Report: Scientists Confirm Veterans C-123 Agent Orange Exposure

There are two foundations for C-123 veterans’ Agent Orange claims (legal and scientific) and we’re going to look into the scientific basis. But first the legal: under the 1991 Agent Orange Act, and the Federal Register of 8 May 2001, all veterans exposed to military herbicides will be treated the same as are Vietnam veterans.

The Basis for C-123 Agent Orange Veterans Claims 

The C-123 aircraft were contaminated with Agent Orange following their Ranch Hand spraying operations during Vietnam, and aircrews, maintenance and aerial port personnel after the war were exposed while flying and maintaining the toxic airplanes between 1972-1982. Agent Orange, especially in the earlier years of the Vietnam War, was contaminated with dioxin, also known as TCDD. TCDD is a known carcinogen, and considered the most toxic of the toxins. Not a good thing in our airplanes!

Exposure to a toxin such as TCDD is via inhalation, ingestion or dermal routes. C-123 veterans experienced all three routes, but base claims on dermal exposure and inhalation. Generally, dioxin exposure is most readily via ingestion, then inhalation, then dermal routes.

In 1979 Air Force testing first confirmed the presence of “military herbicides” on the C-123, although no testing was completed for dioxin. The first comprehensive scientific testing of that same C-123 was fifteen years later in 1994 at the Air Force Museum, where the warplane was found to be “heavily contaminated” and “a danger to public health” by the Air Force toxicologists Drs Ron Porter and Wade Weisman. Using standard hexane wipes, they detected high levels of dioxin on all test surfaces, and consequently mandated HAZMAT protection for museum personnel working around that airplane until decontamination, which required three attempts, was decontaminated.

The 1994 Porter/Weisman data was joined by test results on airplanes stored at the Air Force boneyard in Arizona, where tests were completed between 1999 and 2009. These tests continued to show the toxicity of the warplanes, although degrading over time since the last Agent Orange spray missions completed in 1971.  Air samples were generally acceptable and wipes continued to report dioxin contamination.

Unable to justify decontamination of the aged airplanes and forced to address their disposal in some manner, the Air Force ordered all C-123s destroyed as toxic waste in 2010. At that point no further testing was possible, although two former spray aircraft used as museum displays may someday be examined (Pima Air Museum, AZ and the AF Museum at Warner-Robins AFB, GA). 

Thus, only the testing data already existent is available to analysis. When the veterans learned of the C-123 contamination via the Freedom of Information Act results in 2011, their inquiries to the Department of Veterans Affairs were immediately, and apparently without any even-handed analysis, rebuffed with VA insistence that the airplanes could not have exposed the veterans.

The veterans, convinced by the 1994 Air Force test results, turned to recognized experts in universities and government agencies to find confirmation of their exposure.

The first of these was Dr.Fred Berman of Oregon Health Sciences University Toxicology Program. Berman, himself a licensed pilot, examined the results of Porter/Weisman and concluded veterans were exposed. Addressing the Secretary of Veterans Affairs Dr. Berman wrote:

“It is my professional opinion that…aircrew veterans who flew these aircraft in the same time period)were exposed to harmful levels of dioxin in the course of aircrew duties. I opine that exposure was intense, and long-term, and that cited illnesses are as likely as not to be associated with the aircraft's dioxin contamination.”

Berman had earlier participated in a teleconference between scientists, VA staff and veterans on the issue of C-123 exposure, and in his independent expert opinion dismissed the VA’s contention that the “dried dioxin” on the aircraft could not have exposed the aircrew. In particular, he noted that there was no support in scientific literature for precluding exposure to dry, or surface dioxin, and that two of the authors cited by the VA had themselves stated their articles did not address aircrew exposure and were not relevant to that issue. 

Dr. Jeanne Stellman was also consulted by the C-123 veterans, and she, too, provided an in-depth analysis of their exposure. Dr. Stellman is world-famous in dioxin issues, a decades-long focus of her professional career in public health. Her conclusion paralleled that of Dr. Berman. She confirmed their exposure in her message to the veterans:

“There is every likelihood that you would have been exposed to both airborne herbicides and their contaminants, as well as come into contact with surfaces contaminated by these toxic substances.” “In my opinion, it is highly likely that you and other crewmembers were exposed to the herbicides and to their highly toxic contaminant,2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (dioxin, for short), although it is not possible to estimate the precise levels of exposure because of the failure of the Air Force to carry out proper assessments of contamination levels prior to assigning the contaminated aircraft to post-Vietnam military operations.”

Dr. Stellman also concluded C-123 veterans were exposed more than ground soldiers were in Vietnam, and somewhat less than aircrews in the wartime Agent Orange spray operations. She strongly and directly criticized the VA’s “dry dioxin transfer” position (which VA used to argue against the veterans’ exposure) by writing, “These statements, to be blunt, are technically flawed and show insufficient understanding of surface contamination. Concerned about the poor science procedures followed by the VA, and acting on behalf of fifteen of her physician and scientific colleagues, Dr. Stellman wrote the Under Secretary of Veterans Affairs to challenge the government’s position on C-123 veterans.

