Department of Justice Confirms...AND DISMISSES...VA Errors on C-123 Vet's Claim

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Both VA and the Justice Department casually dismiss VA's refusal to permit years of vital medical care legally due C-123 veterans.

This week the Department of Justice officially informed via email the C-123 Veterans Association that VA's Compensation and Pension Service was in error denying a C-123 vet's Agent Orange exposure claim. Let's look at this in two separate reports, beginning here with why VA took extraordinary steps to dismiss a veteran's exposure claim, an exposure confirmed by the CDC.

C&P was summarizing (poorly, unscientifically, dishonestly) the opinion of Dr. Tom Sinks, Deputy Director of the CDC Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Sinks' opinion was that C-123 vets had a 182-times greater exposure to TCDD than military standards permit, and consequently will experience a 200-fold increase in cancer screening values. To make certain VA got the point, Dr. Christopher Portier, Director of the CDC ATSDR also affirmed the report. So did the director after him, Rear Admiral (MD, US Public Health Service) R. Ikeda. All of this did no good, even coming from the CDC.

Pretty gruesome, but just to make certain the C-123 veteran's claim was denied, C&P made all this evidence disappear by stating, "In summary there is no conclusive evidence that TCDD exposure causes any adverse health effects."

Read that ridiculous statement again very carefully: VA was saying that TCDD (the toxin which makes Agent Orange toxic) is harmless. Somehow, VA insisted that this known human carcinogen, the most toxic of the toxins, causes "no adverse health effects." Here's how Justice weakly defended VA's missteps:

"VA states as follows: The statement regarding TCDD exposure and adverse health effects was written in error and was incomplete.  It was referring to a statement submitted to VA by ATSDR, which was vague on potential exposure and health effects.  The TCDD statement should have read that ATSDR did not provide conclusive evidence that (the veteran's) claimed exposure to dried and solidified TCDD caused his claimed adverse health effects".

But DOJ missed much of the impact of VA's errors and even repeated those errors in its statement!

1. Not only was the scientific opinion of another federal health agency dismissed improperly by VA, but C&P did so by insisting ATSDR didn't provide "conclusive" evidence. The problem is that conclusive evidence isn't required at all in VA disability claims! The law states a veteran need only produce proofs "as likely to as not" or 50/50, with the benefit of the doubt always resting with the veteran.

But C&P quietly raised the bar to insure this claim was denied. C&P rejected the CDC opinion because it wasn't deemed to be "conclusive." In fact, few exposure illnesses are "conclusive." And how many federal agencies did VA require to support the veteran's claim? Here, VA rejected not only the CDC but also the National Institutes of Health and the US Public Health Service...three federal health agencies insisting this C-123 veteran was exposed to Agent Orange but the VA dismissed them all! Not for any legal or scientific reason but instead because, as VA's Post Deployment Public Health Section told the Associated Press, "we have to draw the line somewhere" against C-123 claims.

2. VA's clear obligation is to provide presumptive service connection to any veteran who either is "boots on the ground" during Vietnam, or along the Korean DMZ during certain years, or who is otherwise able to establish factual Agent Orange exposure. There is no requirement that the veteran prove the "adverse health effects" in the DOJ statement. NEVER must a veteran prove that Agent Orange is harmful...that is assumed in the law and repeatedly promised by VA in its Federal Register postings. If a veteran is exposed, the veteran's Agent Orange injury, if present, is required to be presumed...automatically.

But not here. The VARO adjudicator initially wanted to approve this claim on the basis of what she described as "the plethora of evidence," but VA C&P torpedoed the vet's claim.  C&P injected phony extra-legal requirements in its advisory opinion of the C-123 veteran's claim to insure the vet's failure. And DOJ took no notice, so busy were those attorneys defending the VA rather than the veterans who'd been wronged.

DOJ's attorney's should read their own report and consider the VA's very serious errors.

C-123 Veterans Expand Web Presence @ www.c123cancer.org

C-123 Veterans Expand Website: www.c123cancer.org

The Engineers' Prom??

Acting on the requests and comments, especially from government employees (especially folks at Hill AFB  and at 810 Vermont Ave) who use office computers barring access to blogs, the C-123 Veterans Association this weekend greatly expanded its web sites www.c123cancer.org and our parallel site, www.c123agentorange.com.

