Agent Orange and dioxin might have been in enough contact for the toxin to be harmful. No mention was made in his opinion that he'd been involved himself in spraying military Agent Orange. Neither was mention made that his work on Agent Orange was decades old.

Clearly, the OSU personnel involved in the testing should consider the effects of their dioxin exposure, and the industrial concerns which offered their property for this testing might also investigate.
(note: Professor Newton posted a discussion HERE of his Agent Orange views)

All Veterans Alert: VA Develops Scheme to Prevent All Exposure Claims

Burn pits, radiation, toxin, biological hazards...everything. Everything a veteran might have been exposed to can now be denied by the VA.

That's right. VA did this by redefining the word exposure to their own liking. Since 2012, VA's redefinition of exposure is, "Exposure = contamination field + bioavailability."

This means VA won't acknowledge an exposure event unless and until the veteran can prove some biological harm specifically from the exposure. Unless VA or Congress establishes presumptive service connection, as was done with the "boots on the ground" Vietnam veterans, VA can now block any exposure claim unless the impact of the exposure is so immediate as to be indisputable.

Few veterans claiming burn pit exposure, disease, or Agent Orange exposure, or any other type of exposure, can ever prove its bioavailability. Example: you're exposed to biological hazards drinking local water in some remote wasteland and later develop an illness. While statistically you can suggest the association of your illness with the local water, VA won't recognize the exposure unless you prove it.

The VA definition is unique to science. In fact, challenged by the rest of science. The Director, National Toxicology Program reports, "In all my years as a toxicologist, I have never heard the term bioavailability as part of the exposure field."  In their determination to prevent claims, VA Post Deployment Health invented this just for us veterans!

VA won't concede your exposure if you walk into a tent of Ebola patients...unless you develop Ebola and can prove it was from that tent. But in fact, you've been exposed to Ebola, bioavailability or not, and VA won't treat you unless and until you develop Ebola as proof of your exposure.

But you can't prove it and the VA will deny your claim. That's their purpose of the redefinition of exposure...to prevent exposure claims from veterans who have been exposed.

Makes sense from their perspective: VA saves serious money by not treating disabled veterans ill from their exposures. Makes no sense from a veteran's perspective, finding VA hospital doors locked when we're ill.

In the case of C-123 veterans and our Agent Orange-contaminated aircraft exposing us to dioxin, VA employs their redefinition of exposure to prevent exposure claims, regardless of substantiation, electing to have their redefinition trump all evidence affirming the claim.

The list is long...occupational hazards such as asbestos and lead, inoculations, dirty water, radio frequencies, smoke, toxins, chem warfare, dust, bugs...everything for which a veteran might actually experience exposure can be denied with VA's handi-dandi redefinition of exposure, the magic of defining away your disability claim!

Look at the University of Washington exposure graph below, which shows outcome (bioavailability) as an event after exposure. Do you get it? VA now says exposure requires outcome to be exposure. If you can't prove the outcome you haven't been exposed...for example, if you can't prove your prostate cancer came from contact with Agent Orange, VA's definition says you were never exposed.

Using that definition VA can deny service connection for virtually every exposure. Indeed, using it, Post Deployment Health's Acting Chief Consultant informed The C-123 Veterans Association last year that no veterans were exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam (other than perhaps some Ranch Hand crews.)

ATSDR Director Resigns Under Pressure – Senate Cites Poor Communications With Camp Lejune Marines

I find this turmoil in the ATSDR deeply disturbing, and regret the discomforts of its just-resigned director, Dr. Tanja Popovic. I am not familiar with her or her work but a 25 year career seems to have ended quite painfully for a long-time government servant.

Reported in the 20 March 2014 National Journal, reporter Mike Manger:

The head of a federal agency that investigates health problems linked to toxic-waste sites has stepped down after a clash with former Marines who believe their families were harmed by poisoned drinking water at Camp Lejeune.