Further support for the veterans’ exposure claims was offered by the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Deputy Director Dr. Tom Sinks, whose opinion was later joined by that of the ATSDR Dr. Christopher Portier, confirmed the C-123 exposures. While lamenting the paucity of available testing data, Dr. Sinks, and later Dr. Portier, wrote:

“I believe that aircrew operating in this, and similar, environments were exposed to TCDD.”Considering the dioxin concentration, they wrote “This average value exceeds the Army (Technical Guide 312) screening level by182 times and is equivalent to a 200-fold greater cancer risk than the screening value.”

Further agreement with the veterans’ claims to have been exposed were provided by Dr. Wayne Dwernychuk, retired chief scientist of the Hatfield Group, the leading engineering and environmental group specializing in Agent Orange. Dr. Dwernychuk concurred with the findings of Berman and Stellman, and the ATSDR, and using the VA’s preferred language reported the group of C-123 veterans “is more likely than not to have been exposed.” Dwernychuk in addition, particularly challenged the statement used by the VA's director of Compensation and Pension in denying a veterans’ exposure claim, where the government stated “there is no conclusive evidence that TCDD exposure causes adverse health effects”. “This statement I find blatantly disingenuous” wrote Dr. Dwernychuk.

Among the physicians examining the C-123 exposure issue are Dr. Arnold Schecter, professor of medicine at the University of Texas Medical School. Dr. Schecter is perhaps America’s leading physician specializing in Agent Orange, and offered his opinion:

“There is no doubt in my mind, as a physician who has studied Agent Orange and dioxin in Vietnam and in the USA since 1981 that you have had, as a result of your work in the military, to above background exposure to TCDD from work in fixed wing aircraft previously used for Agent Orange spraying missions.” “In my professional opinion you are at increased risk for illness from the dioxin in Agent Orange because of your exposure to it from your military service.”

The US Public Health Service also reviewed the C-123 Agent Orange issue, and Dr. Aubrey Miller’s expert finding on behalf of that agency was:

“Regarding the association between dermal exposure and effects that seems to have been a matter of some dispute, it is my opinion that the scientific evidence is clear. Dermal exposures, including exposures to contaminated equipment or secondary exposures through contaminated clothing, tools, vehicles, etc. could result in absorption that would be problematic.”

Another expert offering her careful review of the exposure issue is Dr. Linda Birnbaum, Director of the National Institutes of Health/National Toxicology Program. Her opinion:

“According to the narrative, exposure is assumed based on wipe-tests demonstrating high dioxin concentrations in the C-123K's. While contact with the aircraft results in exposure to dioxins, the magnitude of these exposures is uncertain.”

Each of these authorities has volunteered their independent expert opinions and findings, while the VA position against veterans’ exposure was written by staffers assigned to do so as part of their jobs. 

Observers might compare the CVs of the VA staff to those of the independent experts...those writing for the VA are hard to even find, if at all, in Google Scholar while the independent experts, like Shecter, Birnbaum and Stellman, total hundreds of pages of CV references and thousands of pages of scholarly contributions to this field. Isn't it clear...people opposed by the senior scholars of their profession! Imagine a court setting with opposing "experts" and the obvious differences between them...no court would fail to side with the veterans, and indeed, no BVA will fail to award service connection for a C-123 veteran but we simply don't have the years waiting for BVA justice!

Supporting the C-123 veterans’ claim to have been exposed aboard the toxic C-123 fleet are federal agencies such as the EPA, NIH and CDC, and prestigious universities and independent experts. The scientists named here have stressed to the veterans that they’re not advocates for one view or another, but instead neutral observers whose opinions are based on the science involved, not the politics. And the veterans note that gives their conclusion about exposure even more weight.

The C-123 veterans ask the VA to yield on its predetermined disqualification of these airman from Agent Orange medical care. Congressmen and senators are asked to stress to the VA our complete qualification under the law for the care we desperately need for our Agent Orange illnesses.

(note: source documents for each issue dealt with are downloadable from www.c123kcancer.blogspot.com)

-- http://youtu.be/JtFQ1svAp

CDC Stands Up For C-123 Veterans on Agent Orange Exposure

In January 2012 we received an opinion confirming our Agent Orange exposure on the C-123s from the ATSDR, part of the Center for Disease Control.. This was a big step for us, giving scientific as well as federal agency merit to our claims with the VA. The Army operates the Joint Services Records Research Center to advise the VA on veterans claims and whether official documentation exists to support them, It has been responding to VA inquiries with negative answers. 

This letter of 6 March 2013 was requested by the JSRRC from the CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to clarify further their initial finding letter about that aircraft were contaminated and our veterans exposed---and without any reservation ATSDR again said YES in this letter to JSRRC authorities. This time, to make sure their point was clear, the ATSDR director himself rammed their point home...which was, the C-123 veterans were exposed...heavily!

Unfortunately, VA advised Wes Carter and Marlene Wentworth during our meeting them at Compensation Services on 28 February 2013 that no such information from US Government agencies is acceptable in the VA's evaluation of veterans' Agent Orange exposure claims. This flows from the VA's earlier determination by its Health Benefits Administration forbidding C-123 claim approvals - the VA has implemented a policy that there actually was no exposure to Agent Orange by any veteran, including Ranch Hand and others with "boots on the ground" excepting only those with diagnosed chloracne. A recent addition of "bioavailability" to VA requirements means, because no veteran other than those with chloracne can prove individual bioavailability, therefore no veteran has ever been "exposed" in the VA's perspective.