We'll still keep the blog the most current, up-to-date posting of information, but web sites and blogs each offer different publishing advantages.

Now, dear readers, you have them both!

Check Your VA Claims File - Check for JSRRC Confirmation!

"JSRRC" stands for the Joint Services Records Research Center, stationed at Fort Belvoir, VA. The

JSRRC has other functions but the one we're concerned with is their role in confirming...or denying...a veteran's claim to have been exposed to Agent Orange.

Settling the question is no problem for Vietnam veterans because the law takes care of that via what is called "presumptive eligibility." If you were in Vietnam you're covered for the typical Agent Orange-presumptive illnesses.

For others, especially C-123 veterans, its is more complicated. The VA regional offices need to gather a lot of data, but at some point they almost always turn to the JSRRC for a report to verify the veteran's claim of exposure.

Early in our struggle, we noted the consistent denials of all exposure claims veterans put forward. I made an appointment with the JSRRC chief and visited in February to learn more about their operation and how we could submit official documentation to make their VA responses closer to our understanding of C-123 contamination. Needed - official US government documentation, because as archivists that is all they can work with.

Fortunately we had our stack of supporting information ready, it has been provided JSRRC and currently their responses to VA are closer to the facts as we know them. Today I added more documentation from the USAF Historical Records Research Agency and also two statements from senior US Public Health officials - USPHS commissioned officers are military officers, thus we have a nice set of two physicians backing up our exposure claims...in writing!

But if you turned in your claim any time in the last two years, you really should check your VA C-file. There probably is, or should be, a JSRRC report on you. That report needs to agree with your situation.

If not, submit a written request, stating your JSRRC response is incorrect and VA should request a restatement from JSRRC. Simple...but you have to initiate the request. Don't out it off!

VA Challenge: Show VA MILITARY Proof That Vets Flew Contaminated C-123s?

The question keeps coming up...and we keep answering it. YES! You want proof???

1. YES. There is military documentation firmly establishing the necessary proof of the C-123s in our unit being former Ranch Hand spray aircraft.

2. YES. There is military documentation firmly establishing the necessary proof of the C-123s in our unit, particularly Tail #362 (Patches) and the others, at last five, being contaminated with dioxin (Agent Orange.)

3. YES. There is military documentation firmly establishing the necessary proof of our aircrews flying C-123s specifically identified as former Ranch Hand spray aircraft.

Here are the three answers for the important question, last raised by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on June 7 2013 in his letter to Senator Burr, in which the Secretary wrote:

"VA does not currently have a method of determining if a Veteran claiming stateside AO exposure was flying on one of the Operation Ranch Hand C-123s or one of the many other post-Vietnam C-123s flown stateside during the 1970s and 1980s." 

1. The USAF Historical Records Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL, has identified the histories of
nearly all C-123 aircraft from manufacture and sale to the Air Force, and has identified which of them by specific tail number was modified for aerial spray operations and used for Operation Ranch Hand, spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam. Further, they identified which of the three post-Vietnam USAF squadrons had which former spray aircraft. Tail numbers and units to which the aircraft were assigned were reconfirmed by HQ Air Force Reserve Command.

2. For Westover veterans, the most heavily tested C-123 is Tail #362 (Patches, mentioned by the Secretary) now at the Air Force Museum. Its first test confirming military herbicides was in 1979, and a more comprehensive series of tests by AF toxicologists in 1994 confirmed the aircraft was "heavily contaminated on all test surfaces" and "a danger to public health." None of the other former spray planes were tested so thoroughly, and because they've been destroyed as toxic waste no testing can be done any longer. Documentation released by AFMC showed 1996 testing of 17 aircraft reported all 17 positive for dioxin contamination.

There is every scientific and logical reason to conclude the other aircraft were similarly contaminated, especially as Patches ceased spraying Agent Orange years before the other aircraft when it was switched to malathion missions, thus the other C-123s had "fresher" dioxin.

3. Air Force aviators are provided tracking of their flying activities via a "Form 5" which reports the individual's name, crew position, date and time of the mission, type of mission, and tail number flown. Thus, veterans who flew Patches will have a Form 5 showing their name and Tail #362. In the decades since the C-123 was flown, very few veterans will have saved paperwork dating back over four decades. Veterans have been gathering available Form 5s and flight orders. Flight orders do not show a tail number but they list the crew members for the flight. Matching names on Form 5s and names on flight orders satisfies Air Force archivists requirements for documenting any individual's flight activities.