Tanja Popovic's sudden resignation followed a tumultuous seven weeks as acting director of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, a division of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, during which she assured West Virginia residents that their water was safe to drink after a toxic chemical spill in January, questioned the need for a study of cancers that may be linked to Camp Lejeune's tainted water, and sent scolding emails to aides of lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

Popovic also had some tense email exchanges with the leader of a group advocating for victims of Camp Lejeune's contamination, former Marine Master Sgt. Jerry Ensminger, in which she accused Ensminger and his colleagues of sending messages that contained "disrespectful, condescending, and even offensive content."

"I take attacks on my professional and personal integrity very seriously," Popovic wrote to Ensminger on March 12, "and I am profoundly saddened to see that you will stop at nothing."

The friction culminated in a meeting on Capitol Hill last week between staff of lawmakers concerned about Popovic's handling of Camp Lejeune issues and congressional liaisons for Popovic's division, the CDC, and the Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees both agencies. That meeting included aides to the two senators from North Carolina, where Camp Lejeune is located, as well as Rep. John Dingell, author of the federal law that established the agency Popovic ran.

The next business day, Popovic's resignation was announced in an email to top managers at the CDC, headquartered in Atlanta.

A spokeswoman for the CDC, Bernadette Burden, said she could only confirm that Popovic's tenure as acting director of the agency began on Jan. 26 and ended Monday. "It's a personnel matter," Burden said, so no information about the resignation would be discussed.

Reached at her home in Stone Mountain, Ga., the scientist who worked for the federal government for 25 years declined to comment. "I would not like to make any comments, thank you," Popovic said before hanging up.

Widespread dumping of military waste at Camp Lejeune over at least four decades caused drinking-water supplies at the sprawling base on the Atlantic Coast to be contaminated with toxic chemicals from the 1950s until 1985, when 10 tainted wells were finally shut down. As many as a million Marines and family members, as well as civilian employees at the base, could have been exposed to the polluted water, and many of them believe illnesses and deaths were caused by it.

Congress passed a law in 2012 providing health care for Marines and family members who have specific illnesses that can be linked to the contamination, but the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is still conducting studies of the pollution's health effects.

One of the studies sought by victims of the contamination would attempt to determine incidences of cancer among former residents of Camp Lejeune. But last month Popovic told lawmakers in a meeting called to get an update on the study that the agency had neither the authority nor expertise to conduct a cancer-incidence study.

The meeting prompted Dingell and the two senators from North Carolina, Democrat Kay Hagan and Republican Richard Burr, to write HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius on March 12 urging that the study be done and also asking that Popovic's agency work on better relations with victims of the Camp Lejeune contamination.

"For reasons we cannot yet discern, the desire for open communication seems to have waned within ATSDR in recent months," Dingell, Hagan, and Burr wrote to Sebelius.

Press Deception at Hill – and it WORKED – Public Was Completely Deceived!

Air Force Press Deception. Deliberate deception of the public to prevent veterans' disability claims.

In June 2010, eighteen multi-engine Air Force transports were shredded, and then smelted, ridding the military of one of its last legacies of the Vietnam War use of Agent Orange.

Years of plans for this destruction of eighteen Fairchild UC-123K cargo planes were firmed up in 2009. Included in those plans were suggestions from the Office of Secretary of Defense Senior Consultant emphasizing the need for minimal public attention. Agent Orange, dioxin, TCDD, Operation Ranch Hand are still attention-grabbing words of great concern to the public, and especially, veterans.

Hill AFB Public Affairs cooperated with leaders at Davis-Monthan AFB in creating the overall plan, which included a unique example of dishonest, unethical public deception. Focused on minimizing public awareness of the destruction process but aware absence of the aircraft might be noticed, the Air Force crafted a press release. As the consultant recommended, the press release was to be readied in the event of inquiries.


But it was to be a press release not released. And in its creative, but misleading wordsmithing, it remains as much a deception of the press and the public as was failure to distribute the document a deception. In two areas, therefore, it not only violated Air Force regulations governing public affairs, but violated the public trust.