Still, this and other documents certainly spell success in other forums such as the Board of Veterans Appeals and federal court. So take heart...not everyone in government is determined to deny us quality VA medical care (which I'm blessed with for the next two weeks here in Seattle), and thank God for men like Dr. Portier who lends his professionalism to our cause!

Domenic Baldini

Chief, Joint Services Records

Research Center US Army

Records Management and

Declassification Agency

Dear Mr. Baldini:

On January 25, 2012, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) sent the

attached letter to Wesley T. Carter, USAF Retired. Major Carter had contacted ATSDR seeking

an opinion about his potential exposure to 2,3,7,8 tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) while

flying C-123 aircraft from 1972-1982. The letter represented the opinion of ATSDR and our

subject matter experts.

The ATSDR letter to Major Carter included several important findings. Information contained

within parentheses have been added for explanation:

• ATSDR calculated an average value of 6.36 ng TCDD/100 cm squared

for the three C-123 interior the wipe samples three collected on November 20, 1994. 

This calculation was based on information from a consultative letter from Capt Wade Weisman

 & Ronald Porter (see footnote 3 in correspondence to Major Carter).

• This value is 182 times higher than the screening value established by the United States

Army Center for health Promotion and Preventive Medicine — Technical Guide 312.

(see footnote 2 in correspondence to Major Carter.) [Levels below a screening value are

often considered acceptable. Levels above the screening value are often considered

unacceptable because of an associated health risk.]

• ATSDR pointed out that the average value of the three wipe samples represented a 200-

fold excess cancer risk above the screening value established by the Department of the

Army.

• ATSDR stated that the office worker scenario used in Technical Guide 312 likely

underestimates the daily exposures of Air Force flight personnel inside confined

contaminated aircraft but that this depends upon exposed skin surface area, duration of

exposure, hand washing, and food intake as well as airborne dust].

• ATSDR stated that TCDD levels on-board contaminated planes were likely higher in

1972-1982 than in 1994 when samples were taken.

• ATSDR stated that it could not exclude inhalation for ingestion] exposures to TCDD

while working on contaminated aircraft.

• Based upon the available information. ATSDR concluded that aircrew operating in this,

and similar, environments were exposed to TCDD.

I hope this information is useful. Please contact XXX  if you have any questions.

/signed/

ChristopherJ. Portier, P.h.D.

Director, National Center, and Environmental Health and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

VA Director Compensation & Pension Service Slams C-123 Vets

Tom Murphy, VA Director of Compensation Services

"Claim Denied!" "Veteran submitted a few documents." Thus did Mr. Thomas Murphy, Director of Compensation Service for the VA fulfill his organizational duty of automatically denying a C-123 veteran's claim, no mater how justified the clam actually is. Thank you for your service, indeed!

The particular claim in question, one of our first C-123 claims, had over 80 supporting documents. Articles from medical journals detailing identical situations. Letters from physicians and scientists offering expert independent opinions. Sworn testimony of other veterans, including unit commanders, field grade officers, flight examiners and instructors, senior NCOs, fellow veterans. Treatment records from VA, military and civilian hospitals. Lots of stuff. And all of it, no matter how much of it, no matter what the science, all of it not enough.

Never enough to overcome the VA's knee-jerk automatic rejection of any dioxin exposure claim by every veteran outside those with Boots on the Ground in Vietnam, and some minor and very specific Thailand and Korea situations. For C-123 veterans, the full weight and majesty of the VA swings into action to immediately construct barriers to justice and medical treatment. To explain, even in the face of proof, why there is no proof. To explain even, even with dozens of non-VA experts and other federal agencies claiming veterans were exposed, why there was no exposure.

Why? "Because we say so!"

Duty to Assist? Benefit of the doubt to rest with the veteran? Again, no. Never. The VA, in two years of working with us, has done absolutely nothing to seek confirming evidence or opinions as the question of  C-123 veterans' exposure came to light. Not once have they ever introduced or admitted to a single fact which could be interpreted as supportive of C-123 veterans' claims. Every citation they have offered in their "scientific" bulletins has been to deny exposure claims. Every single reference, expert, whatever that supports the veterans' claims has been ignored. They probably had a struggle admitting that there ever were C-123 airplanes and people who flew them! "What? C-123? Never heard of it? Thank you for your service.

There is not a single scientific or academic journal which would accept such shoddy work from authors seeking publication of an obviously slanted article! Any reputable journal would demand a juried review, and that panel of independent experts would condemn using their loudest megaphone the lack of even-handed, scholarly work in such materials. "Unscientific" was the description offered by independent scientists. "Not dioxin experts" was the description offered by another federal agency's head after careful investigation...and that person is a dioxin expert!

Any benefit of the doubt? Never, not when the VA's nuclear-powered mission focusses denying veterans' claims, even when such claims are within the scope of their judgement. The benefit of the doubt to the VA means that if there is any possible way to reject claims, that way must be seized upon. The benefit of the doubt to the VA means that unless compelled by law, ordered by Congress, only those veterans specifically named in the law are covered, not those whom the law may allow to be interpreted as covered - and so the VA exercises every possible twist and turn, obfuscation, delay, evidence misinterpretation, denial of truth handed them on a golden platter - all to prevent C-123 veterans from getting medical attention for our Agent Orange illnesses.