So there is no question. All three parts of the Secretary's question are addressed with military documentation adequate to convince any jurist or archivist. If some VA officials remain unconvinced, it is because they are deliberately looking away from the proof and are dedicated to wrongly preventing our veterans' access to vital medical care.

VA Views on Agent Orange Conflict With Other Experts!

note: TCDD=dioxin=2,3,7,8 (toxins in Agent Orange)

"There is no scientific evidence that a Veteran's presence in an aircraft containing solidified TCDD can lead to adverse long-term health effects."

            

                 - Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 7 June 2013 letter to US Senate

In my opinion, it is highly likely that you and other crew members were exposed to the herbicides and to their highly toxic contaminant, dioxin.

        - Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Profesor Emerata, Columbia University

Given the available information, I believe that aircrew operating in this, and similar environments, were exposed to dioxin.
       - Dr. Christopher Portier, Director, CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry

(Received June 24 from the incoming Director of the Agency For Toxic Substances & Disease Registry)

Dear Major Carter,

Thank you for your email and warm welcome regarding my new acting position.  I have recently been briefed about ATSDR actions related to this situation.  I have also reviewed the ATSDR correspondence related to C-123 aircraft and I am in agreement with it.  I understand that the VA has already received our letters and that ATSDR staff have spoken with VA staff about your situation. 

The letter from ATSDR to General Hickey regarding exposures at Camp Lejeune was somewhat different.  We sent that letter after completing an extensive dose-reconstruction model of exposures to volatile organic compounds at Camp Lejeune.  We were obliged to notify the VA because they had been relying on out-of-date information previously generated by us. 

The limited, but high quality, sampling of C-123 aircraft that we reviewed in 2012 confirm that some post-Vietnam era C-123 aircraft were contaminated with TCDD dioxin.   All C-123 aircraft have since been destroyed.  Thus, it is no longer possible to further characterize human exposure pathways through additional sampling.  Without additional environmental sampling information, an official health consultation would not shed additional light on this situation beyond that provided in January 2012 and March 2013.  I understand that United States Air Force restricted entry into these contaminated planes once they were found to be contaminated.  ATSDR concurs with this position and believes it would also have applied to pilots and crew had these planes remained operational. 

I hope this email is helpful.  Thank you again for your service to our country.  

Robin

 Robin M. Ikeda, MD, MPH

RADM, USPHS

Deputy Director, Noncommunicable Disease, Injury, and Environmental Health

Acting Director, National Center for Environmental Health/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

4770 Buford Highway, MS F-39

Atlanta, GA 30341

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From: Wes Carter [mailto:c123kcancer@gmail.com]

Sent: Monday, June 10, 2013 2:55 PM
To: Ikeda, Robin (CDC/ONDIEH/OD)
Cc: Sinks, Tom (CDC/ONDIEH/NCEH)
Subject: Opinion provided earlier by Dr. Sinks and Dr. Portier re: C-123 Agent Orange contamination and exposure

Dear Dr. Ikeda,

Congratulations on your assuming the helm at ATSDR. We are the C-123 Veterans Association, and in the past ATSDR has been very kind to provide opinions over the signatures of Dr. Sinks and Dr. Portier. These opinions confirmed our exposure to Agent Orange for the years we flew the C-123 medium assault transports used earlier in Vietnam for spraying Agent Orange.

Last week I visited with several senators and congressional representatives, as well as with Ms. Amanda Meredith and Mr. Steve Robertson of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee. We have asked the assistance of both the staff director and the Republican General Counsel in approaching the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding our veterans' claims.

I was asked, and they also asked me, why the previous letters from ATSDR have been disregarded by the VA. In one instance, VA's Compensation Services summarized Dr. Sinks' opinion (without mentioning his conclusion that veterans were exposed) by appending the sentence, "In conclusion there is no conclusive evidence of long-term TCDD harm." In another, the Manchester NH Veterans Affairs Regional Office denied a veteran's claim by grouping Dr. Sinks' and Dr. Portier's findings in the unacceptable "lay evidence" category, and into that group also put the findings by the NIH and US Public Health Service. Dr. Linda Birnbaum is also very familiar with this issue, as is Dr. Jeanne Stellman at Columbia.