Were there laws broken? Probably not, although EPA should look into some actions. It turns out that the Executive Branch, even the president, has no constitutional obligation to speak the truth. However, most of us consider that part of his/her job description. And we certainly expect truthfulness from military leaders, whose only excuse for deception would be for reasons of security. Not embarrassment.

This entry will take a bit of patience for our readers...there is a great deal of background, all of it relevant. And like colors of painter's palette, the facts come together to form the complete picture. Please give it your patience as the full story comes into view.

The "colors' we'll use for form our picture of Air Force press deception, and Air Force violation of its own strict rules about honesty and openness. Upon those rules rest the public's trust and the trust of our press, and the trust of those wearing the uniform.

The issue begins with the C-123s stored at Davis-Monthan and growing awareness that decades were passing without resolution of the political and environmental problems associated with the warplanes everyone (generals, scientists, attorneys, political leaders) called "the Agent Orange airplanes."

In 2000, base employees filed a complaint with their union, worried about exposure to dioxin on the airplanes which had been moved into HAZMAT quarantine.

Before discussion of the particulars of the C-123 destruction deception, let’s look at what obligations the Air Force sets forth in its public affairs program. While the Executive Branch may not be constitutionally required to be truthful, the military accepts that responsibility...with reservations.

The Air Force regulation governing Public Affairs is AFI 35-101, “Public Affairs Responsibilities and Management.” There we see very interesting statements, including:

a. "The purpose of Air Force PA operations is to communicate timely, accurate, and
useful information.” "The Air Force’s credibility depends on two factors: maintaining professional integrity and communicating timely and truthful information to the public.”
b: "Achieve informed public support for the Air Force and joint operations.”
c. "Information is not withheld merely because it casts criticism on or causes embarrassment to the Air Force."
d. Department of Defense Principles of Information. DOD makes available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the media may assess and understand the
facts about national security and defense strategy.”
e. "A free flow of general and military information will be made available without
censorship or propaganda to the American public.” “Information is not classified or otherwise withheld from disclosure only to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.”
f: The Air Force should provide the public with information on its major programs; they may require detailed PA planning and coordination within DOD and with other  government agencies. The sole purpose of such an activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propaganda has no place in DOD PA programs.”
g. Air Force Commanders: Ensure legally required community involvement in environmental issues is conducted in a thorough and timely manner.”
h: All Air Force Personnel:  each person must strive to make sure public
contacts show the highest standards of conduct and reflect the Air Force’s core values of integrity first, service before self, and excellence.

In April 2010 the 75^th ABW, Hill AFB, Utah prepared in advance a press release describing the destruction of the remaining C-123K/UC-123K aircraft at the Davis-Monthan AFB. Management of the information about this process was faulty and greatly harmed Air Force interests.

Throughout the period 2000-2010, intense concern was raised at different agencies, including the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Air Staff, the Air Force Surgeon General, the Air Force Office of Environmental Law, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, HQ Air Force Material Command and more. 

The concern: dioxin contamination left on the aircraft from their Vietnam War service as Agent Orange spray aircraft in Operation Ranch Hand.

1993 seems to be the first time when tests were ordered on Patches, the Air Force Museum’s famous C-123, was tested before positioning inside the museum. It tested positive for dioxin…in the words of the Air Force toxicologists it was “heavily

C-123K "Patches" at USAF Museum

contaminated”.

More tests and correspondence accumulate during the period 1994-2000 with the only concerns expressed being the disposal of the aircraft, safety of personnel at the Boneyard, whether Walt Disney films should be told that two of the C-123s they purchased for movie production were possibly contaminated, whether foreign governments should be informed that the aircraft transferred to them were contaminated, and similar correspondence. 

No mention has ever been found of concern for the aircrews who flew these airplanes and had already been exposed, until 2013 when Air Force leaders reported the information had been withheld from the veterans "to prevent undue distress."

In 1996 AFMC’s Office of Environmental Law recommended the contamination be “kept within official channels”, a recommendation endorsed by the writer’s commander, the Director of the Office of Environmental Law.