 Veterans Say:
-"It is my opinion that aircrews operating in this, and similar, environments were exposed to TCDD."
(Dr. Tom Sinks, Deputy Director, CDC/Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry)
- "It is my professional opinion that (veteran name withheld) (and likely, other aircrew veterans who flew these aircraft in the same time period) was exposed to harmful levels of dioxin." 

(Dr. Fred Berman, Oregon Health Sciences University Toxicology Department) 
- "Heavily contaminated. A danger to public health."
(Dr. Ron Porter, toxicologist, USAF Armstrong Laboratories)
- "In my opinion, it is highly likely that you and other crew members were exposed to the herbicides and to their highly toxic contaminant, 2,3,7,8- tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (dioxin, for short)," 

(Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Professor Emerita, Columbia University School of Public Health)

But VA Says:

- "No conclusive evidence that TCDD exposure causes any adverse health effects."
VA Compensation Services in claim denial)
- "TCDD is the most toxic of the dioxins, and is classified as a human carcinogen by the Environmental Protection Agency."
(VA Public Health Bulletin )
- "Claims will be decided on an individual basis."
VA Public Health Bulletin (however: 100% of claims denied -  0% approved, but on an "individual" basis, of course!)
- C-123 vets are "Trash-haulers. Freeloaders looking for a tax-free dollar. I have no respect."
(VA & USAF consultant on Agent Orange, email re: C-123 veterans; also recommended destruction of C-123 fleet to prevent veterans learning of C-123 contamination & crew exposure)

USAF C-123 Report Disputed! Key Evidence Reexamined!

USAFSAM C-123 Report

The May 2012 USAF School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) C-123 report, completed after several months of C-123 literature review and focused on the Agent Orange contamination so much of concern to veterans, has several fatal flaws.

Basically the report failed to confirm whether the C-123 contamination left veterans exposed. For some reason and without further foundation, the report then went on to state veterans were very unlikely to have been exposed.

Veterans who've been insisting we were exposed aboard the C-123 were quick to note that the report tried to focus on the 1994 Porter/Weisman toxicological survey of Tail #362 (Patches) at the Air Force Museum which the veterans had held up as proof of our exposure. That survey seemed quite clear - "heavily contaminated on all surfaces." The survey also directed that all personnel wear HAZMAT protection, so severe was the threat of dioxin exposure. These points and others seemed, to the veterans, adequate proof that Patches and the other C-123s were contaminated. These points were adequate proof that, since we flew in NOMEX flight suits and not HAZMAT protection from the dioxin,  we were in fact exposed.

Not so, said the report. In a twisted effort to prevent allowing the veterans to claim exposure, the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine insisted that Weisman/Porter applied to museum restoration workers only. USAFSAM insisted that the tasks of museum restoration workers could lead to dioxin exposure but somehow - the work of aerial port, maintenance and aircrew wouldn't.

So, the veterans looked at the kind of work done by restoration workers, and even sought advice about such activities from experts at the Museum of the United States Air Force and restoration workers at the Evergreen Aviation Museum in McMinnville Oregon, home of the famous Spruce Goose and dozens of other aircraft.

But the tasks are virtually identical! Grinding, loading, unloading, painting, welding, scraping, corrosion control. assembly, disassembly, and so forth. The veterans did many more activities, all of which further exposed them to the C-123 dioxin residue. In fact, the Porter/Weisman report clearly proves that veterans were exposed! And remember - veterans were exposed much longer than restoration workers who finished their tasks quickly, and veterans were exposed to dioxin which was far "fresher" during our decade of flight than in 1994 when Porter/Weisman was completed. Several senior NCOs and officers provided sworn statements that effect.

The questions must arise - why was the USAFSAM report seemingly so thorough, yet so flawed?

 1. The first obvious answer is that the Air Force, having discovered a situation in 1994 concerning exposure of veterans 1972-1982, had failed to inform the veterans we'd been exposed. Instead, in 1996 and just two years after the Museum survey, the Air Force Office of Environmental Law directed all information about C-123 Agent Orange contamination be kept "in official channels only, 

2. The second answer is that some C-123s had already been sold to Walt Disney Films, and the Air Force would have been embarrassed with that becoming widely known. 

3. The third answer is that many contaminated C-123s had been sold by the Air Force Security Assistance Center to Thailand and South Korea, thus potential embarrassment  to the USAF and the State Department.  Contemporary memos stressed the political implications and the need to minimize publicity about the contamination.

4. The USAF and Office of Secretary of Defense were sensitive to the public concern raised by an article by Prof Ben Quick which addressed the C-123 contamination.  The USAF and Office of Secretary of Defense corresponded frequently about the need to destroy the stored C-123s and do do so quietly, with carefully worded press releases in the event the destruction became known, because C-123 veterans might learn about their exposure and seek VA benefits. It is highly inappropriate for the government to take any such action which would in any way keep veterans from seeking VA service-connected medical care. The words "cover up" come to mind but clumsy would be a better description of the secret C-123 destruction issue.