Similar official letters from ATSDR have been accepted by VA for Camp Lejeune, and we cannot understand why the VA rejects their merit here. Obviously the issue is critical for us, because most of our veterans are not retired military and not otherwise VA-eligible, so they are turned away when seeking care for typical Agent Orange illnesses by the VA hospitals.

The matter has recently reached the desk of Secretary Shinseki. May I again ask ATSDR's leadership in restating to the General the opinion that we were exposed, and if possible, in the form of an official health consultation? Reading the criteria for an official health consultation, it seems to fit the requirements. 

Because the C-123 contamination had been kept "in official channels only" by the Air Force until released via FOIA in 2010, we only recently began presenting claims to the VA, and in every instance the claims have been denied, and all those reaching the VA's Board of Veterans Appeals a year or more later have been overturned in favor of the C-123 veteran. At our age and with our illnesses, however, we need very much for appropriate decisions to be made on the initial claims, rather than years later in appeal. 

I hope we can continue to count on Dr. Sinks, you and the ATSDR for help.

Sincerely,

Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF Retired

Chair

Vietnam Veterans of America proposes updated resolution of support for C-123 veterans!

(following is the proposed resolution presented for consideration by the 2013 convention of the Vietnam Veerans of America, updating their 2011 resolution which as been so influential...our thanks, VVA!)

US AIR FORCE RESERVE C123K AIRCREWS EXPOSURE POST-VIETNAM

Issue: The United States Air Force (USAF) used its fleets of C-123K transport aircraft in more than 9,100 missions, for aerial application of more than twenty million gallons of toxic herbicides between 1961 and 1971 in Vietnam. The aircraft were returned to the United States for continued use in airlift missions by USAF squadrons at Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania; and, Rickenbacker Air Reserve Base, Ohio between 1972-1982 and were then retired from service and placed in storage. Veterans whose duties brought them into intense contact with these aircraft were exposed to military herbicides.

Background: The United States Air Force (USAF) in 1979, in response to the presence of noxious fumes, conducted scientific tests on unit aircraft and identified and determined that significant levels of military herbicides and insecticides used in Vietnam still contaminated the aircraft; and,

additional tests carried out in 1994 by USAF Armstrong Laboratories still showed the presence of herbicides, and in particular, the presence of highly toxic Agent Orange contaminant dioxin. Finding that the contamination was considered sufficient by the USAF, it then required the use of HAZMAT protective equipment when carrying out tests or otherwise entering the aircraft. As late as 2009, further USAF tests conducted at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona demonstrated continued contamination of these aircraft. USAF toxicology staff has testified in federal proceedings that toxic levels of contamination due to the herbicides were a danger to public health; and that the levels observed in the aircraft greatly exceed the Department of Defense’s (DoD) own standards for maximum permissible exposure to any dioxin contaminating interior surfaces.

 Other federal agencies have reviewed the data and concurred that exposures to personnel at levels exceeding DoD recommendations are likely to have occurred. In response to the State of Arizona and US Environmental Protection Agency environmental concerns, the USAF withdrew the aircraft from commercial resale, quarantined them and, in April 2010, ultimately took extraordinary disposal measures and smelted the remaining fleet. It is estimated that approximately 1,500 service members, including aircrews and maintenance personnel were exposed to military herbicide-contaminated conditions on the C-123 aircraft; with many of these personnel, who now having health problems commonly associated with herbicide exposure and have endured lengthy legal struggles to prove these problems are service-related. The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, under Public Law 102-4, has statutory responsibility to accurately designate situations and locations that caused veterans to have been exposed to military herbicides used in Vietnam, as well as their contaminants.

Resolved, That: Vietnam Veterans of America, in light of the review of the data and scientific information available currently, has confirmed that post-Vietnam service aboard the C-123 led to dioxin exposure at about the same intensity as with ground troops from the Vietnam War. And, having secured expert scientific opinions as to the length and breadth of that exposure; urges the Department of Veterans Affairs to promptly designate the C-123K aircraft, used after the Vietnam War in the United States during 1972 to 1982, as having been Agent Orange exposure sites to permit the approximately 1,500 veterans who were aircrew or maintenance personnel to be eligible for Agent Orange-related benefits.