In 2000 the Air Force joined with the General Services Administration in a court action to stop the contracted sale of some contaminated C123s. The federal judge took their sworn testimony of the aircraft being “heavily contaminated, extremely dangerous, extremely hazardous, extremely contaminated, danger to the public” and other descriptions, and ordered the sale terminated. (note: In 2012, faced with veterans' claims for exposure, the USAF reversed its opinion, saying the planes were actually no danger to the veterans.)

In 2009 the AMARG/AFMC moved towards disposal of the remaining 21 aircraft, but officials knew the planes couldn’t be buried as they were too toxic for a landfill. The recommendation of the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Senior Consultant was to stop testing the aircraft immediately for toxicity…all four had tested positive (two significant and two trace, but any trace is unsafe) and his suggestion was that that result could be taken two ways:

First, because the first four tested had two that were contaminated, it could be inferred that “only two of the 21 aircraft were toxic."

Or worse, that “50% or more of the remaining aircraft were toxic.” As the testing was costly, base officials, acting on the OSD consultant's authority, opted to shred the entire fleet of C-123s, having discovered a loophole in EPA regulations that shredded metal could avoid being classified as toxic waste. EPA regulations were looked at carefully, due to a threatened $3,400,000,000 fine.

The OSD consultant also recommended that the public affairs at Hill and Davis-Monthan prepare for possible media inquiries. He mentioned an article from Orion Magazine, and discussed the worry that a media “storm” that might develop could inform Air Force Reservists who flew the airplanes between 1972-1982 that their dioxin-related illnesses might be brought to the VA for treatment. 

Various drafts of a press release were offered, and the OSD consultant along with other officials “corrected” the drafts by eliminating words such as “Agent Orange”, “dioxin”,  “contamination” and replacing them with words less likely to alarm the public. Agent Orange and dioxin and contamination were replaced with “herbicide” and “aged Vietnam-era airplanes no longer flown.” 

The consultant's words...his agenda formed the Air Force press release:

The question of adverse publicity related to additional sampling or the immediate destruction of the aircraft is important to address. Clearly the Public Affairs Office needs to be involved in either course of action. The longer this issue remains unresolved, the greater the likelihood of outside press reporting on yet another “Agent Orange Controversy”. I recommend the IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF ALL THE UC-123K AIRCRAFT. Public Affairs should prepare a news release in the event that there is a press inquiry. The key issues to emphasize in a press release are “that these old and obsolete aircraft sprayed defoliants in Vietnam 40 years ago”, “they were retired to Davis-Monthan AFB many years ago”, and “that recent analytical data from sampling a representative number of the aircraft indicated that only negligible levels of contamination could be detected.” Thus, “they were destroyed in an approved method used for the destruction of all obsolete aircraft at Davis-Monthan AFB.”

The last part of the statements was clearly deceptive, given the volumes of Air Force memos about companies desperate to purchase the valuable engines and propellers, and museums which wanted them, and private buyers who wanted them so desperately they unsuccessfully sued in federal court to try to force a sale. And lost, because the planes were shown to be dangerously toxic.

The final version of the UC-123’s story was approved by the necessary authorities at the 75^th Air Base Wing. It was not distributed, but held in case of media inquiry. This was a further element of the effort to minimize public awareness of the true story of the event.

Perhaps no lies were told. But there were, indeed, pages of prevarication. Mistruths were constructed to build a story which really had nothing to do with the real news of the event…dioxin contaminated aircraft. Nobody at the 75th ABW PA shop inquired of the managers of the event about the Air Force Reserve aircrews which had been exposed to dioxin on their airplanes for a full decade. Instead, the public affairs officers bent without objection, indeed, apparently with eager willingness, and in complete disregard for Air Force Instruction 35-101, to construct a press release to deceive the media and the public, as well as the Air Force Reservists beginning to wonder why they have cancer, heart disease, acute peripheral neuropathy, ALS, and other dioxin-related illnesses.