 5.  Learning of the C-123 dioxin contamination, the USAF acted to cancel private sales but already planes had been sold. Dr. Ron Porter, a USAF toxicology expert had to testify in a federal court to confirm the "hazardous" surfaces and the need for personnel to wear HAZMAT protection in the USAF Museum. Dr. Ron Porter testified under oath confirming the dioxin contamination of the C-123 was, as per his Porter/Weisman survey, hazardous to the public. He made no reference as to his survey applying only to USAF museum staff.

6.  The USAFSAM C-123 report report failed to reference many current documents and opinions, such as from Dr. Jeanie Stellman, Dr. Ron Porter, Dr. Joe Goeppner and others. The  USAFSAM report cited, in several cases, research reports over thirty years old.

7. In an incredulous statement, USAFSAM reported that, even if the C-123 was contaminated, veterans weren't likely to be exposed. That statement is doubly-flawed. In all previous situations government agencies have basically concluded that measurable contamination equals exposure via one or more of the exposure pathways (ingestion, inhalation, dermal contact). In this report, however, USAF implies a point above which exposure occurs and at that point and below, no harm results from that exposure. The statement is further flawed in concluding veterans weren't exposed, and fails to weigh properly the Army TG312 and the CDC/ATSDR findings that the aircraft contamination of dioxin exceeded both US domestic as well as international standards. The C-123 was also contaminated past the safe reentry standards set by the State of New York, relied on throughout all levels of government as a "gold standard."

VA & Air Force Both Miscalculate C-123 Exposure!

This is basic toxicology: The routes of exposure to dioxin contamination are: 
(a)oral 
(b)inhalation 
(c)dermal
(d)all the above, simultaneously

A. Both the VA and the AF reports which address C-123 aircrew dioxin incorrectly dismiss oral exposure to the dioxin which contaminated our C-123 aircraft, even though all aircrew must have had oral exposure from hands touching faces, eating aboard the aircraft, etc. In an approach new to science, and immediately criticized by recognized experts throughout the fields of toxicology and epidemiology, the AF and VA suggest that for the first time, contamination does not equate to exposure!

B. Both the VA and the AF reports incorrectly dismiss inhalation exposure to the dioxin which contaminated our C-123 aircraft. Although the 1979 and 1994 tests, among others, did not assess air samples, later tests did and showed only some C-123's contaminated enough to permit low-levels of inhalation exposure. Let's not forget (although both AF and VA reports ignore the fact!) that no air samples were taken until nearly forty years AFTER we started flying these aircraft...and air contamination must have been much more intense in the earlier years, even though both VA and AF ignored that fact.

C. Both the VA and the AF reports then incorrectly dismiss dermal exposure to the dioxin which contaminated our C-123 aircraft. Both agencies erroneously suggest that the skin is a near-perfect barrier to exposure...what the VA invented a new concept of "dry dioxin transfer" to address. But...

• no attention is paid by either agency to the fact that the C-123 had no sanitary facilities
• no attention is paid by either agency to the fact that aircrew, maintenance and aerial port personnel worked in a sweaty, oily, dusty environment, usually for long duty periods, without being able to wash
• no attention is paid to the fact that virtually every other scientfiic resource dealing with dioxin considers surface contamination to equal dermal exposure - because the skin is NOT a near-perfect barrier to dioxin as erroniously suggested by VHA
• no attention is paid in either agency's report to the fact that vibration while aloft greatly agitated dust particles and encouraged thereby inhalation, ingestion, and dermal exposure
• no attention is paid to the fact that aircrew worked in every area of the aircraft during missions
• no attention is paid to the fact that aircrew frequently slept overnight aboard the aircraft during tactical deployments

And a brand-new observation arises when we read peer-reviewed articles about dioxin, such as Dr John Doull's "Acceptable Levels of Dioxin Contamination in an Office Building Following a Transformer Fire, published by the National Research Council and cited by many subsequent writers, including Wade Weisman and Ron Porter as they conducted the 1994 contamination study of Patches at the Air Force Museum.

Doull makes the point that exposures can be cumulative, and can be simultaneous (dermal at the same time as inhalation and ingestion). If exposures are simultaneous such as while aboard the C-123, Doull states "the associated risks will increase by a factor of 2 with the assumption of a linear dose-response relation at low doses." Both the AF and VA reports ignore the fact of our simultaneous and cumulative exposure to dioxin!

The VA and Air Force reports dealing with C-123 dioxin contamination are faulty in many respects, most importantly because they clearly were written with the predetermined objective of dismissing any possibility of aircrew exposure. They are faulty also in their unscientific assumptions - and it is obvious that while every assumption made is to deny exposure possibility, no assumptions are made which admit that possibility. These reports ignored outside scientific experts, such as those at Columbia University and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, who already postulated that aircrews were "most likely" exposed. Thus we have one government agency (ATSDR) diametrically opposed to two others VA and AF).

The VA report on the C-123 was issued first, and the Air Force report then followed and piggy-backed on much of the VA material. The VA then re-issued their report citing the Air Force! Science does not progress when one report cites the other which cites the first! Absurd! Almost as absurd as Dr. Al's article in which he cites himself ten or twelve times in the recent AMSUS publication. There, he denies dioxin exposure issues by citing the authority of having previously denied it himself!