Further, in light of the inaction by both the United States Air Force and the Department of Veterans Affairs in ameliorating the present situation encountered by these approximately 1,500 veterans; VVA will also advocate with the United States Congress for the introduction of enabling legislation that would grant presumptive herbicide exposure status to US servicemembers who served in the units cited above. 

VA Cheats On Toxicologists' Expert Evidence - defies 8th & 9th Circuit Courts!

In its energetic denial of claims for service connection regarding C-123 Agent Orange exposures, Compensation & Pension's director dismisses expert findings provided about C-123 veterans by some of the field's leading toxicologists. 

The director explained to PVARO that as toxicologists, these scientists lacked medical credentials to establish medical nexus. C&P perhaps passed over the fact that medical nexus was not the issue but EXPOSURE was, medical nexus not being a veteran's responsibility to establish if claiming an Agent Orange presumptive illness. When arguing against veterans, however, VA has no trouble citing toxicologists as experts! 

     VA's own toxicologists are welcome to oppose veterans' claims - but unacceptable to VA in presenting veterans' claims? This VA perspective defies logic.

     In any case, C&P was in error in dismissing the toxicologists' findings. I refer readers to Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. Decided by the 8th Circuit in 2006, the Court decided that  toxicologists are allowed to testify that exposure to a certain chemical is the cause of particular injuries. While I respect C&P's dedication in preventing our claims' approval, it is misplaced fervor. 

      It is also inappropriate and discriminatory, failing to permit the applicable portions of the 1991 Agent Orange Act, Title 38 CFR and other promulgations of Agent Orange and veterans issues protect C-123 veterans. VA's verbal shell

game, switching exposure discussed by the scientists with medical nexus which was not addressed by them, was meant to confuse and misdirect. In fact, toxicologists are uniquely QUALIFIED to address questions of toxin exposure. Here, especially, with several federal agencies as well as the most reputable scientists in their field offering findings in our favor. For whatever reason C&P felt appropriate, they did not address but ignored the MEDICAL opinions provided by physicians to better doom the claims.

     

      In a decision earlier this year, the 9th Federal District found in Whitlock v. Pepsi Americas that such baseless dismissal of expert testimony of toxicologists and chemists regarding exposure issues was an an abuse of discretion by lower courts, and presumably, decision-making bodies such as VAROS making such blanket dismissals would also be illegal.

     I am not sure of the law, but if a federal court cannot

freely disregard expert testimony of toxicologists and chemists addressing exposure questions without earning criticism for abuse of discretion, I cannot imagine greater privilege in doing so by the Department of Veterans Affairs, especially when those opinions are from other federal agencies with the statutory responsibility for determining issues of toxicological exposure. 

     The National Academies Press "Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence: Third Edition" (2011) provides an excellent narration of the generally accepted role of toxicology in addressing exposure questions and the acceptance of toxicological testimony in legal proceedings.

      C&P is skilled and creative in preventing fair and legal evaluation of C-123 veterans' exposure claims, but I ask that VA consider actually basing our claims on law and science, not individuals' preferences.

     Finally, as many BVA citations such as 0634583 and 1110601 make clear, the VA itself has no reservations using VA's own toxicologists in making claims determinations regarding exposures. Is the C&P' suggestion that veterans can't be protected by expert toxicologists' evidence but the VA is free to do take advantage of their professional qualifications necessary to deny claims? 

    It is also amusing (no...actually it hurts!) that VA BVA decisions frequently dismiss PHYSICIAN evidence from veterans because the doctor lacks toxicological expertise - but here C&P opts to dismiss toxicologists instead! Anything to deny a claim. Are they making up the rules as they go along??

Coverup in the Desert - USAF destroyed evidence of veterans' Agent Orange exposure!

Subject: Destruction of Evidence?

The question has surfaced in Washington about the manner in which the Air Force came to decide to destroy the dioxin-contaminated C-123 aircraft, then in desert surplus storage in 2010. The C-123 veterans, exposed during our decade of flying the toxic C-123 fleet, need an opinion  as to what we should make of it, being from our impression a situation involving destruction of evidence? How can the AF misdeeds which affect our veterans’ exposure claims be categorized, because the airplanes were destroyed with the specific objective of preventing our claims?