A careful reader will note a possibly inappropriate use of a business title implying official actions within and by the Office of Secretary of Defense. That particular consultant was described in several documents from HQ AFMC and the 75^th Air Base Wing as Agent Orange “Senior Consultant to the Office of Secretary of Defense.” 

Later, in an interview with Steve Vogel of the Washington Post, the consultant, Dr. Al Young, said he was acting privately in his work overseeing the C-123 destruction.

This person's attitudes and reactions to Reserve Component aircrews are a specific concern. In his 26 June 2009 position paper regarding the need for speedy destruction of the dioxin-contaminated aircraft, the OSD consultant mentions the media “storm” which might attend the operation and cause aircrews and maintenance workers with dioxin-related illnesses to seek care at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Concerned with the visibility of this event, which he frequently wrote must be low key (and even congratulates base officials on concluding the operation with minimal public attention). 

There has been an obvious careful selection of words to hide the actual event – a prevarication - destruction of dioxin-contaminated aircraft with a potential $3.4 billion dollar EPA or State of Arizona fine. This by presenting a completely misleading press release. There is an ethical standard in preparation of press releases, but it seems to have been ignored here in disregard for AFI 35-101.

The OSD consultant, a retired Air Force officer, in a 10 July 2011 message described the dioxin-exposed Air Force Reserve combat veteran aircrews as “trash haulers, freeloaders looking for a sympathetic Congressman for tax-free dollars.”  This is an inappropriate perspective from a person editing Air Force press releases especially when he helps direct the misinformation concerning events vital to the C-123 veterans' health.

His perspective was certainly consistent. He was hired by the VA to report on the C-123 veterans' exposure concerns and in his November 2012 report he recommended against any recognition of their exposure or disability claims. His involvement is also unique: He helped develop Agent Orange as a tactical weapon while in the Air Force. He advised the AF on disposing the airplanes because of their toxicity, he expressed distain for the veterans who flew the warplanes, and then he recommended that, regardless of other scientific proofs (which he opted not to reference in his report) that the VA block the veterans' disability claims. Thus, he had a significant role in each key part of the C-123 contamination story.

Particular concern has been raised with the 12 February 2010 Staff Summary prepared by Mr. Dwight Eagle of the 505^th. He noted the OSD consultant’s suggestion that although the UC-123K was principally used to spray Agent Orange, because some of them sometimes sprayed other liquids or conducted other missions, it could thus be described in terms of those missions, rather than the Agent Orange-Ranch Hand missions which were the principal employment for the airplane. Cleverly, the consultant had “clarified that the low levels of contamination are not necessarily attributed to Agent Orange, since not all aircraft were used in defoliant operations. Therefore, according to Dr. Young, the aircraft disposal does not have to be publicly announced as portraying or relating to Agent Orange.”

The Air Force Academy Cadet Honor Code Handbook, and other military volumes dealing with honor, considers this press release word-twisting to be quibbling, evasive, and incomplete…a lie constructed from half-truths, and dishonorable. It is perhaps not in keeping with the requirements of the State of Arizona or the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules and regulations regarding hazardous waste storage and their threatened $3.4 billion fine. The work product of the 75th ABW was not public affairs. It was an exercise in prevarication and public deception.

What was the news? The destruction of Agent Orange spray airplanes. And that was precisely the news to be obscured, twisted, avoided.

Today, thanks to many media reports, this story has changed quite a bit from what it could have been, and should have been – the simple “destruction of Agent Orange contaminated aircraft in an environmentally responsible way” to one where the news value is in the early attempts to keep the information in official channels, to one where Air Force public affairs abused the trust of the public and media by misleading them through a poorly-crafted and deceptive press release. 

It morphed, and grew into a situation where public affairs at both Hill AFB and Davis-Monthan AFB failed to bring to the attention of leadership their military and civil service ethical responsibilities. And, although public affairs professionals with clear guidance provided by AFI 35-101, they failed to alert their leaders as to the negative impact of failing to notify aircrews who’d been exposed to the toxins and the health dangers this press release was designed to conceal from us, our families, the media and the public.

Mission...failed.