There is much to learn about C-123 aircrew exposure to dioxin as presented by the Veterans Administration and the US Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine. Unfortunately, these two reports are too slanted to take on their face and subsequent peer-reviewed articles can be expected to correct their deficiencies.

Only Safe Way to Fly the C-123

MANDATED Hazmat Protection for C-123 Personnel
Davis-Monthan AFB (AF photo)
 (note: airplanes still poisoned 29 years after last spray missions!)

According to the Air Force in 2000, this shows the only safe way to fly the C-123 following determination that the planes remained contaminated with dioxin and their years spraying Agent Orange in Vietnam.

Please remember that the Air Force considered the C-123 fleet "extremely dangerous" and "a danger to public health" and "heavily contaminated" right up to the point that the first veteran's VA claim was filed...suddenly, perhaps by VA magic wand or by clicking our little red heels together and making a wish, all the poison went away. We can trust the VA, right?

Here is our own design of the follow-on flight suit for C-123 aircrew:

New VA Update Denies C-123 Dioxin Exposure

In their most recent Internet posting, the VA jumps onboard with the Air Force in reasserting the claims they've made that flying contaminated airplanes did not result in our exposure to the dioxin inside those airplanes!

Folks, this is not new science or new research. Instead, both the VA and the AF have merely reviewed earlier documents which themselves confirmed the "heavily contaminated" dioxin-laden C-123 fleet. Caving to political and financial pressure, the report writers labored hard to wordsmith away veterans' ability to claim Agent Orange exposure. However, every university that has investigated the situation confirms our exposure to Agent Orange. The deputy director of the CDC's Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry also confirms our exposure, opining that we flew aircraft which were 200-times more toxic than safe standards!

1. I believe the Air Force is sensitive to the fact that they failed to protect aircrews, and failed inform veterans who'd flown the C-123 once the danger was known.
2. I believe the Air Force and State Department are sensitive to the fact that the AF sold dioxin-contaminated aircraft to Thailand and South Korea before the range was known.
3. I believe the AF is sensitive to the fact that several aircraft were sold as surplus, including some to Walt Disney films, which were contaminated with dioxin.
4. I believe the VA and USAF are sensitive to the potential cost of medical care for Agent Orange-exposed aircrew and maintenance veterans.
5. I believe the AF report is flawed in many ways, including its failure to properly assess exposure via dioxin-laden dust, failure to properly assess the level of contamination and crew exposure in the years before the first tests were conducted,  and is flawed in their obvious effort to downplay the possibility of veterans' exposure below the "as likely to as not" VA threshold. This report, not even signed by the researchers, tries to whitewash the damning description made by earlier AF scientists who themselves conducted the original dioxin test on the aircraft, and under oath described the C-123 "a danger to public health."

Having trouble viewing this email? View it as a Web page. Veterans Health Administration Update: AGENT ORANGE

Agent Orange residue on C-123 planes post-Vietnam The U.S. Air Force’s recent risk assessment report (April 27, 2012) found that potential exposures to Agent Orange in C-123 airplanes used after the Vietnam War were unlikely to have put aircrew or passengers at risk for future health problems. Download the report for the full findings. (PDF) VA’s Office of Public Health also concluded in its review of all related scientific information, including the Air Force report, that the risk of herbicide exposure was very low and therefore, the risk of health problems is minimal. We will review any new scientific information that becomes available.

Bad VA Decision - Now a "Notice of Disagreement"

(update 20 Dec 2014: still haven't heard from VA after two and a half years waiting)

Last week's expected (yet disappointing) VA denial of the first of our veterans' Agent Orange claims gives momentum to our campaign. Rather than the issue sitting on some VA wonk's desk, it gets to the stage where a clarifying argument can be offered, and failing that, can progress to the Board of Veterans Appeals.

Here is the mechanism of this particular claim going forward (from the Vietnam Veterans of America web site). In this particular case, representation will be sought from the American Legion, given their national support and the local VSO's strengths.

How To Respond To The VA's Decision:

You do not help yourself if you simply dump a pile of loose records on the VA. Organize the records and explain their significance in a letter you and your representative prepare together. Once the VA regional office makes a decision with respect to your claim, you (and your service representative) will receive a notice of that decision which explains the reasons for the VA’s determination. Read the notice carefully and discuss it with your representative. Your appeal should address the specific reasons why the VA denied the claim or awarded a rating that is too low or an effective date that is too late.

The first step in appealing a claim is to send the VA regional office a "Notice of Disagreement " (NOD). There is no official NOD form. Generally, the NOD can be a written statement on VA Form 21-4138 (Statement in Support of Claim) or a letter that states that you disagree with the decision. Be sure to include in your NOD the date of the decision that you disagree with, which issues you disagree with and that you intend to appeal those issues. You have one year from the date of the VA’s notice of its decision to file your NOD with the VA regional office. If you miss this deadline, you can only reopen your claim based on new and material evidence or establishing that the VA denial was the product of clear and unmistakable error (which is very difficult to prove).

After the VA receives your NOD, you should receive a letter that acknowledges your NOD. You will be asked whether you wish to have your appeal sent to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA) in Washington, D.C., or whether you wish to have your claim reviewed on a de novo basis. The latter refers to the VA’s Decision Review Officer (DRO) program. This is an informal appellate process within the regional office. The DRO has the authority to reverse or modify a VA rating board decision. We recommend that you seek DRO review before you request a BVA appeal. The DRO process is frequently successful and is generally faster than going straight to the BVA. If you do not receive a better decision from the DRO, you can still appeal to the BVA.