We have located a set of AF papers via FOIA from Davis-Monthan AFB dealing with the toxic planes, which had been stored at Davis-Monthan AFB AZ since 1982 once we'd retired them to the desert.

One of the attention-grabbing points is the AF statement that their analysis of the EPA fines, which might be leveled for improper storage of hazardous/toxic materials, could reach $3.4 billion. There was also memo discussion of hosting Arizona EPA inspections but routing inspectors around the special fenced HAZMAT quarantine area into which the C-123s had been moved. The item that most offends veterans seems wrong to us but on what basis we can’t say.

Base officials had worried about these airplanes ever since 2000 when it became clear they could not be sold as surplus, not transferred to foreign governments, or even parted out for their very valuable engines.

Davis-Monthan solicited OSD’s suggestions about ridding themselves of the toxic C-123s. OSD concurred with AF understandings expressed in various memos that the airplanes could not be sold without enduring liability questions, even for parts such as avionics or engines, including on aircraft which had never been to Vietnam, and engines never unpacked from their storage wrappings.

OSD came to the conclusion that the aircraft needed to be destroyed to bring the issue to a conclusion. Base officials eventually found an EPA loophole which permitted toxic airplanes, which themselves should have been declared to the EPS, to be shredded into cell-phone sized scraps and then smelted, such waste being exempt from EPA hazardous labeling.

In a series of three memos to base officials, including the 505th Operations Officer, Major Carol McCrady, Dr. Al Young reviewed the situation, described an article about the stored airplanes which was published in Orion Magazine, and explained that visibility of the situation could lead to the already-exposed veterans turning to the VA for what he called “presumptive compensation.”

Mr. Buddy Boor then summarized in his position paper the Air Force options, and reiterated Young’s warning that the veterans might learn of the exposure and turn to the Department of Veterans Affairs for “presumptive compensation.” This recommendation traveled upstream to the Air Staff for its eventual approval.

OSD had stressed the need to minimize media attention. OSD recommended that base Public Affairs prepare a press release in case of media inquiry. OSD helped with

various editing cycles, eliminating words like “dioxin” and “Agent Orange’ and other attention-grabbing terms. 

Finally, OSD congratulated the Air Force on minimizing media attention – which was completely non-existent. C-123 veterans worry about the role of this OSD consultant, who describes us as "trash-haulers, freeloaders" for whom he has no respect but would have respect if we'd earned Purple Hearts. 

Well, our membership has plenty of Purple Heart Medals, POW Medals, Air Medals, Distinguished Flying Cross Medals, Bronze Star Medals, Aviator wings, parachute wings, Combat Infantry Badge and others - OSD should have checked before publicly disparaging us. He has his merits but we believe OSD's consultant isn't the right person to have a role in guiding the Air Force in preventing our access to VA medical care.

 What can be done to classify the wrong described here? To us it seems that this is destruction of evidence of our having been exposed. 

It is an inappropriate destruction of evidence by the AF to prevent our claims succeeding with the Department of Veterans Affairs. Obstruction of justice? Bad attitude? Nothing? Eliminating the airplanes has resulted in the Secretary of Veterans Affairs claiming that only two out of four airplanes tested positive for dioxin in 1996, when in fact 14 of 17 did. And it kept the AF from being able to more closely examine the toxic planes in subsequent studies, in particular the 2012 Consultative Report from the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine – the absence of test data led the AF to conclude they had no way to firmly conclude whether or not aircrews were exposed, and upon that indecision VA somehow based its interpretation of the AF report.

This hurt us. The Air Force has a legitimate interest in protecting present and future employees and military personnel, but it has no role in taking actions to prevent already-exposed veterans from turning to the VA for benefits. We feel the AF had a duty to inform us of the exposure, yet the question never arose until mentioned in the distribution memo from the Deputy Surgeon General of the Air Force when he mentioned there would be no notice so as to “prevent undue distress” to the veterans. 

We indeed have experienced distress.

 How can we describe these bad acts? What laws were violated? What OSHA regulations (if OSHA is applicable) were violated? Can we do anything about this?