Once the DRO has made a decision or has received your request for BVA consideration, the VA will issue a “Statement of the Case” (SOC). This document will explain the VA’s decision(s) in detail. You have 60 days from the date of the SOC to file your substantive appeal to the BVA on VA Form 9. (VA forms can be downloaded from the VA’s “Compensation” website. You can even apply for benefits online under “Vonapp” (Veterans Online Application)). Your appeal will then be certified and forwarded to the BVA.

Tucson Publishes Our Letter to Secretary Shinseki

VETERAN VERITAS

Advocacy for our Veterans

Letter To Secretary of Veterans Administration Regarding Agent Orange

By Michael Patrick Brewer         Wednesday, February 29th, 2012

 As is frequently said in my coterie of combat veteran friends, “Agent Orange, the gift that keeps on giving.” Friday, the National President of the Vietnam Veterans of America issued a public letter to the Secretary, endorsing the C-123 veterans' Agent Orange exposure claims and calling for prompt action in the face of convincing scientific proofs.

I will remind the reader, that one of the more elevated functions of blogging is to solicit more truth from a broader base than might be afforded in the dailies. If retired Major Wesley Carter, is on his game, than one could say that this topic is not much different than what the Marines have been dealing with at Camp Lejune with toxic water supplies. Truth is the first, and the last casualty of war.

The Honorable Eric K. Shinseki

Secretary of Veterans Affairs

810 Vermont Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20420

Dear Secretary Shinseki:

I chair our small group of veterans who flew and maintained the Fairchild C-123K “Provider” for ten years following the Vietnam War. These aircraft remained poisoned after spraying Agent Orange during the war, with dioxin intense enough to be labeled by Air Force scientists as “heavily contaminated” and “a danger to public health.” These aircraft should be designated Agent Orange Exposure Sites.

When we asked the Air Force and VA to investigate, we were instead given two press releases explaining that, while the aircraft “may” have been contaminated, there wasn’t enough TCDD left to likely cause long-term health problems for our veterans.

VA’s position was quickly challenged, in particular by Dr. Fred Bernam, director of the Toxicology Department of Oregon Health Sciences University and by Dr. J. Stellman of the School of Public Health at Columbia University. Further, on 26 January 2011, the deputy director of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry stated that our veterans were most likely exposed, and over a long time, and at a level about 200 times more likely to cause cancer. He also said our exposure was probably even more intense in the decade we flew, which was as much as 22 years before that first scientific testing. The ATSDR letter was certainly a game changer…how can VA possibly deny the authority of an ATSDR finding?

General, any observer would conclude that the VA’s threshold of probably has been well-met in our case. Our aircrews, maintenance personnel, flight nurses and medics have been exposed to dioxin, our parent service has confirmed this contamination and its danger, and the federal agency responsible for reaching the definitive conclusion about that has voiced their finding quite clearly. Any benefit of the doubt must rest in our favor, but there is little doubt left surrounding this issue.

We must ask that the Department withdraw its statements concerning the lack of TCDD contamination and the unlikelihood of personnel exposure. Outside scientists have called the VA’s preparation of their C-123 position “unscientific.” Some of the authors cited have specifically told VA that their works have no relation to aircrew exposure. Several of the authors cited insist aircrews have been exposed, and yet the inference of the VA reports is that the sum of evidence available speaks against a reasonable possibility of aircrew exposure.

That simply is not so. Yet, these statements discourage veterans from considering Agent Orange claims. The statements discourage VSOs from working on our claims, regardless of our proven legitimate eligibility for claiming TCDD exposure.

Benefit of the doubt is supposed to fall on the veteran’s side. We have exceeded the threshold of any reasonable benefit of the doubt, and indeed quite the opposite – there is very little doubt left about our being exposed.

As we understand it, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs can designate our aircraft (since destroyed by the USAF because of their contamination) as Agent Orange exposure sites. Please do so. If instead, some other action on your part leads to our veterans receiving medical care for their Agent Orange-presumptive illnesses, please bring us relief via that path instead.

As volunteer aircrews we willingly flew these older airplanes and accepted the extra hazards of flight inherent in them. The Army really needed these aircraft and their unique short-field capabilities, as we proved in several REFORGER exercises. Nobody knew about the contamination during the years we flew but certainly everyone knows now! Our duty was to fly, and now the VA’s duty is to address our medical concerns resulting from exposure to dioxin.

We’d be grateful for an opportunity to discuss this with you or a representative, but we’d be better served by your executive action in designating our old airplanes as Agent Orange hotspots so that we can proceed with fair evaluation of our claims.

And our claim, sir, is “Boots on the Airplane.”

Sincerely,

For the C-123 Veterans:

Wesley T. Carter, Major, USAF Retired
   www.c123agentorange.com 

Oregon Health Sciences University - NEW C-123 exposure confirmation

Today the Secretary of Veterans Affairs was sent an Independent Scientific Opinion from Oregon Health Sciences University. In this expert opinion, Dr. Fred Berman concludes that C-123 aircrews flew aboard aircraft were indeed contaminated as per the 1994 Air Force tests (Porter/Weisman), and that exposure occurred within these "heavily contaminated" airplanes!

Dr. Berman agrees that the VA's announcement dismissing our Agent Orange exposure claim was incorrect, and that aircrews "were more likely to than not" subjected to AO-presumptive illnesses caused by the dioxin exposure.

The VA has claimed there wasn't even any exposure! This is in denial of multiple Air Force tests, reviewed and accepted by other federal agencies and universities, all which say there WAS both exposure and crew contamination.

What's it take? Gold tablets from Heaven?

VA Releases "Scientific" Explanation of C-123 Dixoin Denials

Ever-eager to stomp our hopes into the ground, the VA on December 14 released an explanation of their investigation of the Agent Orange contamination of our C-123 aircraft and how they reached the determination that somehow, despite the aircraft contamination, we have not been exposed.

Readers with a scientific background will recoil in horror at this report being called "scientific". It is not. It was prepared with the predetermined objective of insuring a negative response to our exposure claims...and that ain't science, folks! Science requires being led where the facts take you, not cherry-picking data to make sure your report satisfies the boss.

Simply put their report is full of holes, not full of science.

It cites, first, a report prepared by then-Staff Sergeant Conway who inspected Patches in 1979. While respectful of all NCOs (I spent half of my career as one), I hesitate to base the health care of 1500 veterans upon the report of a 5-level NCO. Further, as confirmed by Prof. Jeanne Stellman of Columbia University's School of Public Health, that inspection did not test for dioxin. Well, duh...isn't that what this is all about?

Next, the VA cites the 1994 test on Patches at the AF Museum, but fails to note those toxicologists (Dr Ron Porter and Capt Wade Weisman) who determined that the airplane was "heavily contaminated" with dioxin. Dr Porter later testified in a federal court case that the C-123s were "a danger to public health." I think this rates another "duh".

The VA concludes by citing the 2009 Hill AFB report "Dioxin and Herbicide Characterization of UC-123K Aircraft - Phase I." However, to make sure their "research" properly reflects their predetermined conclusion, they do not mention that the author of that report himself insisted, on 26 October 2011, that no conclusions be drawn, one way or another, regarding aircrew exposure during 1972-1982! This is another solid "duh".

Finally, to reach for some scientific reason to bolster their denial of veterans' claims, the VA says because chemical wipes were required to release dioxin from the surfaces tested that implies flying personnel wouldn't have been exposed because of dermal protection. Guess these VA "scientists" forgot to read carefully the test protocols which later specified that water, not chemical, wipes would be used for testing. A final, solid "duh" called for here, right?

Good thing that the Armed Services are led by people with a sense of honor and intense dedication to doing their jobs right, rather than by civil servants who yield to their boss' dictating research results to insure veterans are denied well-earned benefits! And that's no duh!

Walkin' the Halls in Washington DC

I spent three days in Washington DC in an effort to work with veterans' organizations as well as to locate the decision maker on the recent VA memo about the C-123 Agent Orange issue.

Success on the first part. I first visited headquarters for the Vietnam Veterans of America. I was fortunate to be routed to their two Board of Veterans Appeals experts who were bewildered...and fascinated...by the VA's memo about us! They point out this is the first instance in which the VA has said a low threshold of Agent Orange should be acceptable regarding veterans' health. This is implied in their paragraph where the VA states that even if we have been exposed via dry dioxin transfer it wouldn't have been "enough" to affect our long-term health! Question...just how much dioxin is "enough"?

Following the VA meeting I traveled to the Disabled Veterans of America. While not as expert about Agent Orange as the Vietnam Veterans of America, they have a much larger staff and their dedication is obvious. The manager I worked with spent an hour with me going over the possible actions we can take.  He encouraged working with our congressional representatives to get an amendment to a veterans or defense act to include our "boots on the airplane" position, and offered to bring the issue to his legal staff for further development.

My last stop was with the Veterans of Foreign Wars. I was extremely disappointed with their lack of concern. Meeting me in their lobby without even the courtesy of an office visit, their representative said he was confused about Agent Orange issues himself, and had little guidance about it. Their focus is more on current veterans' issues, which I respect, but I told him that our group of 1500 deserves attention from both the VA and the VFW!  The sum of their "help" was that we should file our applications for veterans' benefits with their regional offices.

My last day was spent in the archives of the National Air Space Museum where their curators had arranged a collection of literature for me. Unfortunately, all of the highly technical materials were stored elsewhere and in transit to another location, leaving only their collection of popular literature. There was in this the best article I've found summarizing the life and career of the C-123, and I've posted it to our blog to download (34MG). Note: they don't have a C-123 in their collection,  but try not to hold that against them..this is still a great place to visit!

The interest from the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine has been gratifying! Their interest in getting to the bottom of the C-123 dioxin contamination is amazing and appreciated. Currently, their request to us is to help identify areas of the aircraft where our maintenance folks found that black "goop" which led to the 1979 inspection team from Warner-Robbins. They also want to find any remaining aircraft, such as the one at the Warner-Robbins museum, to conduct very detailed and more modern scientific testing. Folks, the Surgeon General of the AF hasn't let us down!